Rattling the Pentagon

President Reagan’s appointment of a Commission on Defense Management was greeted last July with understandable skepticism. After all, the pattern is for the findings of presidential study commissions to be announced with great fanfare--then promptly forgotten. And the new commission was created by an Administration that denied in advance the need for fundamental reforms in the way the Pentagon is run.

It is possible that the dismal pattern of study-and-forget will be repeated. But there is a good chance that, this time, something will be done.

The recommendations made by the presidential commission last week call for far-reaching reorganization of the weapons-acquisition process as well as of the way the Joint Chiefs of Staff function. Most of the proposed changes are similar to Pentagon reform proposals that already are making their way through Congress. Reagan himself finds it prudent to express general support for the commission’s recommendations.

The commission, headed by California industrialist David Packard, was created amid the public furor over fraud by defense contractors, $600 toilet seats and other abuses. But the group properly concentrated on the larger causes of waste and inefficiency, the correction of which could save taxpayers billions of dollars and create more effective fighting forces in the bargain.

As things stand, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are made up of the top military officers of the four services--each of whom is intent on protectingthe interests of his own branch--plus a relatively powerless chairman appointed by the President. The process encourages duplication of functions among the services, avoidance of hard choices among competing weapon systems, and a defense budget that owes more to log-rolling among the services than to a conscious effort to match available resources to global strategy.

The Packard Commission proposes new powers for the chairman of the Joint Chiefs--including authority over the Joint Staff, which now reports to the Joint Chiefs as a body, and a greater role in drawing up defense budgets that rise above the parochial desires of the individual services.

Among other things, the commission also would create a high-level procurement czar to oversee all military spending plans and, if the job is handled right, to demand more realistic cost estimates and more rigorous operational testing of new weapons before too much money is invested.

Packard urges a strong code of ethics among defense contractors--and sure punishment of those who cheat. Finally, the commission wants Congress to approve defense budgets on two-year cycles, instead of annually, to help smooth out the erratic ups and downs in the weapons-buying process--a phenomenon that Packard says wastes billions of dollars a year.

The House has already passed legislation that would enhance the powers of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in much the same way proposed by the Packard Commission. The Senate Armed Services Committee is ready to vote out an even more ambitious bill.

Chairman Les Aspin (D-Wis.) of the House Armed Services Committee, who himself is highly critical of present Pentagon management, cautions that “a look at (past) procurement reforms . . . would indicate that sometimes reforms cause bigger problems than the old ones they seek to solve.” Indeed, Congress must avoid adding new layers of bureaucracy without eliminating old ones--a point especially to be remembered in considering the proposal for a procurement czar.

But most of the major reforms included in pending legislation, and backed now by the Packard Commission, are the result of a winnowing process that has been going on for several years. They hold great promise of making the defense establishment more effective. It is vital to take advantage of the existing momentum for reform by enacting corrective legislation this year.