Impact of Cold on Shuttle Discounted : NASA Proceeded With Launch After Conference on Dangers to Challenger

Concerns about how cold weather might affect “the integrity” of seals between sections of the space shuttle Challenger’s solid rocket boosters were discussed--and then discounted--on the eve of the catastrophic launch, a senior National Aeronautics and Space Administration official revealed Thursday.

Judson A. Lovingood, deputy manager of NASA’s Marshall Space Flight center, said that chief engineers and project managers for both NASA and the manufacturer of the booster rockets considered the potential impact of sub-freezing temperatures on the so-called “O rings” during a telephone conference.

Their concerns, however, apparently were allayed, as Lovingood said representatives of the rocket manufacturer, Morton Thiokol, “recommended to proceed in the launch.”

Presidential Commission

Lovingood was one of seven top-ranking NASA officials to testify before a 13-member commission impaneled by President Reagan to investigate the tragic Jan. 28 flight. It was the commission’s first public meeting, and the NASA witnesses attempted to present an elementary primer on the shuttle program and space agency policies.

After fielding numerous questions about weather as a potential cause in the explosion, Arnold D. Aldrich, manager of NASA’s Space Transportation Systems Program, told the commission the only worry was about the potential for slight damage to thermal tiles: “We had no concerns for performance safety of the flight articles, nor do I at this time.”

NASA officials have been extremely reticent about discussing what might have caused the Jan. 28 tragedy, and Lovingood’s remarks represented the first public admission by the space agency that questions were raised concerning the ability of Challenger’s twin booster rockets to operate in cold weather.

Commission members--many of whom bring impressive aerospace credentials to the panel--repeatedly made specific inquiries about the circumstances of the Challenger accident, only to be given vague explanations or assurances that more detailed information would be forthcoming.

At one point, William P. Rogers, former secretary of state and attorney general, felt impelled to directly implore the NASA witnesses to “relate a little more to Challenger and what happened to it. Otherwise it all becomes a little bit abstract.”

Mysterious Plume

The commission members were shown photographs--released to the media by NASA last Saturday--that depict a mysterious plume jetting from the starboard solid rocket. The plume appears 13 seconds before the explosion at a point near one of the seams that bind the multi-sectional missile.

The boosters are designed to provide the extra power needed to hurl the shuttle and its huge fuel tank into space. Ordinarily, they are blown away from the ascending craft two minutes into flight and drop by parachute into the ocean.

While NASA officials gave no official interpretation of the photographs, sources within the space agency have said it is thought the plume depicted a leak from a booster rocket seam that heated the adjoining fuel tank to the point of explosion.

Temperatures the night before the launch had dropped into the mid-20s and it was 32 degrees when the shuttle lifted off--the coldest launch temperature in 25 shuttle missions. Outside rocket experts have speculated that cold weather might have altered booster performance.

Lovingood said that on the night before launch a telephone conference was held about the weather and its effect on the rockets’ O rings. The rings of synthetic rubber are placed in joints between each piece of the 11-section rocket, and are supposed to act as a sealant against pressure leaks.

The prelaunch conference involved experts at the Marshall Center in Huntsville, Ala., where NASA propulsion operations are centered, the launch site at Kennedy Space Center, Fla., and a Morton Thiokol facility in Brigham, Utah.

“The discussion centered around the integrity of the O rings under lower temperatures,” Lovingood said. “We had the project managers for both Marshall and Thiokol in the discussion. We had the chief engineers for both places, as well, in the discussion.

“And Thiokol recommended to proceed in the launch. So they did recommend launch. But we did have a meeting where there was concern about low temperatures.”

It was not clear from Lovingood’s testimony who first raised questions about cold weather, and what specific impact on the O rings was envisioned.

A spokesman for Morton Thiokol said he could not confirm Lovingood’s version of events, since all records have been impounded by NASA’s in-house board conducting its own investigation of the tragedy.

“I have no way to find that out,” said Rocky Raab, manager of public relations. “Virtually all the records that we have, including records of prelaunch meetings and reviews, were impounded by NASA and we don’t have access to those. . . . We are getting information from NASA the same as you are, and only as much as you are.”

According to specifications, the rockets are supposed to have a core temperature of 40 degrees or more for safe operation.

Temperature Report

Asked about this, Lovingood said the 40-degree requirement is “a propellant mean bulk temperature, and it was predicted that the mean bulk temperature would be 55 degrees before launch. And it was reported to me that that is what it was.”

He said, however, that there was no thermometer inside the rocket to measure the temperature. The temperature, Lovingood explained, “is a calculation” based on temperatures outside the rocket.

Earlier in the proceeding, another NASA official confirmed for the first time that representatives of Rockwell International, which built the shuttle, expressed concerns less than an hour before the 11:38 a.m. EST launch about ice still hanging from the launch pad and how it might damage thermal tiles needed to protect the craft from heat during re-entry.

“We did not see a credible threat to the orbiter,” said Aldrich, “except for the Rockwell International orbiter contractor, who at (a prelaunch) meeting expressed some concern that there might be a slightly higher risk for the orbiter (thermal protection system) because this was a condition we had no experience with.”

Icicles on Pad

NASA previously refused to confirm reports that a Rockwell official had tried to halt the launch out of fear icicles he saw hanging from the launch pad might damage the orbiter. Rockwell also has declined comment.

Most of the rest of the daylong session was devoted to an exhaustive overview of NASA operations and the shuttle vehicle, a briefing that at times seemed to leave some members of the commission impatient for more detailed information about the Challenger flight.

Commission member Albert D. Wheelon, a physicist who serves as senior vice president of the Hughes Aircraft Co.’s Space and Communications Group, asked the most pointed questions, at one time seeking to determine if tape recordings existed of meetings at which key prelaunch decisions were made.

He was told there were no such recordings.

Other members also sought to elicit details about the history of various Challenger engines, previous mishaps and data recorded during the 73-second flight.

With few exceptions, they were told by NASA officials that the information would be forthcoming at later meetings.

It was clear that the commission and NASA are still sorting out their relationship to one another. The White House said the commission was selected with an eye toward experts “with no ax to grind.” For the present, however, they are at the mercy of NASA to gather and provide information about shuttle operations in general and the Challenger flight in particular.

The commission has yet to hire a staff or develop a working agenda, and throughout the day discussions were being held between White House aides and NASA officials in the hallway of the National Academy of Science auditorium where the opening session was staged.

“No one knows what is going on,” said one frustrated NASA aide. “The whole thing is a mess.”

Perhaps most importantly, there doesn’t yet appear to be a consensus among commissioners over whether they should hold public meetings or meet behind closed doors. One member expressed concern about asking “stupid questions” in public.

Private Meeting Planned

The commission was to hold a private meeting today. Rogers said the public would not be allowed because classified material might be discussed. He also said it was important to meet privately from time to time to help commissioners fully air their thoughts.

Rogers was flanked at the session by former astronaut Neil A. Armstrong, the first man to walk on the moon, and Sally K. Ride, the first American woman in space. Popular test pilot Charles (Chuck) Yeager, the first man to break the sound barrier, was absent from the proceeding, as was Massachusetts Institute of Technology aeronautics professor Eugene Covert.

A 13th commissioner, Joseph F. Sutter, was named to the panel by President Reagan on Thursday. Sutter, executive vice president of Boeing, was involved in the development of the 747 wide-body jet.

After the meeting, some commissioners said it was too early to make any judgments about how they will proceed during the 120 days Reagan has given them to investigate the Challenger tragedy, find its cause and make recommendations about how to prevent similar disasters in the future.

“It’s obvious how serious it would be if we couldn’t come up with a decision about what caused it,” Nobel Prize-winning physicist Richard Feynman told reporters. “It would be very difficult to put another shuttle up without knowing what happened to this one. And imagine how we would feel if we did put another one up without knowing and the same thing happened again.”