Reagan Seeks Legacy of Significant Arms Curbs : Defeat of Communist Revolts in Central America Is Close Second on Foreign Policy Priorities List

With an eye on his place in history, President Reagan made clear in his State of the Union address Wednesday night that he will seek a significant new arms control agreement with the Soviet Union as his chief legacy in foreign affairs, with the defeat of Communist-backed rebellions in Central America a close second on his list of priorities.

“Just as we are positioned as never before to secure justice in our economy, we are poised as never before to create a safer, freer, more peaceful world,” he said, reiterating his commitment to “fair and verifiable arms agreements that would lower the risk of war and reduce the size of nuclear arsenals.”

And in his most public call thus far for continued covert aid for anti-Communist insurgents, the President said that “we must not break faith with those risking their lives--on every continent, from Afghanistan to Nicaragua--to defy Soviet-supported aggression. . . . Support for freedom fighters is self-defense.” It is “essential” for Congress to continue to support “all facets” of the Administration programs in Central America, he added.

Yet his goals, each extremely difficult to achieve under the best of circumstances, may be doubly elusive because they are interrelated--and in some ways even mutually antagonistic. In his dealings with Moscow, for example, Reagan is committing himself to attempting negotiation and confrontation simultaneously.

In pursuing his foreign policy goals with Congress, which he seemed to address more directly than he had in previous State of the Union messages, Reagan must deal with Democrats who champion arms control but oppose his Central America policies and also with conservatives in his own party who mistrust arms deals but yearn to crush communism in the Americas.

Odds Less Than Even

The foundation Reagan has already laid--the Soviet agreement to return to the bargaining table next month and the progress toward peace in El Salvador--could set the stage for at least significant progress. But the odds for complete success must be rated less than even as the President begins his second and last term in office.

In the arms control arena, Reagan seeks to persuade the Kremlin to accept his “Star Wars” space defense program as a “better way.” That is a radical new direction in arms policy, predicated on Reagan’s belief that defensive weapons will make the nuclear balance more stable. Conventional doctrine has held that defensive systems tend to increase the danger of nuclear war, not decrease it, because the possessor of defensive weapons might feel free to launch a preemptive strike on a vulnerable enemy.

At the same time, Reagan will be asking the Soviets to reduce their offensive missile forces, a move that would make the job of a U.S. space shield easier because it would have fewer warheads to intercept.

Compounding Reagan’s difficulties is the possibility that the Soviet Union may not be able to negotiate significant compromises for years because of its repeated leadership struggles and its severe economic problems. While always defensive, the Kremlin today appears to have adopted a siege mentality in the face of a U.S. military buildup that might make any Soviet compromise appear to be a sign of weakness.

Even reaching agreement on the daunting problems of arms control is not enough by itself: The Soviets must also be persuaded to curb their adventures in the Third World. A new agreement almost certainly could not be ratified by Congress if the Kremlin embarked on another Afghanistan invasion, let alone openly supported another Latin America rebellion.

And that is not the only obstacle that Congress presents to the President’s agenda. Reagan will need the votes of congressional liberals and conservatives alike for his controversial MX missile and “Star Wars” programs--without which U.S. arms negotiators would be disadvantaged, he said--as well as for his Central America programs.

Trading Support

But each faction in Congress--the arms control advocates and the anti-Communists--will probably attempt to trade its support in one area for Administration moderation in the other.

Reagan is not unaware of the difficulties. He has acknowledged that the arms negotiations may take more than his remaining four years. And defeating the Communist challenges in Nicaragua and El Salvador will require, beyond military resistance, massive social and economic reforms there that could take decades.

Nonetheless, during his first term, Reagan won some important victories that will help him move toward his goals.

On arms control, Reagan has been vindicated in his view that the Soviets would return to arms talks without any U.S. concessions. They had walked out of two sets of negotiations--on intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe and on intercontinental-range nuclear weapons--and threatened to stay away until the United States withdrew its newly deployed missiles from Europe.

Halt to Squabbling

Liberals had insisted that concessions, such as a moratorium on deploying U.S. missiles in Europe and a ban on testing anti-satellite weapons, would be required to get the Soviets to return. But Moscow has now agreed, without so much as a fig leaf to cover its reversal, to new talks in Geneva starting March 12.

Moreover, the President brought a halt to the squabbling between the State and Defense departments that had prevented the Administration from agreeing in Reagan’s first term on realistic negotiating positions. Virtually an entire new team has taken over, both at the policy-making and the negotiating levels, and that should facilitate serious bargaining if the Soviets are willing.

Similarly, the Administration’s policy in Central America has registered significant gains. Thanks largely to U.S. aid to El Salvador, the Communist-backed rebels there appear to have lost momentum and have engaged the elected government of President Jose Napoleon Duarte in preliminary peace talks.

Widely Criticized

Meanwhile, Nicaragua’s leftist government, harassed by contra rebels, has failed to consolidate its rule, while its presidential election and repression of Catholic Church leaders have been widely criticized by European socialists and American liberals who had previously sympathized with the six-year-old regime.

But the peace process in El Salvador could collapse under pressure from right wingers there, and covert U.S. backing for the contras is certain to end unless Reagan can persuade Congress that it must fight Soviet-supported aggression in the hemisphere lest turmoil south of the border increase the flood of illegal immigration into the United States.

And, despite the forthcoming arms talks, the disparate views within the Administration may continue to hobble the formulation of new positions unless Reagan shows that he is prepared to demand that some senior officials toe his new line on negotiations with the Soviets or quit.