Inquiry Panels: Key Factor in Israel : Commissions Have Spurred Change, Caused Heads to Roll

During the first 20 years of Israel’s existence, the government set up an average of one investigative commission every seven weeks. Nearly half of them dealt with the controversial issue of compulsory military service for women.

That was excessive, almost everyone finally agreed. So, in 1968, the Knesset, Israel’s Parliament, enacted a law to differentiate between run-of-the-mill investigations and those undertaken by state commissions of inquiry into matters considered to be of “vital public interest.”

Still, Menachem Begin, who was prime minister at the time and concerned with clearing the names of his ideological forebears, managed in 1982 to push through a state investigation into the murder 49 years earlier of Zionist pioneer Chaim Arlosoroff. And, in 1975, a commission of inquiry looked into the question of corruption in soccer.

A Strange History

As those examples suggest, there is a long and not always glorious Israeli tradition behind the people now pressing for a judicial inquiry into the so-called Shin Bet affair, the 1984 beating deaths of two Palestinian prisoners and the subsequent coverup of security police involvement in the deaths.

A government decision on how to proceed in the Shin Bet case could come as early as this week. But in the meantime, the vehement opposition to a state inquiry by some top officials illustrates both the sensitivity of the affair and the evolution of the investigative commission as an Israeli institution.

State commissions have “become like a fourth branch of government without anyone intending them to be,” said Zev Chafets, a former Israeli government spokesman and political commentator. “The major changes in Israeli life have been made either by elections or by commissions.”

Diverting Public Anger

Chaim Cohen, a former Israeli Supreme Court justice, said that such commissions are “a lightning rod by which the government can divert the public anger and storm into a very serene, quasi-judicial channel.”

Cohen said he thinks commissions of inquiry are often “a great waste of time and money” and that they are “in vogue because it looks like an easy way out.” He went on: “You have a problem, the public is agitated, everyone cries for a victim--appoint a commission. The government itself can’t be trusted--appoint a commission.”

Even the most famous Israeli commissions of inquiry have not satisfied everyone, but they have caused some famous heads to roll.

The Agranat Commission, which looked into the nearly disastrous surprise attack on Israel by Egypt and Syria in 1973, forced the resignation of the chief of staff and several other high army officers. The commission sidestepped the issue of political responsibility, but ultimately the war ended the careers of Golda Meir, who was prime minister at the time, and Moshe Dayan, her minister of defense.

Camps Massacre Probed

In 1983, the Kahan Commission, set up to investigate the massacre of Palestinians at the Sabra and Chatilla refugee camps in Beirut, caused the dismissal of the chief of military intelligence and the resignation of Ariel Sharon as defense minister. (Sharon remained in the Cabinet as a minister without portfolio.)

The Beisky Commission, which looked into the 1983 collapse of bank shares that cost Israeli citizens billions of dollars, caused the replacement of the heads of the state bank and most leading commercial banks here.

Any state inquiry into the Shin Bet affair could have a decisive impact on the fate of the so-called national unity government, since it would presumably explore the role of Likud Bloc leader Yitzhak Shamir, who was prime minister at the time.

Shalom’s Damaging Testimony

Shamir has said he is innocent of any wrongdoing, but the outgoing head of Shin Bet, Avraham Shalom, who has resigned in return for a presidential pardon in the case, has said he acted under official orders--which could have come only from Shamir.

Shamir, now foreign minister in the coalition government, is scheduled to exchange posts with Prime Minister Shimon Peres in October under a provision of the agreement on which the coalition government is based. It is not likely that the exchange would take place in the event of an adverse finding by a commission of inquiry.

Two lower-level commissions have already considered the Shin Bet affair without generating any significant political fallout. Their powers were minimal, however, and one of the charges in the case is that they were deceived by the coverup.

Under the 1968 law, even the most powerful judicial commissions of inquiry can only make recommendations. They have the authority to summon witnesses and subpoena evidence, but they cannot dismiss, indict or order.

Great Moral Authority

Still, these commissions can have great moral authority, and this makes if difficult for politicians to ignore their recommendations.

“Woe is us that we had to accept them,” Begin lamented after the Kahan Commission made its recommendations. “I will claim this for the rest of my life.”

However, in a subsequent report to Parliament, he said, “We could not do otherwise, so that it would be known that the commission was not appointed in vain, but for the purpose of accepting its recommendations, and the state of Israel is a state of law, free and democratic.”

Chafets, who was a spokesman for the Begin government, said that at first Begin opposed the appointment of a commission of inquiry into Sabra and Chatilla. “He knew it would be a loose cannon,” Chafets said.

No Other Alternative

According to Shlomo Avineri, a political scientist at Hebrew University, Israeli politicians are likely to set loose a cannon only when they have no other choice.

There is no constitutional separation of powers in Israel such as there is in the United States, so the Knesset enjoys little of the power of the U.S. Congress to investigate government wrongdoing.

More important, the tradition here of numerous political parties and delicately balanced coalition governments makes it difficult for the group in power to clean its own house.

“If we had a one-party government, then it would be very easy for the party in power to chuck the minister of defense or the foreign minister, as the British do,” Avineri said.

But in a fragile coalition, to sack any one minister could bring down the whole alliance.

While the Israeli government structure seems to be stacked against self-policing, it is a democracy responsive to public pressure. And when the pressure builds, a commission of inquiry may be the only way to relieve it.

‘Abdicating Responsibility’

Chafets said: “What the politicians do, in effect, is say: ‘We are now abdicating responsibility,’ ” and the commission becomes “a super-constitutional way of solving all those conflicts that are otherwise insoluble in this country.”

Almost by definition, the government names a commission of inquiry only when there is sharp disagreement at the top over an issue. And that becomes the strongest guarantee that no faction in the leadership is able to see to it that the commission is constituted in its favor. Opposing factions watch each other too closely to permit this to happen.

By law, state commissions of inquiry are headed by a Supreme Court judge, and because their recommendations are not binding, continued public support is important if a commission’s opinion is to carry much weight.

This gives the news media an important role, Cohen said. “Whether they (commissions) have authority depends on what moral force they are accorded by the mass media,” he said. “In theory, you could kill them simply by silence.”

The influence of public opinion is one of the biggest question marks in the Shin Bet affair. The Israeli media have generally favored a commission of inquiry as proof of the country’s commitment to the rule of law.

Seen as Unsung Heroes

But public opinion polls indicate that a significant majority of voters would like to see the affair dropped. Israelis tend to see the Shin Bet security police, Israel’s equivalent to the FBI, as unsung heroes in the war against terrorism. And they are not willing to drag the organization’s name and methods through the mud over the deaths of two Palestinian prisoners who, only a few minutes before, had hijacked an Israeli bus in which a passenger was killed.

Even if opponents of a state inquiry win out, analysts here say, the Shin Bet affair could be a time bomb for months or years to come.

They note that the famous Lavon affair, involving an ill-fated attempt to destabilize the Egyptian government of the late Gamal Abdel Nasser, festered for years before the Israeli public even found out that their leaders were at one another’s throats over who had been responsible. The question was never answered, but fallout from the Lavon affair ultimately ended the political career of founding father David Ben-Gurion.

And the commission that investigated Arlosoroff’s assassination did not submit its final report until just 13 months ago, 52 years after his death.