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‘How did we get here?’

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This article was originally on a blog post platform and may be missing photos, graphics or links. See About archive blog posts.

‘The Reckoning: White House Philosophy Stocked Mortgage Bonfire,’ posted Saturday on the New York Times website, is an exhaustive report that attempts to answer President Bush’s own question, wondered aloud Sept. 18 when the credit markets froze up, ‘How did we get here?’

A big part of the answer, according to the article, is housing.

There are plenty of culprits, like lenders who peddled easy credit, consumers who took on mortgages they could not afford and Wall Street chieftains who loaded up on mortgage-backed securities without regard to the risk.... From his earliest days in office, Mr. Bush paired his belief that Americans do best when they own their own home with his conviction that markets do best when let alone. He pushed hard to expand homeownership, especially among minorities.... But his housing policies and hands-off approach to regulation encouraged lax lending standards.... And he pushed to allow first-time buyers to qualify for federally insured mortgages with no money down. Republican Congressional leaders and some housing advocates balked, arguing that homeowners with no stake in their investments would be more prone to walk away....

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There’s much, much more to the article, but among the warning signs along the way:

Typically, as home prices increase, rental costs rise proportionally. But Mr. Thomas [Jason Thomas, an economic analyst for President Bush] sent charts to top White House and Treasury officials showing that the monthly cost of owning far outpaced the cost to rent. To Mr. Thomas, it was a sign that housing prices were wildly inflated and bound to plunge, a condition that could set off a foreclosure crisis as conventional and subprime borrowers with little equity found they owed more than their houses were worth. It was not the Bush team’s first warning. The previous year, Mr. [Lawrence B.] Lindsay, the former chief economics adviser, returned to the White House to tell his old colleagues that housing prices were headed for a crash. But housing values are hard to evaluate, and Mr. Lindsay had a reputation as a market pessimist, said Mr. Hubbard [Al Hubbard, Bush’s former chief economics adviser], adding, “I thought, ‘He’s always a bear.’ ” In retrospect, Mr. Hubbard said, Mr. Lindsay was “absolutely right,” and Mr. Thomas’s charts “should have been a signal.” Instead, the prevailing view at the White House was that the problems in the housing market were limited to subprime borrowers unable to make their payments as their adjustable mortgages reset to higher rates.

They weren’t the only ones who thought the subprime problem would be contained to a small segment of the market -- I recall talking to several housing experts who assured me the same thing -- and that expanding homeownership was a fine goal. If you can put party politics aside, I think there’s a lot to be gleaned here on how we got to this point.

--Lauren Beale

Thoughts? Comments?

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