Ruled by Rumors in Iraq

FALLOUJA, Iraq -- Ali Karim is furious. He was told that President Bush wants the U.S. Army to kick everyone out of their homes, force them to live in tents and turn this volatile community west of Baghdad into a military camp.

Hussein Ali is angry too. He heard talk about America’s plan to install a king to rule Iraq. “Most of the people think that America will install a king because it is beneficial to Americans,” said Ali, 40, who owns a coffee shop. “We all oppose that. A lot of people will resist.”

Both men have grown to hate the Americans occupying their country, in part because they believe what they have heard.

After nearly three decades in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, where information was a tool the government used to help control the public, rumors remain a powerful force. Even as independent television, radio and newspapers are launched, there is a news vacuum that has helped give rumors nearly unprecedented credibility on the street.

With people hungry for clarity about the present and desperate for information about the future, rumors are frequently received as truth. But whether mundane or bizarre, street talk can cause very real problems. Rumors are fueling unrealistic expectations, undermining public confidence in the ability of the U.S. to rebuild the nation and riling an already agitated public.

It seems that the more outrageous the rumor, the more perilous the consequence.

In this conservative Sunni stronghold, for example, rumors spread that U.S. soldiers were using their night-vision goggles to spy on Muslim women. There were other stories of soldiers handing pornography to children. Irate Iraqis took to the streets, in part because of the rumors, in a wild demonstration in April that ended with U.S. troops fatally shooting at least 14 of them after soldiers say they were fired upon.

“These rumors affect the people in a negative way,” said Hamza Abbas Khalif, 49, a local baker who said he really isn’t sure what to believe. “They push people to use their weapons against Americans.”

Of course, the power of rumors is hardly unique to Iraq. Rumors have ruined reputations, sparked riots and undermined products the world over.

But in recent times, rumors have taken on added value in the Middle East, where angry and cynical populations are especially susceptible to outlandish ideas.

It is still widely held, for instance, that 4,000 Jews fled the World Trade Center before the Sept. 11 attacks. Before that, several Muslim leaders called for a ban on Pokemon products, based on a rumor that they were part of a Jewish conspiracy aimed at Muslim children.

But Iraq may stand alone in the way it institutionalized the study and use of rumors. Hussein clearly viewed them as a tool of power. His security services monitored and collected them. His intelligence services fabricated and spread them, according to former agents of his government and documents from that period.

Maan Izzat, 62, was an editor in the Ministry of Information. Every day without fail, Izzat said, Hussein would receive a report with details of the most prevalent rumors, as well as political jokes. That was his way of keeping his finger on the pulse of the people, and of knowing when to get tough.

“I can tell you,” he said, “the existence of the former regime was dependent on their knowing the rumors. What are the people thinking? It was very important for them to know what was in the minds of Iraqis.... Saddam was there because he knew what the Iraqi people were thinking.”

Rumors, power and control were inextricably intertwined, recalled Hani Samaraai, a specialist in character analysis who said he worked for the Iraqi intelligence service from 1982 until 1986 before turning to careers in business and art. The service often went to great lengths to spread ideas that would help the Hussein government, he said.

“The rumors were created ... to pacify the volcano of the people,” he said. “They tried to create rumors that appeared to be negative but would have a positive effect for the government.”

He said the government, for example, would start a rumor campaign telling people they would receive larger amounts of free food every month. Even if it didn’t happen, the government’s theory was that people would hold onto the hope anyway.

Izzat recalled one day in 1995 when a friend who worked for military intelligence stopped by his house and asked if he would come to the bar at the Meridian Hotel for conversation.

“I said, ‘Why are we doing this?’ ” Izzat recalled. “He said, ‘Don’t ask.’ ”

When they sat at the bar, Izzat said, his friend spoke to him in a loud, almost exaggerated voice. The topic was politics and the idea was to start a rumor. After some time, they made the 15-minute drive back to their neighborhood.

“We drove back and we heard people repeating the rumor,” Izzat said in an interview in his living room. “That is how powerful rumors are.”

While Hussein’s intelligence services were spreading rumors, his security service, which was a separate agency, was collecting them. Agents around Baghdad wrote daily reports that attempted to gauge the public mood by identifying rumors. Whereas Western politicians conduct opinion polls, Hussein relied on the secret police.

“They analyzed and collected the most credible rumors,” said Izzat’s son, Ahmed, 32, who worked in the security service until the government collapsed.

The Hussein government’s own files chronicle its commitment to using and monitoring rumors. A collection of those files for the year 1995 was found dumped outside the bombed, burned and looted security office headquarters in Al Karkh, the portion of Baghdad west of the Tigris River.

Bound with twine between two pieces of cardboard, the reports reflect the events of 1995. Iraq was suffering under sanctions imposed after its forces invaded Kuwait five years earlier. Food was in short supply because Iraqi officials had not yet agreed to participate in the United Nations oil-for-food program. When adopted at the end of the year, the program allowed the nation to sell oil to buy humanitarian supplies such as food and medicine.

Some of the rumors were simple.

Filed Nov. 4, from Mansour district: “The rumor is circulated among the people that it is the intention of the state to increase the salary of employees to 6,000 dinars.”

The document continued with an agent’s analysis: “This rumor aims to give hope and psychological comfort to the Iraqi people.”

Others bordered on the bizarre.

Filed Nov. 10, from Shoula district: “King Hussein of Jordan is related to Yitzhak Rabin,” the slain Israeli prime minister.

Analysis: “This rumor was launched after the participation of King Hussein in the funeral of Yitzhak Rabin when he submitted condolences to the wife of Rabin in an extraordinary way.”

Some rumors foreshadowed events that later took place, suggesting amazing coincidences, a decision by the government to follow public opinion or the strategic use of rumors in advance of controversial decisions.

On Nov. 18, 1995, for example, a rumor was reported that the government would begin issuing red military ID cards to all deserters, a practice that did begin in 1996. There were many deserters when Iraq invaded Kuwait, and all would now be embarrassed to carry what amounted to a scarlet letter.

At the same time, the public was very angry at the rising price of food. Hundreds of pages of reports noted this was a topic of constant discussion and concern. Suddenly a rumor started that the Revolutionary Command Council, the government’s top executive body, had issued a decree to punish all merchants who raised prices.

The analysis: “This rumor was launched because most of the people want to put an end to the increasing prices in the market.”

In time, punishment was meted out. Some merchants deemed to be guilty of price gouging were executed.

No one really knows where the current crop of rumors comes from -- whether they are planted by former government agents or a clever opposition party, or just arise spontaneously.

In this city about 35 miles west of Baghdad, at least one resident believes that former members of Hussein’s Baath Party are spreading the stories to create conflict with the Americans.

“Some of the bad people, former Baathists, are the ones creating the rumors,” said Dr. Ahmed Jasim, 35, who spoke in halting English because he said he was afraid that others on the street would overhear him if he spoke in Arabic.

U.S. officials in Iraq concede that their failure to get their own TV and radio stations up and running quickly hasn’t made their jobs any easier.

Rumors have dogged the American presence in Iraq from the moment U.S. forces helped pull down a statue of Hussein outside the Palestine Hotel, an event that has come to symbolize the collapse of the government.

Even among people who welcomed the dictator’s demise, there was a widespread belief that Baghdad fell without a huge battle because the Americans had cut a deal with Hussein. That was one of the first bits of “news” that began to convince a skeptical public that they were being tricked by the U.S.-led occupation forces.

“I think Saddam is an agent of America, 100%,” said Ahmed Azawi, 27, a barber in the upscale Mansour neighborhood.

Depending on one’s view, more recent rumors in Baghdad reflect a surprising degree of optimism for the future -- or unrealistic expectations. Many people said they had heard that when the U.S. resumed distribution of food rations Iraqis had received under the oil-for-food program, there would be a war dividend. Some expected the packages to include meat, cigarettes, cash -- even an iron, according to one rumor.

“One of my closest friends said they will give $150 to each family and that will be distributed with the food,” Munir Hassan, 36, a house painter, said a day before the distribution began this week.

But when the rations were handed out, the parcels included exactly what people had received before. That seemed to create disappointment, rather than relief at receiving food.

Now many people are saying that within days the U.S. will install a mobile telephone system. There has never been a cell phone network here, and most telephone service was knocked out by U.S. bombs and missiles.

“Today we heard there will be a new cell phone network,” said Mohammed Adnan, 31, Hassan’s business partner. “They brought it from Sweden and Kuwait and it is waiting at the border in Jordan.”

In fact, a cell phone system is soon coming to Iraq, but it is for the occupation administration, not the Iraqi people.

There are also rumors in Baghdad that U.S. soldiers are selling confiscated weapons at $50 apiece. In Fallouja, there is a widespread belief that U.S. forces killed more civilians than they’ve acknowledged. Earlier, it was said that the United States had brought in Kuwaitis to do all the burning and looting of the country. That was followed by a rumor that Bush had ordered Kuwait to compensate Iraq for its losses.

Hassan and Adnan said they have also heard recently that foreign investment is coming, and that despite the present difficulties, life will become prosperous. That may yet happen, but the reality is, for the moment, bleaker. Life is improving, but not fast enough to stem the growing frustration and anger.

The rumors are only making matters worse.

“The people demand a good life,” said Izzat, the former editor. “Of course there are rumors. People have no jobs, so they sit and spread rumors.”