A World-Class Meeting

An extraordinary conference at the Carter Center at Emory University in Atlanta last week could make an important contribution to the Geneva talks on nuclear arms control. It depends on how the Reagan Administration reacts to some things that were said, and whether Soviet representatives were sending serious signals or playing propaganda games.

The meeting, co-chaired by former Presidents Jimmy Carter and Gerald R. Ford, also featured three former secretaries of state, several key members of Congress, two former defense secretaries, a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Soviet ambassador and a member of the Soviet general staff, and other military strategists--foreign and domestic.

There was a loose consensus among American participants on several key issues:

--The United States and the Soviet Union should continue honoring the 1972 anti-ballistic missile treaty and avoid moves that undercut provisions of the SALT II and other arms-control accords that have been negotiated but not ratified by the Senate.

--The two governments should proceed with a threshold test-ban treaty, with progressively lower limits on nuclear tests until a comprehensive test ban is in effect.

--The Geneva negotiations should take account of the relationship between offensive and defensive strategic weapons, and both should be on the bargaining table.

--Research into anti-missile defense systems cannot be reliably monitored and should be continued by the United States, in light of the “massive” effort by the Soviet Union in this field. However, the two governments should negotiate an understanding of the gray-area difference between research, which is allowed by the anti-ballistic missile treaty, and developmental testing, which is not.

--It is crucial to the arms-control process that each side have confidence that agreements are being complied with by the other. Provision should be made for on-site verification of compliance when other means of resolving accusations of violations have failed.

The public remarks of the Soviet representatives were mostly boilerplate repetitions of their longstanding positions, except on two points:

Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin suggested, albeit vaguely, that Moscow might no longer insist on an agreement to halt the Strategic Defense Initiative, or “Star Wars” program, before taking up reduction of offensive missiles. If he meant it, that is a major shift in the Soviet position.

Dobrynin also said that U.S. representatives might be invited to visit a big new radar install-ation at Krasnoyarsk, which most American experts consider a violation of the ABM agreement--another possible big change in the Soviet position concerning on-site inspections.

The Reagan Administration is entitled to suggest that the best place for the Soviets to make helpful shifts in their negotiating posture is in Geneva. Indeed, the Russians may have been less interested in sending serious signals than in exploiting a major American media event to their own advantage by making vague formulations for which they cannot be held accountable.

For its own part, however, the Administration may find it hard to ignore the unease over Washington’s present arms-control policies that was clearly reflected in Atlanta by highly respected American experts in the field, including some with service in Republican administrations. President Reagan could do himself and the country a favor by taking the implied criticism to heart.