Poindexter: Influence Out of the Limelight

Judging by some press accounts and talk around town, the President’s national security adviser is under siege. White House colleagues “who do not wish to be identified,” have blamed John M. Poindexter for mishandling the announcement that the United States would no longer be bound by the unratified SALT II treaty. White House spokesman Larry Speakes has “corrected” him for overstating the extent of the Administration’s internal review of South Africa policy. Congressional sources criticize him for “not being plugged into” the arcane world of Capitol Hill.

And even his warmest supporters say it is a mistake for Poindexter to avoid the press. “John doesn’t believe dealing with the press is part of his job,” says one Administration official. “He doesn’t care. But it is a mistake. Talking to the press is the way you promote and explain policy.”

Who is Poindexter and why are these people saying bad things about him? Last December, when President Reagan tapped Vice Adm. Poindexter to succeed Robert C. McFarlane as the principal White House foreign policy adviser, all agreed he had struck a perfect balance. An active-duty naval officer, Poindexter had been attached to the National Security Council staff and worked his way up to become McFarlane’s principal deputy. An “inside” man, he had studiously avoided the limelight, shunning the press, Congress and public appearances. His forte was “crisis management” and his finest hour came when he masterminded the interception of the Achille Lauro hijackers in October.

Lacking a constituency in the press and on Capitol Hill, Poindexter was deemed the perfect selection for a President who promotes the concept of Cabinet government and a Cabinet that includes such powerhouses as Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger and Secretary of State George P. Shultz. Perhaps most important, Poindexter’s aversion to the limelight and willingness to accept a role in the chain of command made him an appealing choice to Chief of Staff Donald T. Regan, a man who jealously guards his White House suzerainty.

Recognizing the built-in constraints and his own limitations, Poindexter almost immediately set out to make the most of this position. He recruited some of the Administration’s ablest national security experts, beefing up White House expertise in arms control, international economic policy and the Middle East. He created two additional positions near the top of the national security pyramid. He appointed Peter Rodman, who had served under Henry A. Kissinger and Shultz, and arms-control expert Ronald F. Lehman. As his principal deputy, Poindexter promoted from his staff Donald B. Fortier, whose Capitol Hill experience and bipartisan background made him an invaluable asset in congressional dealings.

Unfortunately, Lehman soon departed. He was named to replace John G. Tower, who unexpectedly resigned as U.S. representative to the Geneva arms talks. A bigger blow came when Fortier, at age 39, was stricken with cancer. But Poindexter refused to panic. He is still methodically searching for a replacement for Lehman while refusing to even countenance suggestions of appointing an acting deputy to replace Fortier. “You have to admit the man has character,” says one otherwise critical congressional source.

But what are the policy results of Poindexter’s steadfastness? They are, according to a number of officials, a good deal better than his critics give him credit for. Despite his acknowledged ignorance of Capitol Hill and the absence of Fortier, Poindexter did oversee the Administration’s victory in gaining $100 million in military aid for the Nicaraguan contras.

It was also on his watch that the long-simmering dispute over “the use of force” was at least temporarily resolved. The decision to bomb Tripoli brought to a head the most intense and disruptive debate--after arms control--that has existed in this Administration between the state and defense departments.

Since the Lebanon involvement in 1982, Shultz had sought to employ U.S. military power in a variety of situations, notably against international terrorism. But he was effectively checked by the defense secretary and the Joint Chiefs of Staff who, after all, have a lot to say about the use of American military power. “Weinberger and the Chiefs put up every conceivable roadblock,” said one Administration official. “But after Rome and Vienna (the December 27 terrorist attack at the Rome and Vienna airports), John began methodically taking them down.”

Together with Fortier, Poindexter convened numerous “working groups” that coordinated U.S. economic sanctions against Libya, maneuvered the Sixth Fleet into position in the Mediterranean and set the stage for the massive air strike on April 15. “Today the Pentagon is basking in the glory of what Poindexter forced them to do,” said one official.

There is an Administration-wide consensus as well, that the diplomatic benefits of the raid far exceeded expectations. “We have been vindicated 100 times over,” says one Administration official. He and others point to unexpected European cooperation in combatting terrorism, allied solidarity at the Tokyo summit, as well as a marked diminution in terrorist attacks. “Not just Libya, but Syria and Iran have also been chastened,” said one State Department official.

Administration officials say Poindexter is applying the same stolid, methodical approach to arms control and South Africa. However, on these issues, they caution not to expect similarly dramatic results. Still, they give Poindexter credit for the President’s Glassboro, New Jersey, speech which they assert has helped steer the Administration towards viable arms-control proposals and improved the chances for a summit later this year.

On South Africa, Administration insiders admit they are caught between a rising tide of congressional anger and what one senior official, with deliberate understatement, calls, “a recalcitrant South African government.” Moreover given the President’s adamant refusal to significantly alter U.S. policy toward the white-dominated regime, it would be foolish, say these insiders, for Poindexter to try to engineer a major policy shift.

And the fact is Poindexter has suggested no such thing. Instead, say his supporters, Poindexter is the victim of other White House officials and press disgruntlement with his close-mouthed style and growing influence.

Speakes, for example, is known to be dissatisfied with his own limited access to classified information. “Speakes has to feed the press every day and it drives him crazy not to know what’s going on,” says one Administration official. Others in the White House are thought to resent Poindexter’s easy access to the President. Access, an important key to power, cannot be denied the man who briefs the President on world affairs every day. Moreover, points out one Administration official, “Poindexter is the only White House official who has a large bureaucratic role. He serves as the pivot for crisis management, intelligence activities, arms control and anything else that interests the President.”

While acknowledging that criticisms from within the Administration can affect Poindexter’s influence, Administration insiders argue that in the long run these attacks are self-defeating. “It is not in the interest of the White House institutionally to make it harder for Poindexter to exercise the President’s influence.”

What does Poindexter have to say about this controversy swirling about him? Nothing, publicly. Instead, according to a number of officials who watch him closely, he will, for better or worse, continue to work effectively behind the scenes and not “give a damn” about his public image.