The Line of Shame : Route Flown to Hit Libya Shows How U.S. Allies View NATO

When President Reagan appeared on television Monday night to explain the Libyan strike to the American people, he was as effective as ever.

But for once he was upstaged--by a line. For by far the most dramatic thing about the Administration’s presentation was the map used by Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger to show the route taken by the F-111s on their flight from England to Tripoli and Benghazi. The line went around Brittany, the Bay of Biscay and the Iberian Peninsula, through the Straits of Gibraltar and across the Mediterranean. Nowhere between England and Libya did it touch land, though most of the land involved was that of America’s NATO allies.

According to Weinberger, the route was about 1,200 nautical miles longer than a direct flight across France, which is if anything an underestimation. But even that figure represents 2,400 extra miles of night flight and repeated in-flight refueling.

The etching of this line on the mind of the American people is likely to be the most enduring and important consequence of the Libyan episode. It is a shameful line. It shows, in the most graphic way possible, how the United States’ allies--other than Great Britain--view the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. On a question as clear-cut as terrorism, with smoking-gun evidence of Moammar Kadafi’s complicity, the Europeans were unwilling to cooperate with their major ally and protector--even to the extent of letting U.S. aircraft use their airspace. On the contrary, their main concern seems to have been to distance themselves as far as possible from America.

An increasing number of American intellectuals and politicians have already become thoroughly disenchanted with NATO: The newly isolationist liberal left dislikes the commitments that it entails, interventionist conservatives and neoconservatives feel constrained by it, and budget cutters, recognizing what a large component of America’s defense budgetit absorbs, regard it hungrily. Many are outraged at the cheap ride that Europe demands.

But up to now the American in the street --inclined to accept the dictum “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it,” and confused by the technical arguments, figures and acronyms involved--has not been moved. The stark simplicity of Weinberger’s map may change that. As soon as Reagan, Weinberger and Secretary of State George P. Shultz finished their television appearance on Monday, British pundits began appearing to explain what a dreadful mistake it all was. Of course, terrorism was awful and Moammar Kadafi unspeakable. But this was quite the wrong way to go about things. It would make a hero of him . . . unite the Arabs, embarrass Egypt, strengthen the Soviets . . . dreadful mistake by Thatcher . . . price to pay, retaliation, escalation . . . .

Two things stood out in all this:

First, a concern about everyone’s reaction to America’s action but no concern about America’s reaction to others--particularly to Europe’s behavior. This inclination to take America for granted and to be sensitive only toward the view of adversaries and to domestic political pressures is, unfortunately, typical. Anything else is likely to be reviled as subservience to Washington. It is one of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s great strengths that she is impervious to such nonsense. Her countrymen may one day have cause to be grateful for that and for the fund of good will that she has built in America as a result.

Second, unspoken but palpable was the familiar sense of European superiority, of distaste for the dangerous crudeness of the American approach to international problems. However, the crucial difference between the United States and its major European allies is not one of culture or sophistication but of power and responsibility. Really great powers confront problems and are concerned to solve them; others usually evade them for as long as possible.

It might be remembered that when Britain was truly great it took on, at considerable cost and over a long period, the task of suppressing the slave trade and piracy. It was not averse to using force to do so, realizing that nothing else was likely to get the job done, and it was not particularly scrupulous about respecting international law in the process. In retrospect the successful performance of this task stands as one of the most worthy endeavors in British foreign policy. It is one well worth bearing in mind when contemplating America’s response to terrorism.