Where to Cut Defense

Among politicians of both parties on Capitol Hill, it is a given that defense spending must be, if not frozen at near current levels, at least restrained before Congress summons the courage to cut politically sensitive domestic spending. The foot-dragging by Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, must be overcome or circumvented or federal budget deficits will keep running out of control.

It is extremely important, however, that a sensible political consensus be worked out not just on the overall size of next year’s defense budget but on its composition as well.

Keep in mind that the budget-deficit problem is a long-range one. If the deficits are to be controlled, plans for spending reductions must look well beyond fiscal 1986 and deal with the troublesome budget outlook for at least the rest of this decade. That means making some hard choices right now.

Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger is seeking to avoid this reality. While he agreed to make $8.7 billion in mostly illusory cuts in his 1986 budget proposal, his approach would do nothing to reduce expenditures in future years.

The instinct of most congressmen to save money in the short run by stretching out weapons programs is also inappropriate. As the House Budget Committee noted in a recent study, stretchouts and slowdowns don’t save money over the long haul. On the contrary, they result in fewer lanes or tanks or guns produced at higher prices.

Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), ranking Democrat on the Senate Armed Services Committee, drew the obvious conclusion in a recent interview. What’s really needed, he said, is to eliminate some weapons programs entirely.

As Nunn observed, the Pentagon has three major nuclear-bomber programs under way. It has both the MX missile program and the so-called Midgetman missile, which makes more sense than the MX from the arms-control viewpoint. It has three varieties of cruise missiles and two types of submarine-launched missiles.

“All of these are important individually,” Nunn said, “but collectively that’s too much emphasis on the strategic nuclear area. I would trim that down as well as trimming some conventional programs. If we continue to stretch programs, the per-unit cost will increase, and each defense dollar will be buying much less.” He is exactly right.

The MX missile is an obvious candidate for elimination, given the greater survivability of the submarine-launched Trident 2 missiles, the small, mobile Midgetman missiles that are under active development and the cruise missiles that are being put aboard bombers and certain warships. A choice may have to be made, too, between the B-1 bomber and the “stealth” bomber. Anybody can make up his own list. The point is that, if the budget problem is to be addressed seriously, choices must be made.