Forcing the Issue

The United States and its leaders have rarely practiced colonialism, and those of us who live in the Middle East are beginning to see why: They’re just not very good at it.

America’s colonial efforts in Iraq are peculiarly un-American in both their spirit and implementation. But the most disturbing aspect of American policy in Iraq may be the new plan to hurriedly turn over sovereignty to a democratically elected Iraqi government.

This effort is based on the “Agreement on Political Process” that was hastily approved in mid-November by the U.S. occupation authority in Iraq and the American-appointed Iraqi Governing Council. The document is both fascinating and deeply irritating. Though idealistic and ambitious in its stated quest to define a transition from American-occupied Iraq to a sovereign, free and democratic Iraqi state, it also mirrors the worst aspects of the whole American adventure in the region.

It is the height of hubris to think that self-appointed American occupiers, who rode into Iraq on the backs of tanks, can now simply order Iraqis to become free and democratic -- and on a timetable that was designed more to address White House domestic political concerns than to respond to realities on the ground in Iraq.

The transition political agreement for Iraq deserves an award for high values and righteous ambitions. It embodies powerful principles of democratic pluralism, equality before the law, representational federalism and the consent of the governed. It is audacious in the sweep, speed and clarity of the proposed democratic transition. In just 66 lines, the document offers a blueprint to wipe out three decades of Iraqi- engineered Baathist tyranny and the previous five decades of postcolonial incoherence, and replace them with a Washington on the Tigris.

The specifics of the document are impressive too, calling for “freedom,” “equality,” “rights,” “due process,” “independence of the judiciary,” “transparency” and other such positive political values. Its democratization procedures include the selection of representative individuals to regional bodies that will draft a national constitution, ratification of the constitution by the citizenry, “governorate selection caucuses” at the provincial level to select individuals who will collectively form a transitional national assembly, a constitutional convention of directly elected Iraqis and other such ringing aspects of accountable democratic governance.

So what’s the problem? If these democratic values were on a commercial website, I would want to put every one of them in my shopping cart. But the process is unlikely to work as envisaged. The manner of Washington’s attempt to transform Iraqi despotism into Iraqi democracy is unrealistic. It attempts to bring democracy as practiced in places like Iowa and Idaho to a country with very different traditions and values.

The plan ignores the points of tension and incompatibility that are certain to surface, not only between American cultural values and those of Iraqis but also among the Iraqis themselves as the concerns of Kurds, Shiites, Sunnis and innumerable tribal factions are aired and ultimately addressed. A clash of definitions will arise around fundamental concepts such as elections, representation, pluralism, equality, political voice, transparency, redress of grievances and even justice. These tensions can be resolved over time by Iraqis working together to build a country -- just as they were resolved during the European and American transitions from feudalism and slavery to democracy in earlier centuries. But they will not be resolved by next June, as the White House has mandated.

Another problem is with the way representatives will be selected. Basing the political transition on caucuses in 18 designated regions largely ignores the key issue of the legitimacy of either the “governorate selection” regions or the concept of a caucus. Using the principle of a straight majority vote in choosing members of provincial caucuses may well rub against the ancient local tradition of forging consensus through quiet negotiations and consultations, rather than with a public vote. Forging a new Iraqi nationalism and democracy with the crucible and molds of American republicanism creates a process of democratization that is peculiarly undemocratic.

Another issue is certain to be that the Governing Council, with which the U.S. signed the agreement, is seen by many in Iraq -- and in the wider region -- as an illegitimate body. Although many of its members are credible national or tribal leaders, the council, because it was appointed by the U.S., lacks credibility with many if not most Iraqis. The council’s endorsement of the process in no way guarantees its acceptance by the broader public.

Ultimately, this agreement reflects the dangerous tendency of America to engage in policymaking by panic. The agreement’s content and the hasty manner in which it was promulgated reveal that its main goal is to provide an American exit strategy rather than a workable plan for Iraqi sovereignty.

Washington has taken a good idea -- transforming tyranny into democracy -- and implemented it badly. In acting unilaterally and militarily, and in seeing Iraq through a narrow Western prism, the U.S. has fallen into the colonial trap of attempting to reshape a society according to Western rules and values.

Making it all work in the end won’t be easy, and the U.S. can’t expect much help from other countries in the region. Most Arabs and their governments are proving to be docile spectators, passively watching their own postcolonial history of autocracy, passivity and powerlessness replayed over and over again. Arab critics have lambasted the U.S. for its policies in Iraq, but not a single Arab country has provided a model of democratic governance or the sort of widespread prosperity that would keep young Arabs at home rather than seeking to emigrate.

The antidote must include a more realistic, humble and multilateral American policy, along with more activist, honest and credible policies on the part of Arab countries. Countries in the region must provide their people with better governance and systems based on the rule of law in order to avoid both the home-grown tyranny of Baathist Iraq and the colonial militarism of Anglo-American armadas.

Iowa and Idaho and the other states became prosperous and democratic because their people wanted, and worked to forge, good governance. America offers us ennobling lessons, along with ugly, imposed colonial treaties. We should reject treaties that don’t serve our interests, but at the same time we should embrace the concept of good governance. America is welcome as our partner in this process, but not as our master.