Bush’s Narrow Audience

Long before most Americans had ever heard of Abu Ghraib prison, the U.S. effort in Iraq was stumbling. There were too few troops to support an occupation, and the United States was getting too little help from other nations while paying too little attention to Shiite radicals. The photographs of coalition soldiers abusing Iraqi prisoners at the prison outside Baghdad only deepened the hole the U.S. had dug for itself.

U.S. diplomats unsurprisingly report that the prison scandal merely adds to Arab antagonism generated by White House support for Israel’s unilateral plan for only partial withdrawal from occupied Palestinian territory. NATO nations, already resistant to providing troops for Iraq, now say they will delay any substantial commitment until after November’s U.S. presidential elections. The lack of support from major nations other than Britain forces the U.S. to spend additional billions of dollars and commit more troops.

President Bush’s pep talk to the military and his ringing defense of Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld on Monday were aimed strictly at a U.S. audience. Diplomats rightly fret that more efforts need to be geared toward Europeans, who no longer see a positive side to any joint effort with Americans, and toward moderate Arab nations such as Jordan, without which larger democratization efforts in the Middle East will fail.

Next week’s start of the courts-martial of National Guard members accused in the prison abuse is one necessary step in proving U.S. determination to right its wrongs, although the seven people charged could turn out to be scapegoats.

What was the role of military intelligence officials, private contractors and the Army chain of command? It may be up to Congress to find the answers, given Rumsfeld’s continued “let me do my job” attitude.

Bush said Monday that the U.S. was “confronting problems squarely” in Iraq and “making changes as needed.” These reassurances might comfort some Americans, but they have no effect on European and Middle Eastern audiences that are profoundly distrustful of U.S. motives.

Most nations understand and fear the damage that an unstable Iraq can do to the Middle East and beyond, providing haven for terrorists and offering welcome in its chaos to Islamic radicalism. Unfortunately, to move from fear of a shattered Iraq to material support of the U.S. military and political effort has become a long leap.

As steady violence continues, it becomes harder to envision the United Nations and the United States succeeding alone in handing over substantial self-governance by June 30. Time is dismayingly short for gaining the international participation that could help Iraq function as a free nation.