No Signs of Iraq-Al Qaeda Ties Found

The commission staff investigating the Sept. 11 attacks said Wednesday that it had found “no credible evidence” of cooperation between Iraq and Al Qaeda in targeting America or of any other collaboration between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden’s terrorism network.

The findings appeared to be the most complete and authoritative dismissal of a key Bush administration rationale for invading Iraq: that Hussein’s regime had worked in collusion with Al Qaeda.

Bin Laden made overtures to Hussein in the mid-1990s while he was in Sudan and again after he went to Afghanistan in 1996, but they “do not appear to have resulted in a collaborative relationship,” the staff said in a report. And two of Bin Laden’s most senior associates, interrogated by U.S. authorities, “have adamantly denied that any ties existed between Al Qaeda and Iraq.”

Also, a much-publicized meeting between a senior Iraqi intelligence official in Prague and lead hijacker Mohamed Atta appears not to have occurred, the commission report concluded. It based that finding on cellphone records showing Atta was in Florida at the time.

As recently as Monday, Vice President Dick Cheney said in a speech in Orlando, Fla., that Hussein “had long-standing ties with Al Qaeda.” Asked Tuesday about Cheney’s remarks, President Bush said he supported them.

The commission, as a matter of procedure, has not endorsed any of the staff’s 16 reports to date, but is expected to include them in its official report due July 26. Some of the commission’s Republican members suggested during questioning Wednesday that they may not agree ultimately with the staff findings.

The staff’s analysts on the Iraq issue and on Al Qaeda include Douglas J. MacEachin, former deputy director of intelligence for the CIA, and other senior intelligence and law enforcement officials.

The White House had no immediate comment Wednesday on the report’s conclusion on the lack of an Iraq-Al Qaeda link, a spokesman said.

But the conclusions prompted immediate accusations from Sen. John F. Kerry of Massachusetts, the presumed Democratic presidential nominee.

“The administration misled America, the administration reached too far, they did not tell the truth to Americans about what was happening or their own intentions,” Kerry told a National Public Radio affiliate in Michigan.

In two staff reports and in a lengthy hearing Wednesday, the commission also disclosed a wealth of details about Bin Laden and his transformation of Al Qaeda into a paramilitary operation.

The organization turned out perhaps 20,000 trained soldiers for Islamic conflicts around the globe -- but saved the most promising recruits for terrorism plots of its own.

Bin Laden and Al Qaeda forged alliances with another global terrorism group, Hezbollah. And while there was no alliance with Iraq, there were with the governments of several other nations, the independent commission concluded.

Operating as much like a statesman as a terrorist, Bin Laden entered into mutually beneficial relationships with the leaders of Sudan, Iran and Afghanistan that provided him with the protection and resources to expand Al Qaeda from a small group of militants into a global organization run much like a corporation.

There were also some surprises, according to the commission staff’s findings. Among them:

* Al Qaeda appears to have played a role in the attack on the Khobar Towers military barracks in Saudi Arabia in 1996 that killed 19 U.S. military personnel and injured hundreds more. The attack long has been attributed to Saudi Hezbollah, a radical Islamic group.

* Bin Laden, contrary to popular belief, did not use his share of a family fortune to finance Al Qaeda’s growth or its acts of terror. The Saudi exile received about $1 million a year, but not his $300-million inheritance, relying instead on his charisma, networking skills and fundraising efforts to pay for the global jihad.

* Al Qaeda operated at times like a Fortune 500 company, with special committees for fundraising, budgeting, employee expenses and travel, training and for issuing religious decrees, proposing terrorist targets and authorizing attacks. But it also employed spies, infiltrators and well-placed financial facilitators to raise money, strong-arming contributions from some charities and mosques while surreptitiously taking over others to divert funds.

As a result, Al Qaeda was raising about $30 million a year or more, and distributing it equally quickly.

The actual terrorism operations were relatively inexpensive; the Sept. 11 attacks cost between $400,000 and $500,000, and others were far cheaper, the commission staff found.

Supporting global jihad was more costly, with millions a year going to pay for broader terror operations such as maintaining training camps in Afghanistan and elsewhere, paying the salaries of jihadists -- or “holy war” fighters -- and contributing to other terrorist organizations.

The report traced Al Qaeda’s roots to 1992, when Bin Laden began forming a coalition of previously independent terrorist groups, uniting them into a broader Islamic army that spanned most of the Middle Eastern countries and Africa. He also made connections with several governments, which in turn helped Al Qaeda launch attacks and spread its influence.

In Sudan, Bin Laden set up training camps, weapons and supply depots and front companies to acquire weapons, explosives and technical equipment. And intelligence officers of the Sudanese government provided false passports and shipping documents. In December 1992, soldiers trained in Bin Laden’s camps in Sudan began attacking the United States, bombing two hotels in Aden, Yemen -- a stopover for U.S. troops en route to Somalia.

A year later, Bin Laden trainees helped in the attack on two U.S. Blackhawk helicopters in Mogadishu, Somalia, that led to the killing of 18 U.S. soldiers. Evidence that the Sudan government aided Bin Laden continued through 1996, according to the staff.

They described Khobar Towers as “a case study in the collaboration” between Al Qaeda and Sudan.

In that 1996 attack, Bin Laden supplied the money for the explosives, and the Sudanese Ministry of Defense served as a conduit for bringing them into Sudan. They were stored in the warehouse of a Bin Laden business, then transported under the cover of Sudan Ministry of Defense invoice papers into Saudi Arabia.

The staff also concluded that although the attack was carried out by a Saudi-based Hezbollah cell with assistance from Iran, Al Qaeda appears to have played a role as well.

Bin Laden also worked with Iranian officials on other projects -- despite their religious differences as Sunni and Shiite Muslims.

One small group of Al Qaeda operatives, for instance, traveled to Iran and another went to Hezbollah camps in Lebanon for training in explosives and intelligence, according to the commission staff. Hezbollah’s expertise in such bombings, as shown in its 1983 attack in Lebanon that killed 241 U.S. Marines, would soon be mimicked by Al Qaeda in attacks on two U.S. embassies in Africa and elsewhere.

During his time in Sudan, Bin Laden also “explored” possible cooperation with Iraq despite his opposition to Hussein’s secular regime.

Bin Laden at one time sponsored anti-Hussein Islamists in Iraqi Kurdistan, but agreed to cease that support because Sudan wanted to keep good relations with Iraq. So Bin Laden allowed a senior Iraqi intelligence officer to make three visits to Sudan, and to finally meet with him personally in 1994, the report said.

At that time, it added, Bin Laden is said to have requested space to establish training camps and assistance in procuring weapons, “but Iraq apparently never responded.”

“So far,” the report concluded, “we have no credible evidence that Iraq and Al Qaeda cooperated on attacks against the United States.”

Once in Afghanistan, Bin Laden paid $10 million to $20 million to maintain diplomatic relations with the Taliban, receiving protection in return. Soon, he would join forces with Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and begin plotting the Sept. 11 attacks. At first, the plot was based on Mohammed’s failed plans to blow up a dozen U.S. jetliners over the Pacific Ocean.

But Bin Laden was a micromanager with intense interest in details of Al Qaeda attacks, changing targets and suicide bombers at the last moment.

The camps in Afghanistan soon flourished.

“A worldwide jihad needed terrorists who could bomb embassies or hijack airliners, but it also needed foot soldiers for the Taliban in its war against the Northern Alliance, and guerrillas who could shoot down Russian helicopters in Chechnya or ambush Indian units in Kashmir,” the staff said.

According to one unnamed senior Al Qaeda associate, trainees were encouraged to think big, floating options like taking over a launcher and forcing Russian scientists to fire a nuclear missile at the United States, mounting mustard gas or cyanide attacks against Jewish areas in Iraq and releasing poison gas into the air-conditioning system of a targeted building.

“Last but not least, hijacking an aircraft and crashing it into an airport or nearby city,” the report said.

According to the staff, the Taliban’s ability to provide Al Qaeda with a haven, despite mounting international pressure, was critically important in its ability to pull off the Sept. 11 attacks.

The staff concluded that some governments may have turned a blind eye to Al Qaeda’s fundraising activities -- including Saudi Arabia, long considered the primary source of Al Qaeda funding. But the staff found no evidence that the Saudi government as an institution or senior officials within the Riyadh government funded Al Qaeda.

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The White House makes its case

The commission staff investigating the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks said Wednesday there was no evidence that Iraq helped Al Qaeda attack the United States, contrary to suggestions by the Bush administration. Following are statements by the administration on the alleged ties:

Tuesday

In a meeting with reporters during a visit by Afghan President Hamid Karzai, President Bush was asked what the evidence had been linking Iraq to Al Qaeda. “Zarqawi. Zarqawi’s the best evidence of a connection to Al Qaeda affiliates and Al Qaeda,” Bush said in reference to Islamist militant Abu Musab Zarqawi.

Monday

Vice President Dick Cheney told members of a conservative think tank in Orlando, Fla., that former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein “had long-established ties with Al Qaeda.”

Sept. 14, 2003

Cheney, interviewed on NBC’s “Meet the Press,” said: “It’s not surprising the public would believe [Hussein] was involved in the attacks. We learned more and more that there was a relationship between Iraq and Al Qaeda that stretched back through most of the decade of the ‘90s.”

Feb. 5, 2003

Secretary of State Colin L. Powell made a case for the war against Iraq before the U.N. Security Council by linking Zarqawi, suspected of plotting the killing of a U.S. diplomat in Jordan, to Al Qaeda. Powell said Zarqawi was an associate of Osama bin Laden and part of a “sinister nexus between Iraq and the Al Qaeda.”

Jan. 28, 2003

In his State of the Union speech, Bush said evidence from intelligence sources, secret communications and statements from people in custody revealed that Hussein “aids and protects terrorists,” including members of Al Qaeda, and could provide them with weapons of mass destruction.

Oct. 14, 2002

In a campaign speech in Michigan, Bush said of Hussein: “This is a man that we know has had connections with Al Qaeda. This is a man who, in my judgment, would like to use Al Qaeda as a forward army.”

Reuters