Kadafi’s Days Numbered, U.S. Officials Say

The good news from last week’s U.S. air raid on Libya, Reagan Administration officials say, is that Col. Moammar Kadafi’s days are probably numbered.

The bad news is that whoever succeeds Kadafi will probably share most of the mercurial leader’s basic policies: anti-Americanism, fierce hostility to Israel and close relations with the Soviet Union.

And beyond the impact on Libya itself, independent Middle East experts say, the raid may ultimately strengthen the hand of Arab radicals who already menace Egypt, Saudi Arabia and other moderate Arab regimes.

Satisfied With Results

Overall, Administration officials say they are satisfied with the results of the first U.S. military attack on a recognized government since the end of the Vietnam War. The United States, they say, had to prove to Libya and other countries that they would have to pay a high price for terrorist attacks against Americans.

U.S. officials hope that lesson will not go unnoticed in Libya, where Kadafi has been plagued by violent--but so far unsuccessful--opposition. Secretary of State George P. Shultz and other officials have publicly urged that Libyan military officers stage a coup against Kadafi.

A senior State Department official conceded after last Tuesday’s U.S. attack that the regime that followed Kadafi could turn out to be even more pro-Soviet than the present one. “We don’t believe a military coup is likely to be Soviet-influenced because those guys are intensely nationalistic,” he said, “but it’s a possibility.

‘From Terrible to Bad’

“That doesn’t change the premise of our policy,” he added. “We don’t believe a Soviet-client regime would be worse than what we have now. It would be like going from terrible to just bad.”

Some scholars, such as G. Henry M. Schuler of Georgetown University, believe that last week’s U.S. air strike against Libya makes a coup less likely, not more so, at least in the short run. But Schuler agreed with the Administration officials that almost any successor regime would be preferable to that of Kadafi.

“You have to assume that they’d be hostile to the United States,” he said, “but they’re not going to engage in international terrorism either, if that’s what brings Kadafi down.”

Libya’s civilian political opposition, the analysts say, has been decimated by Kadafi’s secret police and has been unable to organize underground dissent inside the country.

Resentment in Military

That leaves the military, many of whose officers are believed to resent Kadafi for sending them into losing battles in Chad, mismanaging the Libyan economy and cutting back their own perquisites and benefits.

Kadafi has also nettled some officers by announcing that he plans to abolish the army and rely solely on the people’s militia for defense--while, at the same time, arming the so-called Revolutionary Committees that are made up of his most committed followers.

For two days after the U.S. raid, officials said, military units and militiamen traded gunfire in Tripoli and several other areas of Libya in skirmishes that reflected the enmity between the two forces but failed to develop into large-scale fighting.

“There is an extreme problem between the military and the militias,” one official said. “We were surprised--and encouraged--that the single spark of our air strike could touch it off like that.”

Murder as a Tactic

But Kadafi has already detected and quashed half a dozen dissident cells within the military, usually by murdering their leaders. Any would-be successor would have to get past the elite presidential guard and could end up in a civil war with the Revolutionary Committees.

“That means you’d basically need the entire military united behind the cause,” said one official.

Outside Libya, other Arab nations may find themselves drawn closer to Kadafi by the U.S. attack.

“Even Arabs who do not sympathize with Kadafi and his ideology see this as an aggression against an Arab, Islamic and African country,” said Mary Jane Deeb of Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies in Washington.

Schuler said the Arab masses were already receptive to Kadafi’s “Yankee-bashing” tactics. “That will only get worse as a result of the raid,” he said. “I think that Kadafi’s support (outside Libya) has probably increased. That is a very great danger.”

‘David to Our Goliath’

Robert E. Hunter, a member of the National Security Council staff in the Carter Administration, said the raid will “increase support for radical forces in the area, which will be a problem for our friends--Kadafi gets to play David to our Goliath.”

But Hunter said the raid has positive aspects as well for U.S. relations with Arab states. “Countries like Saudi Arabia that realize some day they might have to rely on the United States to defend them against aggression now know that we are willing to use force,” he said. “That is a plus.”

Shultz and other Administration officials said they are not particularly concerned about criticism from other governments, such as those of France and Spain. They dismissed some of the complaints as little more than ritual denunciations issued to appease domestic public opinion, and they said Western European governments are beginning to realize how dangerous international terrorism can be.

No Effect on Decisions

In any case, the officials said, the reaction of foreign governments will not affect future decisions on how to respond to terrorist attacks on Americans.

When Shultz was asked if he was surprised that the Soviet Union underlined its protest by canceling a scheduled meeting to plan for the next summit between Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev, he said: “We didn’t try to predict (the Soviet response). It is a mistake to do too much of that.”

Schuler, like Shultz, said the ultimate result of the air strike may be to persuade Western European nations to join in economic sanctions against Libya, which they have resisted until now.

“They may not like sanctions, but they like military action even less,” Schuler said. “Their failure to support sanctions contributed to the frustration that led to this military action.

“We sent a signal not only to Kadafi but to our allies about our willingness to use force.”