Soviets May Finally Want Arms Control

Mikhail S. Gorbachev’s proposed timetable for the elimination of all nuclear weapons by the end of the century should be taken seriously--not as a blueprint but as evidence that the Soviet Union may be ready for major concessions in arms-control negotiations. It is at least possible that, as in the mid-1950s, the Soviet Union may be so worried about nuclear developments in Europe that it is willing to negotiate in a new spirit. Thirty years ago the West missed a rare opportunity. It cannot afford to make the same mistake again.

Several flaws in the Gorbachev proposal are immediately obvious. It proposes the “complete elimination of intermediate-range missiles of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. in the European zone, both ballistic and cruise missiles, as a first step toward ridding the European continent of nuclear weapons.” But the Soviet SS-20 is a mobile missile and, if deployed in the Asiatic region of the Soviet Union, could be redeployed in the European region during a crisis.

In the second stage, nuclear powers are asked to eliminate their battlefield nuclear weapons or those having a range of 1,000 kilometers. But Soviet missiles deployed in Eastern Europe would still have sufficient range at 1,000 kilometers to hit most of the great capitals of Europe. London is less than 1,000 kilometers from the borders of East Germany. Western missiles in Europe with a range of less than 1,000 kilometers would not be able to hit major Soviet cities.

Finally, from the Administration’s perspective it is unacceptable that the Soviet proposal be conditioned on U.S. willingness to forgo the Reagan Administration’s Space Defense Initiative.

But it is interesting that the Gorbachev proposal has as another condition that Britain and France pledge not to enlarge their nuclear arsenals. Today these two powers plan to increase their current force of roughly 300 land- and sea-based missile warheads to at least 1,200 warheads. Lt. Gen. George M. Seignious II, former head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, has pointed out that, once modernized, the British and French nuclear forces will have awesome power: “The warheads of one British submarine firing Trident II missiles could eliminate the U.S.S.R. as a major power.” Even Hitler did not have such power.

There is a suggestion here of history repeating itself. During President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s second term, Harold Stassen, then in charge of disarmament negotiations with the Soviets, became convinced that the Soviet Union was so alarmed by the development of a British deterrent that it would go to new lengths for an agreement preventing further nuclear proliferation. Indeed, in May, 1955, the Soviets had introduced a comprehensive, three-part proposal: measures for the relaxation of international tensions; a program for reducing armaments and prohibiting atomic weapons, and an outline for a system of international control. The disarmament sections went further to meet Western concerns than any earlier Soviet proposals. The proposal for international control, for example, suggested more extensive means of assuring compliance than any previous Soviet proposals.

Stassen, who had assumed his duties only a few months before, recognized the opportunity and received Eisenhower’s authorization--over the misgivings of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles--to explore, with the Soviets, a far-reaching proposal that would prohibit the manufacture or detonation of nuclear weapons except by the three existing nuclear powers, weapons to be used only in response to an atomic attack on themselves or in accordance with a United Nations decision.

Fearing that military or allied opposition would lead to a reversal of his instructions, Stassen on May 30 presented an informal memorandum to the Soviet delegation--without consulting the allies.

For a few tantalizing moments the Soviet reaction suggested that progress might be possible. But the extremely harsh reaction of the allies caused Eisenhower, as he stated in his memoirs, “acute embarrassment.” The United States backed away from its own position. When a revised proposal reflecting allied concerns was presented, the Soviets immediately rejected it.

Now, 29 years later, a new opportunity may be at hand. The Soviet Union is once again worried about the nuclear plans of America’s allies (as well as U.S. deployments in Europe). The Soviet Union is once again under new leadership seeking to improve the standard of living for the Soviet people. Both superpowers, once again, stand at the end of a new technological age. In the 1950s, it was the looming age of the missile. In the 1980s, it is the exotic prospect of moving the arms race into space.

The Eisenhower Administration proved too divided, internally, to exploit the opportunity. The record of the last year suggests that the Reagan Administration suffers from even greater internal divisions. If a new opportunity does indeed exist, therefore, the President must move quickly to bring order into an Administration increasingly famous for a lack of it.