Weinberger and ‘Star Wars’

Weinberger offers seven reasons to proceed with the SDI program, all of them supporting the thesis that the path to peace is by way of achieving invulnerability. That thesis is offered to counter the notion that vulnerability contributes to peace.

As in many arguments to support one thesis or another, those arguments are made as special pleading without looking at the whole picture. Thus, when country A feels assured that its antagonist, country B, is vulnerable, A is confident that B won’t start anything. Then B’s vulnerability, so A argues, is an assurance of peace. But how does B see it, especially if A has moved to make itself invulnerable? It is clear that B would view A as putting itself in a position for a successful first strike and it then would make every attempt to catch up.

We must realize that the Soviet Union and the United States do not trust each other. Whatever program one side adopts the other will, in its planning, counter under the assumption of “worst case”; that is, it must assume that the antagonist will use every device to overcome the other in a critical situation and when it assesses the potential nuclear damage it will assume that the enemy will impose the maximum possible under its capabilities. That is what it must plan for even if it is not likely to happen.

For example: In conventional weaponry the Soviet Union has overwhelming strength in Europe. The “worst case” in this situation is that the Soviet Union will invade with these weapons, either with or without support of its SS-20s aimed at Europe. We counter with the deployment in Europe of fast accurate short-range missiles. That, of course, would not be the end of the matter for we both have strategic missiles aimed at each other. At each step in its plan the two antagonists must consider that the other will strike first.

Those who believe that the Strategic Defense Initiative is really “creating options for a safe world” simply ignore the fact that the antagonist will see the move as preparation for a possible first strike and, under the “worst-case” hypothesis, take steps to forestall the possibility.

If invulnerability is to be effective it must be absolute, for otherwise the antagonist will seek and exploit any “window for vulnerability.” In any case there will be a period of time, even if absolute invulnerability is attainable, when the advent is foreseeable. In that time the antagonist will be under the greater temptation to strike first rather than accept the prospect of losing its independence. Striving for invulnerability thus becomes the greatest hazard to world stability.

The only way out of that dilemma is for both powers to work together in a common laboratory to achieve whatever measure of defensive capability is possible at the same time.

PAUL LANSMAN

Arroyo Grande