Deviants’ Rights in Civil Actions Curbed

The Supreme Court ruled Tuesday that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination does not protect those who face an involuntary civil commitment as “sexually dangerous” people.

The justices, by a 5-4 vote, rejected an appeal by an Illinois man who contended that he had improperly received an indefinite commitment to a state prison psychiatric center as the result of testimony by psychiatrists who had elicited information from him during a compulsory mental examination.

Not Criminal Procedures

The court, in an opinion by Justice William H. Rehnquist, concluded that the state’s procedures were “civil” in nature, not “criminal” proceedings that would invoke the Fifth Amendment guarantee against compulsory self-incrimination.

“The state serves its purpose of treating rather than punishing sexually dangerous persons by committing them to an institution expressly designed to provide psychiatric care and treatment,” Rehnquist said.

The fact that criminal prisoners also are housed in the facility does not mean that the state intended to punish those committed under civil process, he said.

Dissent by Stevens

In dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justices William J. Brennan Jr., Thurgood Marshall and Harry A. Blackmun, said that the proceedings were so similar to the way the state prosecuted sex-related crimes that they should be considered “criminal” under the Fifth Amendment.

“The impact of an adverse judgment against an individual deemed to be a ‘sexually dangerous person’ is at least as serious as a guilty verdict in a typical criminal trial,” Stevens wrote.

He noted that civil commitments can sometimes place an individual behind bars longer than a criminal conviction for the same act--and that the stigma of being found “sexually dangerous” is as great as being labeled a criminal.

Lawyers in the case say that about one-third of the states now have special statutes for dealing with sexually dangerous people. The most recent data available indicated that in 1978 about 2,500 people in the nation were being confined under those laws.

In California, special statutes for the commitment of mentally disordered sex offenders were repealed by the Legislature in 1982. Now, sex offenders are sent to prison on conviction or, if found insane, treated under the same civil procedures as others.

Assault on Woman

The case (Allen vs. Illinois, 85-5404) involved Terry B. Allen, who was arrested for deviate sexual assault on a woman he met at a restaurant. The criminal charge was dropped when the prosecution brought civil proceedings against Allen under a law providing for commitment of people suffering from mental disorders who have shown “propensities” toward sexual assault.

A trial court ordered Allen to submit to two psychiatric examinations. Later, over Allen’s objections, the two psychiatrists testified about the examinations, concluding that he was mentally ill and likely to commit criminal assaults.

The trial judge ordered Allen’s commitment. But a state appeals court reversed the action on the grounds that it was based on psychiatric testimony obtained in violation of Allen’s privilege against self-incrimination. The Illinois Supreme Court then overturned the appellate court, finding that the proceedings were civil and that the Fifth Amendment did not apply.

In another decision, the court ruled unanimously that, under the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, North Carolina agricultural officials may be required to eliminate pay disparities between black and white workers holding the same jobs, even though they originated before the law took effect.

The justices ordered further proceedings in a case brought by black employees against the state’s Agricultural Extension Service (Bazemore vs. Friday, 85-93).

The ruling was praised by women’s and employee groups as adding strength to their campaign for “comparable worth” pay for jobs held predominantly by women and those held largely by men.

By a separate vote of 5 to 4, the justices said that the officials had no obligation to take “affirmative action” to bring blacks into largely white 4-H and Homemaker clubs.

Segregation Policy Ended

The clubs’ long-time policy of segregation was abandoned after enactment of the Civil Rights Act. The court, in an opinion by Justice Byron R. White, held that any racial imbalance that still exists is not the result of official policy and thus is not unlawful.

Previous rulings that required segregated public schools to take such steps as cross-town busing to integrate their systems do not apply in this instance because club membership is entirely voluntary, White said.