Tough Bargaining Likely at Geneva : Gromyko, Shultz to Begin Crucial Talks Monday

After a 13-month break, Secretary of State George P. Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko will resume superpower talks on arms control Monday in meetings so charged with worldwide expectations that they are almost sure to end in disappointment.

Both sides have emphasized modest objectives for the two days of talks in Geneva, but the possibility of even a partial thaw in one of the coldest periods of East-West diplomacy seems to have fueled hopes from the Vatican to Tokyo.

Yet even though Shultz and Gromyko are both canny negotiators who seldom reveal their true intentions in public, enough is known about the U.S. and Soviet bargaining positions to make it clear that the talks are certain to be tough and any substantive progress hard to achieve.

Soviet Resistance

U.S. officials have made it clear that their primary goal is to restrict land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, which they consider the most dangerous of all nuclear weapons. But the Soviets, who have concentrated their nuclear arsenal in land-based ICBMs, will certainly resist the U.S. effort.

The Soviets, on the other hand, have made it clear that their main objective is to derail U.S. research on space-based weapons, especially the $26-billion effort popularly known as “Star Wars,” which is aimed at providing a defense against incoming ballistic missiles.

In preparing for the Geneva meeting, however, U.S. officials seem to have given a higher priority to saving the “Star Wars” program than to limiting Soviet missiles. The United States has said it will not even consider curbs on research, although it is willing to discuss both the offensive and defensive weapons of both countries.

The “Star Wars” program, which the Administration prefers to call its Strategic Defense Initiative, is in a very preliminary research stage.

A senior U.S. official who briefed reporters on the understanding that he not be identified by name said the system will not be ready for use before the 1990s even if the extremely difficult research program is successful. He said the United States insists on retaining a future President’s option to deploy a space-based anti-missile system if and when “the technologies are validated.”

The Soviets have mounted a massive public relations campaign, primarily in Western Europe, depicting the “Star Wars” initiative as a brand-new phase of the arms race. U.S. officials reply that the Soviets are far ahead of the United States in anti-aircraft and anti-missile defensive systems. The United States abandoned most of these programs about a decade ago, and although Moscow lacks the sort of leak-proof missile defense that Washington now hopes to develop, U.S. officials say the Soviets have been conducting their own research in this area.

The senior U.S. official said the Soviets seem to be asserting that “what’s Soviet is Soviet and what is U.S. is negotiable.” He said Gromyko will have little success if he follows that approach in Geneva.

However, some non-governmental American arms-control specialists are convinced that Shultz cannot expect to make much progress unless he is willing to have a full discussion of space-based weapons.

“Without an agreement involving space, there won’t be an agreement on anything else,” said John D. Steinbruner, director of foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution in Washington. “It is very difficult to be realistically optimistic.”

Although the “Star Wars” plan has captured much of the attention, the main purpose of the Geneva talks is more mundane. The objective, apparently shared by both sides, is to find a formula for further talks on the specifics of arms control.

By that standard, the meeting will be considered a success if Shultz and Gromyko agree to hold further U.S.-Soviet negotiations, either meeting again themselves or turning the matter over to full-time negotiators. The senior official said the United States prefers separate talks on offensive and defensive systems but would be willing to consider any other plan the Soviets might suggest.

“Our foremost purpose in Geneva is to come to terms on a format for formal follow-on talks,” the official said. “In that context, if one looks at the family of strategic systems, they fall logically into those that are for offensive purposes and those that are for defensive purposes.”

Leadership Unclear

If Shultz and Gromyko agree to start full-time negotiations, it is not clear who would head the U.S. team. Veteran negotiator Paul H. Nitze was thought to have the inside track when he was named special adviser to Shultz for the Geneva meetings, but Nitze has since said he does not want the job.

U.S.-Soviet arms control talks broke down late in 1983, when the Soviets walked out of separate negotiations on intercontinental and intermediate-range nuclear weapons.

The walkout was a protest against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s deployment of U.S. Pershing 2 and cruise missiles in Europe to offset the Kremlin’s buildup of SS-20 medium-range missiles targeted on Europe. At that time, the Soviets said they would not resume the strategic arms reduction talks (START) or the intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) negotiations unless the United States removed the missiles from Europe.

Last June, in an effort to restrict U.S. “Star Wars” and anti-satellite research, the Soviets proposed a new round of talks on limiting the militarization of space. President Reagan replied almost at once, agreeing to the meeting but suggesting that the range of topics be broadened to include offensive ballistic missiles. The Soviets refused, and the proposed talks never began.

In agreeing to go to Geneva, the Soviets insisted that the Shultz-Gromyko meeting must be considered a new round of discussions rather than a resumption of the START and INF talks. Washington agreed to go along with the face-saving formula.

“We have helped the Soviets walk back off the limb they walked out on when they walked out of the INF talks,” said Raymond L. Garthoff, a former U.S. arms negotiator who is now a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.

Although it is not clear just why the Soviets decided to return to the bargaining table, most experts in the United States believe it was because of concern that the United States might be pulling ahead in space-based missile defense research. Another possible reason cited by U.S. experts is that Moscow may have realized it has failed in its campaign to block deployment of Pershing 2 and cruise missiles.

The stated objective of both sides in any sort of arms control talks is to provide a stable military balance and avoid an all-out arms race that would increase weapons spending on both sides and might produce a dangerous imbalance.

Some hard-liners in the Reagan Administration, apparently led by Assistant Defense Secretary Richard N. Perle, are convinced that arms-control agreements play into the hands of the Soviets by convincing the American public that increased arms spending is unnecessary. Perle and those who share his views also contend that the Soviets cannot be trusted to keep the agreements they make.

The disputes within the Administration apparently have not been resolved. Officials say Reagan settled the issue for the time being, however, when he gave Shultz his formal instructions, which have not been made public, during the New Year’s holiday.

Shunning Criticism

In addition to the dispute over whether arms control is worth the effort, some U.S. officials say privately they are concerned that Reagan is putting too much emphasis on his “Star Wars” defense system, which is probably at least a decade away from reality and may never prove technologically possible. These officials say that by concentrating on an exotic research program, the Administration has abandoned programs that might have been deployed before the end of this decade.

But officials on both sides of the argument agree that Reagan is enthusiastic about prospects for space-based defensive systems and is unwilling to listen to criticism of it. Administration officials who once seemed cool toward the plan later embraced it, apparently after talking with the President.

In advance of the Geneva meeting, the Administration issued a new booklet on the program, including a foreword by Reagan in which he said the objective is to “render ballistic missiles impotent and obsolete.”

“I want to emphasize that in carrying out this research program, the United States seeks neither military superiority nor political advantage,” the President said. “Our only purpose is to search for ways to reduce the danger of nuclear war.”

The Soviets obviously see the issue differently. If the United States had an effective defensive system in place, they reason, it could launch a preemptive nuclear attack without fear of effective retaliation.

Garthoff, the former arms control negotiator, said Soviet concern about the U.S. defensive systems gives the American negotiators some leverage in the talks. But he said this leverage can be used only if the United States is willing to consider trading restrictions on “Star Wars” program for limitations on Soviet systems.

Progress is unlikely, he said, “if the United States is only willing to conduct a seminar on the benefits of defensive systems.”

Shultz left Andrews Air Force Base aboard a U.S. Air Force plane Saturday night and was to arrive in Geneva this morning, about eight hours before the arrival of Gromyko from Moscow.

The Superpower Negotiating Forums

Secretary of State George P. Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Adrei A. Gromyko will meet in Geneva Monday to discuss a fill range of possible arms-reduction negotiations. Following are the superpower negotiating forums--some active, some indefinitely suspended.

START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks): Geneva talks broken off by the Soviets in December 1983 to protest U.S. deployment of Pershing 2 and cruise missiles in Western Europe. Purpose was a treaty reducing nuclear weapons with intercontinental range, following on the SALT 1 agreement of 1972 and the SALT II agreement of 1979, which has not been ratified by the United States. The Reagan Administration proposed deep cuts in land-based missiles, which it called the most destabilizing nuclear weapons. The Soviets, who have about 70% of their nuclear arsenal in land-based missiles compared with about 25% for the United States, rejected the proposal. Former President Jimmy Carter made a similar proposal shortly after he took office, which the Soviets also rejected.

INF (Intermediate-range Nuclear Force): Geneva talks broken off by the Soviets in December 1983 to protest NATO’s deployment of U.S. Pershing 2 and cruise missiles in Western Europe. Purpose was a treaty limiting nuclear weapons within European theater (Soviet weapons targeted on Western Europe and weapons in Western Europe targeted on the Soviet Union). The Soviets demanded a freeze on INF deployment before deployment of Pershing 2 and cruise missiles, which would have given the Soviet SS-20 a monopoly in the field. Reagan responded with his “zero option,” an offer to cancel deployment of Pershing 2 and cruise missiles if the Soviets scrapped their SS-20s. U.S. negotiator Paul Nitze and Soviet negotiator Yuli A. Kvitsinsky came up with a possible compromise during an informal walk in the woods near Geneva, but the “walk in the woods” formula was rejected by both Washington and Moscow.

Space Weapons: No recent talks held. In June, 1984, the Soviets proposed talks in Vienna aimed at banning weapons stationed in space such as anti-satellite weapons and defensive systems intended to stop approaching nuclear weapons. The United States accepted but added that the talks should also include ballistic missiles that arch through space in flight. Soviets then refused to negotiate, and the talks did not start. An earlier round of talks on anti-satellite systems was held in 1978 and 1979, but no agreement was reached.

MBFR (Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction): Continuing talks between NATO and Warsaw Pact delegations, with stated aim of reducing conventional military forces in Central Europe. Talks began in 1973 and have made no progress. With Soviets now holding an edge in non-nuclear strength in the area, the United States wants both sides to reduce strength to approximately equal levels, while the Soviets are talking about equal reductions that would leave them ahead. The Soviets briefly interrupted the talks in December, 1983, when other arms talks were broken off, but they agreed to a resumption a month later.

Conference on Confidence-and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe: Aimed at reducing conventional arms and chemical weapons in Europe. These talks in Stockholm--involving 35 countries, neutrals as well as members of the two major blocs--have been under way since early 1984, but no progress has been reported.

U.N. Disarmament Conference: Held from time to time in Geneva to discuss all forms of weaponry. The United States proposed a ban on chemical arms in April, 1984, but nothing was agreed upon.