N. Korea May Be in ‘Anybody but Bush’ Camp

North Korea has never had a real election, doesn’t believe in democracy and wouldn’t dream of putting the political fate of “Dear Leader” Kim Jong Il in the hands of ballot-wielding commoners. But it does have an election strategy -- as far as the U.S. is concerned.

Pyongyang, analysts say, is rooting for Sen. John F. Kerry, Sen. John Edwards, the Rev. Al Sharpton -- in fact, virtually anyone other than George W. Bush -- to be the next U.S. president. That’s why many observers are expecting little progress at the six-party talks aimed at halting North Korea’s nuclear program that start today in Beijing.

“North Korea is waiting for its own regime change -- in D.C.,” said Pang Zhongying, professor of international relations at China’s Nankai University.

In return for shutting down its weapons program, the North wants to get the most generous possible trade terms, aid and security guarantees. Pyongyang is betting that by stalling, it can achieve a better deal with a new administration, analysts say. Nor does it want to grace Bush with a diplomatic victory that might help reelect him.

“I expect North Korea to make certain compromises in the six-party talks to keep them going,” said Li Dunqiu, a North Korea expert with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. “But don’t expect any real progress before the U.S. elections.”

The lack of urgency is trying for North Korea’s immediate neighbors who have been living under a cloud of uncertainty since Pyongyang moved to restart its nuclear program in late 2002. South Korea is expected to put forward a three-stage proposal that would start with North Korea pledging to dismantle its nuclear program in return for promises from the U.S. and the other parties of security and economic assistance.

But even the most optimistic diplomats believe that it will be difficult to move forward given the animus between the United States and North Korea.

Bush has been tougher on North Korea than have many of his predecessors. But analysts emphasize that North Korea’s dislike of the administration is more than political. It’s personal.

The president has vilified Kim as a man who banquets while others starve, and called North Korea a member of an “axis of evil.” In 2002, Bush told interviewer Bob Woodward: “I loathe Kim Jong Il.”

The Dear Leader reportedly is not quick to forget such things.

At the same time, many here don’t expect Pyongyang to walk away from the talks. The isolated, cash-strapped Stalinist regime also is pragmatic and realizes that self-preservation depends on having resources to distribute. It sees few ways to do that other than expanded economic integration with the outside world, many believe.

Pyongyang has taken modest steps to open its economy by allowing free markets, reducing subsidies and easing wage and price controls. But to tiptoe further down that road, it must come to terms with the United States, which holds great influence not only with international financial institutions such as the World Bank, but allies such as Japan and private investors.

In recent days, the ever-mercurial Pyongyang has hinted that it is ready to deal, at least on a limited basis. An Asian security official who spoke on the condition that he not be identified said North Korean diplomat Son Mun San in Vienna has explored with the International Atomic Energy Agency ways to implement a weapons freeze -- assuming that an overarching agreement can be reached with the United States and the other participants in the talks: Japan, South Korea, China and Russia.

The South Korean proposal eliminates the concept of a freeze -- since the very word has become anathema to the Bush administration, which insists that the North Koreans dismantle before they get any rewards. Instead, in the first stage, the parties are supposed to exchange “statements of intention.” In the second stage, the dismantling of the nuclear facilities would begin at the same time that South Korea or other parties start to provide economic assistance, according to diplomats.

In the final stage, the parties would deal with additional issues such as the abductions of Japanese citizens and North Korea’s missile development. It could also lead to diplomatic relations with North Korea for the United States and Japan and even a formal peace treaty between the North and South.

Energy assistance is thought the most likely of the early rewards to be offered North Korea, although the parties would probably not resume deliveries of the heavy fuel oil.

South Korean and Chinese officials have said that they believe the U.S. position of not offering any incentives to North Korea in the early stage is too rigid.

Still, analysts say there’s little incentive for the Bush administration to open new negotiating paths or make significant compromises with Pyongyang, and several reasons not to. Bush will be in a stronger position to make demands on North Korea after November -- assuming he’s reelected and the U.S. has restored Iraqi sovereignty. At that point, a U.S. threat of unilateral action against Pyongyang also would become more credible.

The administration continues to be divided internally on its North Korea policy between advocates of give-and-take and hard-liners who believe compromise is unacceptable.

“There is disagreement within the U.S. government about what to offer Pyongyang, in what order, on what timetable,” said Alan D. Romberg, senior associate with the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington.

On recent visits to China, Undersecretary of Defense Douglas J. Feith and Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage have emphasized the carrot Washington is holding out to North Korea: Come clean with your weapons program, as Libya did, and we’ll work with you. Heading into elections, the White House would welcome a quick deal that shows another so-called rogue state acquiescing to its demands.

But many analysts think North Korea is unlikely to accept the sort of intrusive inspections that Libya has allowed, given Pyongyang’s far deeper distrust of the outside world. With expectations so low coming into the talks and the White House juggling so many other issues, treading water on North Korea becomes an easy fallback.

Japan and South Korea are more eager for a deal. Japan is pushing for progress as a precursor to resolving the highly charged abduction issue, while South Korea would welcome a thaw with its neighbor.

But China is likely to be the key player at the talks. It is best positioned to bridge the gap between Washington and Pyongyang, analysts say.

Although China has less leverage with its old communist ally than it once did, it still has closer ties than most countries. It continues to provide substantial aid to North Korea, with official and unofficial trade links providing another lifeline.

At the same time, China has increasingly staked its future on its international ties, and relations with Washington are better than they’ve been in years.

Before the talks, officials in Washington voiced concern that China appeared willing to turn a blind eye to North Korea’s uranium enrichment program -- which Pyongyang denies having. Analysts in Beijing, however, say North Korea is just trying to divide its opponents by provoking debate over a uranium program when in fact there are few differences among the overall objectives of the other five parties.

“North Korea is playing games,” said Shi Yuanhua, deputy director of the Center for Korean Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai. “They want different countries to see different things. But I don’t see it affecting the talks.”

China comes into the talks with several objectives, analysts say. It wants a nuclear-free Korean peninsula, but for reasons different from those of the U.S. China fears that Japan or Taiwan could go nuclear in response to North Korea’s belligerence.

Beijing also wants to undercut any U.S. pretext for launching a military strike in its neighborhood. And in the long term, it’s concerned that Washington could use North Korea as an excuse to ramp up its missile-defense system.

China’s role as host of the talks is a sensitive matter in itself. A resounding failure, with all parties stomping off, would amount to a loss of face for Beijing.

Even modest success, preferably backed by a document outlining shared objectives, would bolster its standing as a global player and score points with Washington.

Eventually, scholars say, China would like to turn the six-party talks into a permanent grouping, with itself at the center -- initially to deal with North Korea but ultimately to advance its own regional influence.

Magnier reported from Beijing and Demick from Seoul. Times staff writer Sonni Efron in Washington also contributed to this report.