Deterrent to the Soviets Is Weakening in Europe

For years the conventional wisdom has been that the Soviets would not attack in Europe because the end result would almost certainly be nuclear war--and the destruction of the Soviet Union as well as the United States.

That’s still a good bet. But anybody who travels through Western Europe, and has the opportunity to talk with both European and American military experts, finds a near-consensus that the odds are moving in the wrong direction.

The concern is not really that the Soviets are about to send their tank columns pouring across West Germany and the Lowlands to the North Sea. Defense planners and political leaders do worry, however, that as Moscow perceives a pronounced military superiority in the Soviet favor it may become less careful to avoid situations that could escalate into conflict.

There is also a concern that the Soviets will gain enough power of intimidation to achieve the political domination of Western Europe without firing a shot.

Despite the anti-American, anti-NATO drift of the opposition parties in West Germany and Great Britain, a political shift of that magnitude is not in the immediate offing, but the military tilt within Europe has gone much further than most people realize.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, since its earliest days, has not seriously tried to match the Soviets, soldier for soldier or tank for tank, in conventional, non-nuclear forces. If the Soviets were so foolish as to invade Europe, the strategy called for a knockout blow by long-range American nuclear forces.

As long as we could nuke the Soviets but they couldn’t nuke us, the United States and its allies could be confident that the Soviet Union would remain deterred from starting anything.

As the Soviets developed and deployed nuclear forces capable of hitting the United States, however, U.S. interest grew in beefing up allied conventional forces to avoid all-or-nothing reliance on nuclear weapons. But NATO doctrine, as modified at American behest, still threatened the first use of nuclear weapons if that was what it took to stop a Soviet attack.

That has remained the basic NATO strategy. But in recent years it became less and less credible as the Soviets achieved genuine parity--perhaps even superiority--in the strategic nuclear balance with the United States, and established a clear-cut nuclear superiority within Europe through the deployment of SS-20 missiles and short-range tactical missiles capable of carrying either nuclear or conventional warheads.

The net result is that the United States and its allies no longer enjoy the advantage of nuclear superiority at any level to offset the Soviet advantage in conventional forces. Under those circumstances the NATO allies will be reluctant, to say the least, to go nuclear in order to save the day. The Soviets, knowing that, may be less deterred from adventurist actions that could lead to war.

Making a bad situation worse is the fact that the conventional balance of power within Europe has shifted even more in favor of the Russians.

In earlier years the Western allies could count on days or even weeks of warning time, from the visible evidence of mobilization and troop movements, if the Soviets ever decided to attack. Nowadays, however, the Soviets have large ground forces based well forward and in a good state of readiness.

As a result, the Russians are now much better prepared for a come-as-you-are war than their NATO counterparts, who for political reasons are badly deployed for quick and effective resistance to invading Soviet forces. They are also thinly stocked with ammunition and other stores, and heavily dependent on reserves to meet follow-up waves of Soviet attackers.

American Gen. Bernard W. Rogers, supreme commander of allied forces, has repeatedly warned that, as things stand, NATO would in a matter of days face the choice of using nuclear weapons--with all the attendant risks of escalation--or of losing the war.

Rogers wants to redress the balance by employing high-technology conventional weapons--smart bombs and the like--capable of decimating Soviet tank formations and troop reserves without resort to nuclear weapons.

Unfortunately, such technological fixes are costly. Considering the tight constraints on defense funding in this country and in Europe, it’s hard to see how sufficient high-tech weapons can be developed and deployed without cutting back on other vital elements of NATO’s defense structure.

Already questions are rising as to how long Britain can maintain both its Army on the Rhine and its increasingly expensive independent nuclear force. The French face similar budgetary strains. And the West Germans face a demographic curve that, by shrinking the draft pool, may force reductions in their contribution of military manpower to the alliance.

No doubt the effectiveness of the allied forces can be improved at present spending levels through such measures as greater commonality of weapons and ammunition, and better communications among allied forces. Realistically, though, you can only go so far without spending more money. Unfortunately, European political leaders are loath to tell that unpleasant news to their constituencies.

But letting things slide could be perilous.

If a confrontation developed that seemed to carry the danger of war, the NATO countries could not even take the precaution of moving active divisions forward and calling up reserves without considering that the Soviets might feel compelled to launch a preemptive attack to prevent it. Faced with the situation, European governments would probably dither and do nothing until it was too late.

Since the alliance would have no chance of prevailing with conventional arms if war came, it would face an early decision on going nuclear. The best way to avoid having to make that horrible decision is to keep the Russians deterred from reckless actions that could trigger a conflict.

At present the Soviets may be 90% sure that the United States would not in fact risk its own destruction by using nuclear weapons to stop a conventional Soviet attack in Europe. Hopefully, the Kremlin will remain reluctant to find out.

If the tilt in the balance of military power in Europe is allowed to continue, the larger danger is that the Russians will sooner or later overestimate their powers of intimidation and gamble that in a showdown the Western powers will blink first. That could be a fateful day for us all.