As Smoke Clears, the Kurds Stand Firm

The Kurds understand why suicide bombers attacked their political leaders on Sunday.

The attacks had all the hallmarks of an operation by Islamic extremists -- nearly simultaneous detonations at two different locations, use of sophisticated explosives hidden in specially designed jackets and an utter indifference to the collateral damage. In addition to seven senior officials of the Kurdistan Regional Government, the toll included nearly 100 ordinary citizens of Irbil.

Visiting the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan headquarters a day later, I found it hard to imagine how such a small quantity of explosives could do so much damage. The ground was scorched black. The exterior wall 25 feet from the blast center had collapsed and all the furniture had been blown to one end of the room. The rubble was mixed with pools of blood.

It was an awful, jarring tragedy. But even though the Kurdistan Regional Government has been America’s closest ally in Iraq, and even though the Kurdish military -- the peshmerga -- fought closely with U.S. special forces in last year’s war, almost no one in Kurdistan blames the United States for what happened on Sunday. That’s because they know why their region was targeted. They were attacked for what they have become during 12 years of self-rule, for the fact that they are virtually independent from the rest of Iraq. Kurdistan was hit because it is secular, pluralistic, increasingly democratic and successful. As such, it is the major obstacle to a terrorist strategy that depends on chaos for success. The last thing Islamic extremists want is for secular democracy to succeed anywhere in Iraq.

In the immediate aftermath of the bombings, the two main Kurdish parties, onetime rivals that fought a nasty civil war in the 1990s, have come together, moving to unify competing Kurdistan governments, one based in Irbil and the other further south in Sulaymanya. Thanks to government institutions the Kurds have developed, a cadre of civil servants can replace the lost leaders. As the grim-faced Kurdistan Prime Minister Nercivan Barzani told me after the attacks: “We shall continue.”

But in the long run, Iraq’s fragile unity may be the attack’s main victim, in spite of brave words from Kurdish leaders to the contrary. Though the leaders have long understood that full independence is not a realistic option at this time, there is a grass-roots movement that disagrees. Since the U.S. takeover of Iraq, a new Kurdish movement toward referendum on the issue has gathered 2 million signatures, more than 50% of Iraq’s adult Kurds. The movement is widely seen as a proxy campaign for independence.

The bombings are likely to intensify Kurdish views that Kurds should have little to do with the chaotic south. They do not understand why the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority wants to replace their institutions with Iraqi ones. Certainly, Kurds negotiating Iraq’s provisional constitution will now be even more insistent that the Kurdistan Regional Government continue to handle security in the region.

The Kurds were already resisting American efforts to introduce a reformed Iraqi army and intelligence service into Kurdistan. As Kurdish officials point out, the Iraqi army has been the Iraqi Kurds’ only enemy over the last 80 years. Baghdad’s intelligence services plotted the murder of more than 100,000 Kurds in the 1980s, and it is no surprise that no one wants them back.

Despite the obvious lapses that allowed the bombers near so many senior leaders, the Kurds have confidence in their own peshmerga and intelligence services. And even after Sunday’s massacre, Kurdistan remains relatively peaceful. Home to one-sixth of Iraq’s population, just 200 coalition troops are stationed here.

Under these circumstances, the Kurds say, the plan to replace their governing institutions is not a formula to bring democracy to Iraq, but rather to bring chaos to Kurdistan. Fortunately, the Kurds have no intention of complying with American proposals. Scheduled to depart in less than five months, the Coalition Provisional Authority has little leverage.

It is neither just nor realistic to turn back the clock in Kurdistan. Allowing the Kurds to retain their autonomous governmental arrangements probably provides the best hope for a stable Iraq. Though almost all Kurds prefer full independence, most seem willing to give Iraq one last chance. But that chance will surely evaporate if they feel coerced.

While the U.S. actively seeks to diminish Kurdistan’s successful government, it does nothing about the other issue of great concern to the Kurds: the status of Kirkuk. Kirkuk is possibly the most explosive issue in Iraq today. One hour from Irbil, it sits atop Iraq’s largest producing oil reservoir. Home to Kurds, Turkmens and Arabs, Kirkuk is claimed by all three. Beginning in the 1950s and accelerating in the last 20 years, successive Iraqi regimes tried to change Kirkuk’s ethnicity by expelling Kurds (and some Turkmens) and settling Arabs in their place. In 1974, differences between Kurds and Arabs over Kirkuk led to a war that ended a previous attempt to give Kurdistan autonomy. Today, Turkey’s self-professed role as the protector of the Turkmens (and as opponents of Kurdish self-rule) provides additional volatility.

No foreigner can fully sort out claims that go back centuries. But there should be a process to determine Kirkuk’s future. The Kurds, who now dominate the province politically, have offered to suspend their own claims in exchange for such a process.

Getting all contending groups to agree on an objective process will not be easy, but the Coalition Provisional Authority is not even trying. Instead, Kirkuk is to be settled in conjunction with the drafting of a permanent constitution in 2006. Since the constitutional assembly will be at least 75% Arab, neither the Kurds nor Turkmens will feel fairly treated.

The handling of Kirkuk is part of a pattern by which the Bush administration is deferring Iraq’s most volatile issues until after the U.S. elections in November. But as with the decision not to hold Iraqi elections until 2005, the failure to act on Kirkuk may backfire. Any spark could ignite the Kirkuk tinderbox.

Ideally the people of Kirkuk should decide their status in a referendum that offers both the possibility of joining Kurdistan and options for special autonomy and power-sharing within the province. But, before any vote can take place, evicted Kurds should able to return to their homes, and Arab settlers should be offered financial incentives to leave.

More than a year ago, Pentagon planners endorsed my suggestion for a special commission to sort out property issues. By speedily establishing a system to rectify past wrongs, I hoped to ease tensions. Alas, the commission has yet to meet.

For all the suffering they inflicted, the terrorists failed completely in Irbil to destabilize Kurdistan. But by failing to address the status of Kirkuk promptly, the Bush administration may make the problem insoluble. And it leaves a vulnerability that terrorists or insurgents can exploit.