Gorbachev Talks Big, but Little Has Changed in Kremlin

There is more smoke than fire to Mikhail S. Gorbachev’s much-publicized campaign to transform Soviet policy and society. The general secretary talks big. At home he promises a “radical economic reform.” Abroad he stresses “the need for an urgent radical break with many conventional approaches to foreign policy.” He speaks of bringing to power a new generation of competent, vigorous and--most important--honest officials. And he is not afraid to encourage glasnost, which means public openness, as one Soviet commentator put it, “from top to bottom and from bottom to top.”

Well, not quite to the very top. Consider the Moscow TV footage of Gorbachev’s allegedly spontaneous exchange with unidentified workers in the Far East.

Gorbachev: “I will ask you one question that is always being asked everywhere. Do you have any doubts regarding our internal and foreign policies?”

Crowd: “No.”

Man: “There cannot be.”

Man: “We very much approve. We have great hopes.”

Man: “An even tougher line is needed.”

Woman: “Yes, yes.”

Glasnost, Gorbachev-style, is freedom to promote the Kremlin’s cause. Now the Politburo has launched an offensive against drunkenness, corruption and inefficiency. The Politburo is busy bringing new blood to the party and government offices. The media feel free to attack the disgraced cadres. But do not look for criticism of Gorbachev or his cronies.

True, people promoted under Gorbachev are generally more impressive than the Brezhnev crowd. But they were shaped by the same system.

Gorbachev recently compared his domestic and foreign-policy innovations to a revolution. It is nothing of the sort. His new steps have one common denominator--they are bold and conservative at the same time. They are bold in that he has no patience for the red tape, inertia, pettiness and incompetence that over the years have increasingly made the Soviet Union look like a basket case armed to the teeth.

Economic managers are being released from the intrusive supervision of overly protective officials. Soviet foreign-policy initiatives are presented with greater finesse. The ideological straitjacket over Soviet conduct has relaxed considerably.

But Gorbachev is able to move with such speed and confidence precisely because the basic thrust of his policies is conservative and is, at a minimum, acceptable to party traditionalists. Inside the Soviet Union private initiative is under new attack from a series of decrees against “unearned incomes.” Political dissent is still banned. And Jewish emigration is at a 15-year low.

Outside the Soviet Union, Gorbachev’s sweeping peace overtures are presented in the pursuit of well-established Soviet international objectives. Speaking in Warsaw on June 30, Gorbachev reaffirmed the 1968 Brezhnev doctrine. No East European state would be allowed to abandon socialism or leave the Soviet orbit. In the Third World, Moscow is determined to use military muscle to enhance its influence.

The Soviets are attempting to cultivate China and Japan. But, again, not at the expense of giving away anything of importance. In his July 28 address in Vladivostok, Gorbachev did not even refer to the Japanese insistence on the return of the Northern Territories. And he failed to go beyond token gestures in dealing with the Chinese concern over Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the Soviet-supported Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia.

While bombarding America with arms-control proposals, the Kremlin accuses the Reagan Administration of “state terrorism” and portrays it as a danger to world peace. Gorbachev has perfected the use of arms control as a political weapon to strangle conservative opponents in the West and cultivate discord inside NATO.

But he is facing a dilemma. A more determined, enlightened leadership may tentatively arrest the economic decline. It may be sufficient to improve the Soviet international image and to put the Reagan Administration on the defensive. It may even be enough to allow an arms-control compromise. Still, sooner or later, Gorbachev will have to face the moment of truth.

Nothing short of systematic change will allow the Soviet Union to enter the 21st Century as a modern, prosperous power. Nothing short of reducing, at least temporarily, Soviet foreign-policy ambitions in accordance with its currently limited economic potential and marginal political appeal will assure a stable accommodation with the United States.

Gorbachev has yet to deal with these critical choices. American supporters of detente are entitled to wish him well, and to advocate policies that in their view would contribute to Moscow’s moderation. But pretending that something fundamental has already changed about the Soviet challenge is to confuse facts with hopes.