Miranda Rule Curbed Again by High Court : Justices Hold Confession Valid Even When Police Fail to Tell Suspect That Lawyer Wants to See Him

Over bitter dissent, the Supreme Court ruled Monday that a criminal confession is valid even after police mislead a lawyer about an impending interrogation--and then fail to inform a suspect that the attorney wants to see him before he is questioned.

The justices, again limiting the controversial Miranda rule, held 6 to 3 that there was no need to overturn a conviction when officers “are less than forthright” with an attorney seeking to aid a suspect.

A requirement that police officers tell a suspect of an attorney’s effort would provide only minimal constitutional protection--and would come at “a substantial cost to society’s legitimate and substantial interest in securing admissions of guilt,” Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote for the court.

In an outspoken 35-page dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justices William J. Brennan Jr. and Thurgood Marshall, said that the majority had “flouted the spirit” of the justice system.

“Today, incommunicado questioning is embraced as a societal goal of the highest order that justifies police deception of the shabbiest kind,” Stevens said.

O’Connor replied that the court was doing “nothing of the kind” and called the dissenters’ “misreading” of the requirements of its 1966 Miranda decision “breathtaking in its scope.”

Monday’s decision left intact the 20-year-old court-imposed rule that police officers must inform suspects of their rights to silence and to counsel before interrogation. And policemen still must permit suspects to talk to a lawyer when they wish to and may not interfere with an attorney representing a defendant already charged with a crime.

However, the ruling was a clear victory for the Reagan Administration and prosecutors in 30 states, including California, who had urged the justices to overturn a lower court ruling that invalidated three confessions made by a Rhode Island man accused of beating a young woman to death with a metal pipe in 1977.

The justices in recent years have consistently restricted the scope of the Miranda rule, which has been widely attacked by law enforcement officials. Last term, for example, the court ruled that an initial failure to warn suspects of their Miranda rights did not foreclose further questioning after a valid warning.

In Monday’s case (Moran vs. Burbine, 84-1485), police officers in Cranston, R.I., arrested Brian K. Burbine on a charge of breaking and entering but later received information implicating him in the murder of Mary Jo Hickey in Providence.

Waived Right to Counsel

A local public defender, contacted by a relative of Burbine about the breaking-and-entering charge, called police at night saying that she would act as his counsel in the burglary case if he were questioned. An unidentified officer said that Burbine would not be interrogated in the breaking-and-entering case until morning and did not mention the murder investigation. Meanwhile, police officers warned Burbine of his right to counsel but did not mention the call from the public defender. He waived his rights, rejecting counsel, and confessed.

Burbine was convicted of murder, but a federal appeals court in Boston found later that police officers had deprived him of information he needed to make a “knowing and intelligent” decision about his need for counsel.

But the Supreme Court held that the policemen had done all that was required under the Miranda rule, rejecting the suggestion that officers must inform suspects of “any and all information” that might be useful to them.

The court expressed its “distaste” for the officers’ conduct and said that, in “more egregious” situations, such actions might constitute a violation of a suspect’s right to due process of law.

The justices conceded that several lower courts have reached contrary conclusions and noted that nothing in Monday’s decision prevented states from requiring officers to inform suspects when an attorney has called. A long-pending case raising similar issues is now before the California Supreme Court.

Mary Broderick of the National Legal Aid and Defender Assn. said that the ruling represented “another example of the end-justifies-the-means decisions” by the court. “It certainly sets a bad tone when the Supreme Court implicitly condones such conduct by police,” she said.

California Deputy Atty. Gen. Dane R. Gillette praised the ruling and discounted the possibility that it would encourage violations of individual rights. “To obtain a confession, police will still have to advise a suspect of his rights. Once he says he wants an attorney, there’s no further questioning.”

Cleanup Taxes Limited

In another decision Monday, the court ruled 7 to 1 that states may not tax chemical firms and other companies for hazardous waste cleanup costs covered under the $1.6-billion federal Superfund program.

The justices, ruling in a New Jersey case (Exxon vs. Hunt, 84-978), said that states may tax companies for cleanup expenses not covered under the federal program--such as oil spills--as well as the costs of compensating private parties for damage from hazardous wastes and to pay for personnel, equipment, administrative and research costs not provided for under the Superfund program.

Deputy Atty. Gen. Reed Sato of California said that state officials would study the ruling to assess the potential impact on state hazardous waste programs. However, preliminary indications were that the decision would not adversely affect state programs financed under a multimillion-dollar bond issue approved by voters in 1984, he said.

Leslie Dach of the National Audubon Society noted that legislation is pending in Congress to give states the authority they lack under the court decision.