Official Tells of Decision-Making : Reagan OKd Plans for Earlier Attacks

Time after time, in the shadowy war against terrorism, President Reagan has secretly given approval in principle for military strikes against suspected terrorist targets, and “time after time we’ve decided not to carry them out,” according to a senior Administration official.

But last Wednesday, when Reagan signed the National Security Decision Directive that granted authority in principle for military action against Libya, things were different. This time, officials close to the operation said Tuesday, it would have taken a major new development to derail the response that came to be code-named Operation El Dorado Canyon.

Once U.S. intelligence analysis of cable traffic between Tripoli and the Libyan Embassy in East Berlin provided what Administration officials viewed as hard evidence linking Libyan leader Moammar Kadafi with the April 5 bombing of a West Berlin discotheque, the die was cast.

A strong consensus developed among top Administration officials to resort to the military option, and Reagan quickly gave the go-ahead for planning the raids.

“Contingency plans to strike back had been on for months and months and months,” said a source in the U.S. intelligence community. “There were a variety of possible targets that were taken off the contingency shelves, and they were renewed and validated last week. It was a carefully chosen package whose targets could be related to military support of Kadafi’s terrorist infrastructure and his command post--his bunker, in effect.”

“The Administration decided to make a major overall effort to make the case that whatever we did was viewed as a proportional response and self-defense against future action,” according to a White House official who declined to be identified.

“An extensive plan was laid out for making the case internally within our own government and among our allies,” he said.

Thus, U.S. diplomats consulted extensively with the European allies in the days leading up to Tuesday’s attack. An 11th-hour session was held with key congressional leaders. And White House spokesman Larry Speakes said Reagan retained veto power over the operation until 6:59 p.m. EST--1:59 a.m. Libya time--one minute before the strike began.

Authority of Planners

Yet there is no indication that Reagan ever thought seriously about exercising his veto. And by delegating his approval so early in the process, the President also turned over an enormous amount of authority to his military planners.

Speakes said the decision to strike Monday evening (Washington time) was made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and conveyed to Reagan by his national security planning team. “When they came to him and said, ‘Is Monday night all right?’ the President said, ‘Fine, Monday night’s OK.’ ”

Asked in a White House briefing whether Reagan’s decision was contingent on diplomatic and congressional consultations or whether the military option would have gone forward regardless of the reaction in those two communities, Speakes said, “It was to go forward.”

He noted that U.N. Ambassador Vernon A. Walters had carried letters to European leaders over the weekend informing them of Reagan’s decision to use military force without divulging the timing of the mission. “They were told that the President had decided on the military option and we’d go from there,” Speakes said.

Red Light Warnings

As planning moved forward, Administration officials said several points were reached at which a red light might have flashed:

--Although Reagan’s approval in principle came a full five days before the actual raid, officials said he might have been persuaded to back off if the allies had been willing to take drastic economic action and cut off all trade with Libya.

“If they had come up with a package of meaningful sanctions, we probably could have been dissuaded from a military response,” said the intelligence official. But that was never in the cards, and a State Department official termed the action finally taken by the European Communities “half a loaf.”

--If members of Congress had “vehemently opposed it” in the briefing session shortly before the attack, an Administration official said, the President might have pulled back. “But they didn’t. And that probably was the final hurdle in the decision-making process,” an official said.

Sen. Robert C. Byrd (D-W.Va.) complained about being informed of Reagan’s plans so late, telling the President in the White House session, “There are a few people up here (on Capitol Hill) who can be trusted.” Similarly, Sen. Claiborne Pell (D-R.I.) questioned whether the military response was an overreaction; Administration officials defended it as “proportionate.”

Covert Military Acts

And when one congressman asked why covert measures were not used to undermine Kadafi, he was told tartly, “You know how covert activities are perceived in your own body”--an apparent reference to recurrent congressional objections to covert military operations.

The final piece fell into place when Vice President George Bush returned from his tour of the Middle East. Officials had not wanted to proceed with the raid while Bush was a potential target in that part of the world.

A key element in Reagan’s decision to go through with the attack was evidence uncovered by U.S. intelligence showing that Kadafi was targeting 30 more American installations around the world, primarily embassies, along with Americans virtually all over the globe.

Officials said the President was incensed by the nature of Libya’s terrorist plans. Shortly after signing the approval for military action last Wednesday, in a nationally televised press conference he described Kadafi as “a mad dog.”

Attack on Visa Line

Reagan learned that Kadafi had ordered the Libyan Embassy in Paris to carry out an attack on those standing in line for visas at the U.S. Embassy. The operation was thwarted two weeks before the bombing of the La Belle discotheque in West Berlin, prompting the French to expel two Libyan diplomats.

During the week, Reagan and several other Administration officials sent out strong signals that Washington planned a military reprisal against Libya. At the same time, perhaps to preserve some element of surprise, other officials indicated that the United States might be backing away from an attack.

Last week, for example, Donald T. Regan, White House chief of staff, said the European allies were beginning to cooperate in cracking down on terrorists and appeared to be moving toward a coordinated effort with Washington in responding to terrorist activities. The allies were much stricter in issuing visas and were putting suspected terrorists under much closer surveillance, he said.

Offer to Kadafi

And in a television interview the day before the raid on Libya, Deputy Secretary of State John C. Whitehead said the United States would cancel its widely reported threat of a military strike if Libyan leader Moammar Kadafi called off his plans for new attacks against Americans and ended his support for terrorism.

Reagan has struggled with the question of how to combat terrorism almost from the moment he took office.

A task force on terrorism headed by Vice President Bush acknowledged earlier this year that it had failed to solve Reagan’s central dilemma of how to implement his policy of “swift and effective retribution” against terrorists when innocent lives might be at stake. The Bush report, however, did say that military retaliation is possible “where it could be surgically done.”

Bombings in Lebanon

Two and a half years ago, in the aftermath of the October, 1983, terrorist bombings in Lebanon that killed 241 U.S. servicemen and 59 French paratroopers, the United States agreed in principle to join with France in a retaliatory strike against suspected terrorist sites, one Administration official said Tuesday, speaking on condition that he not be named.

Three weeks afterward, French warplanes struck a target described as a barracks occupied by pro-Iranian Lebanese Muslim militiamen, but the Reagan Administration decided at the last minute not to take part because conditions were judged not quite right.

This week there was no pullback. A consensus apparently had formed around the view of Secretary of State George P. Shultz--that while every precaution should be taken to limit innocent victims, the United States must not be barred from striking back at terrorism.

Times staff writers Michael Wines and Sara Fritz contributed to this story.