With Funds Low, Mexican Military Halts Expansion, Changes Its Role

The Mexican military, which a few years ago was being showered with new equipment and plans for expansion, has had to lower its expectations.

Mexico’s poor economic performance over the past five years has meant that there is no money to pay for new hardware or more troops.

The planned buildup had worried some politicians, who feared that a stronger Mexican military establishment might follow the example set elsewhere in Latin America and meddle in government. But military growth has been stunted, and fears of a coup have proven so far to be unfounded.

Meanwhile, the main mission of Mexico’s armed forces has undergone a change that was probably not expected.

Ten years ago this month, the armed forces put down an insurgent threat, and planners expected the military to turn its attention to Central American guerrilla movements that might spill over into Mexico. But Defense Minister Juan Arevalo Gardoqui said recently, in what might have been an overstatement, “There are no guerrillas in Mexico.”

Busy in Anti-Drug Work

Thus, the military now is focusing much of its attention on enforcing anti-drug laws. At any one time, about 30% of the military is engaged in searching for and burning off marijuana and opium poppy crops and pursuing traffickers in illicit drugs.

Emphasizing the military’s new role, Arevalo said, “Be assured that we will work harder to eradicate (drugs) . . . , to finish off this evil that has done so much harm to our youth and the youth of other countries.”

Mexico’s military has long been an anomaly in Latin America; for more than half a century it has submitted to civilian rule.

By comparison with neighbors to the north and south, Mexico has a puny military establishment. The military budget is about $800 million a year, less than 2% of the overall budget for 1986. The United States, by contrast, will put close to $300 billion into defense in 1986, more than a quarter of its budget.

Mexico, with a population of 70 million, has about 150,000 men under arms. Nicaragua, with a population of 3.5 million, has 100,000 men in the regular army and the militia.

Had Planned Buildup

In the late 1970s, Mexico’s armed forces were planning an unprecedented buildup; by 1986, the number of men under arms was to exceed 200,000. The vision of a militarily stronger Mexico came with a boom in oil revenues and a feeling that Mexico needed to protect its oil wells, to secure its borders and project an image of a strong and modern nation.

Some of the oil dollars went to buy armored cars and reconnaissance vehicles. A new, $200-million school for officers was opened. Mexico began manufacturing German-designed G-3 rifles. The army built its first tank.

Mexico also acquired 12 F-5E jet fighters from the United States at a cost of $106 million. The planes are considered by some authorities to be of questionable value to an army used essentially for internal security.

“The purchase was strictly for image,” a foreign military observer remarked. “Mexico wanted to look like a power.”

The buildup ended with the inauguration, in 1982, of Miguel de la Madrid as president. Having inherited an economy in chaos, De la Madrid has struggled to cut government spending. The military, though not suffering cutbacks, ceased to grow significantly.

No Growing Insurgency

Mexico is often perceived as the ultimate domino in an unstable region, its military as a last resort in case of unrest. But there is no indication that ending the military buildup is contributing to instability.

No insurgency has developed despite continuing and desperate economic problems. The cities, including bloated Mexico City, are orderly. The southern border, although a fluid crossing point for Guatemalan guerrillas and a growing refugee population, is quiet.

There have been rumors, as usual, of a coup against the civilian government, but they have proved, as usual, to be without substance. Military leaders go out of their way to pledge loyalty to the civilian system.

In ceremonies at a military school this fall, Defense Minister Arevalo lavished praise on De la Madrid, saying, “We do our duty with enthusiasm, thanking destiny for being able to serve under a serious, austere, efficient and patriotic command.”

Arevalo is related to De la Madrid by marriage.

The stability has permitted the armed forces to expand its role in the anti-narcotics campaign. It inherited the job from the police forces, which were considered more prone to corruption.

Role Well-Publicized

The armed forces’ role is well-publicized, considering the customary secrecy about the military in this country. Soldiers with rifles and steel helmets are routinely pictured pulling up marijuana plants and opium poppies.

Hardly a month goes by without publication of a report that acres of such plants have been destroyed by soldiers using helicopters supplied by the United States. Early in December, Arevalo announced that his troops had destroyed more than 10,000 tons of marijuana in the past three years, along with 40,000 acres of poppies.

Arevalo is considered to be enthusiastic about drug eradication. “If deceived and needy campesinos would stop planting thousands of hectares with poppies and marijuana, there would be more food for the people,” he once said.

He bristles at suggestions--and there are many of them--that soldiers and their commanders have fallen prey to the lure of quick drug money.

“The Mexican army is clean of corruption,” he said in June.

In countries to the south, soldiers are a common sight in most towns and cities. Not in Mexico. Men in uniform are rarely seen here, except in parades, even though the military dominates some remote villages and there is a military governor in the state of Chiapas, which borders on Guatemala.

Illiterates Educated

The military acquires its recruits from around the regional bases and, by all accounts, has little difficulty filling its ranks. A private is paid $70 a month, along with food and clothing, and this is adequate incentive for many of Mexico’s poor. The military also prides itself on being an educator; illiterates accepted for service are taught to read.

Despite an effort to streamline the military, it is top-heavy with officers. At least 300 aging generals cling to their posts.

In further contrast with neighbor countries, the military here does not see itself as an arbiter in politics or as the protector of the people against inept politicians. The absence of this sort of paternalism may have its roots in history, for the Mexican military has not performed particularly well in its periods in the limelight.

Its most famous general, Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, an off-and-on caudillo , or political strongman, for many years following independence from Spain, lost Texas to the United States. Another general and regional warlord, Porfirio Diaz, had himself reelected to the presidency six times, bringing on the revolution of 1910.

Earthquake Effort

Mexico’s present ruling faction, the Institutional Revolutionary Party, has used the military to put down unrest, and this has made the people mistrustful of the military.