Shaping Up the Kremlin

White House efforts to head off exaggerated notions of what can be expected from the summit meeting between President Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev at Geneva in November are well taken. A face-to-face meeting can be helpful, but at this time it appears doubtful that any major advances in U.S.-Soviet relations are in the offing.

The major political shuffle currently under way in Moscow suggests, however, that the outlook could change by November.

After only four months in office, Gorbachev remains an unknown quantity--especially with respect to his vision of the Soviet role in the world and his intentions toward the United States. But he is moving with remarkable speed and self-assurance to assert control over the instruments of power in the Kremlin.

Since Gorbachev took over in March, there have been reports that Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko was really calling the shots on U.S.-Soviet relations, and that the new Soviet leader was content to leave things that way until he had the domestic side of Soviet policy well in hand. Gorbachev, it turns out, had other ideas.

At Gorbachev’s direction, the Supreme Soviet on Tuesday elevated Gromyko to the largely ceremonial job of president. His successor is Eduard A. Shevardnadze, a provincial police chief and party bureaucrat who has virtually no experience in foreign affairs.

Only a day earlier, the 57-year-old Shevardnadze was promoted to full membership in the ruling Politburo, replacing Grigory Romanov, who himself is only 62--young by Soviet leadership standards. At the same time, two other Gorbachev men were promoted to the Central Committee Secretariat, which is the power center of the huge Soviet bureaucracy.

Romanov, a former Leningrad party leader, was regarded as a representative of the military-industrial complex. Does his downfall mean a lessening of military influence in the Politburo? Possibly. But Romanov’s rumored opposition to Gorbachev’s meteoric rise is the more likely reason.

Shevardnadze--not a household name either inside or outside the Soviet Union--has credentials mainly as a tough anti-corruption crusader. His travels abroad have been mainly to Third World countries--leading to speculation that, whereas Gromyko considered the U.S.-Soviet relationship to be paramount, his successor may be preparing to concentrate on North-South issues.

Gromyko will probably continue to exert an influence on the Soviet Union’s foreign policy until Shevardnadze is up to speed in his new job. But, by having his own man at the Foreign Ministry, Gorbachev seems to be serving notice that he is already prepared to be the ultimate arbiter of Soviet foreign policy.

The foreign policy of every nation, including the United States, is heavily influenced by domestic considerations. It is clear that Gorbachev’s first priority is to get the ponderous Soviet economy moving again. By Western logic, that should translate into a need for a period of calm in U.S.-Soviet relations in order to encourage maximum Soviet access to Western trade and technology.

But Soviet logic may be different. Gorbachev may feel the need for an outside enemy to justify internally repressive measures. Or he may pursue a split-level policy of sweet reason toward Western Europe combined with a tough, vituperative policy toward the United States.

Whatever the answer, one thing seems increasingly clear: It will be Gorbachev, not the hold-overs of the older generation, who will be calling the shots.