U.S. Now Has Moral Leverage For Talks

The Daniloff affair has created a great deal of apprehension in the United States, but it has yet to inflict a long-lasting damage on the U.S.--Soviet relationship. As a matter of fact, the whole incident may prove to be a blessing in disguise.

The Soviet frame-up of an American reporter has provided a useful reminder of what is hidden behind Mikhail S. Gorbachev’s smile and his sweeping disarmament proposals. For months, the Kremlin kept tossing out arms-reduction initiatives. And the strategy was partially successful. Among the Western European allies--and increasingly in the U.S. Congress--the Reagan Administration found itself squarely on the defensive.

No more. The Soviet entrapment of Daniloff turned out to be more than a crime. To paraphrase Talleyrand, it also happened to be a costly mistake. At a time when the Politburo is attempting to demonstrate its arms-control virtues while exposing an alleged U.S. intransigence, the focus of the American debate has shifted from the Administration’s attitude toward weapons cuts to the dark side of the Gorbachev leadership. In the U.S.-Soviet public-relations battle, the general secretary has lost a round. The Reagan Administration has regained some higher moral ground and with it, new leverage in the superpower bargaining.

The leverage is much needed because, despite the Daniloff affair, the U.S.-Soviet dialogue is bound to continue. And after Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze met last week in Washington with President Reagan and Secretary of State George P. Shultz, intriguing signs of progress have emerged.

Reagan was correct to remind the United Nations that as a result of the Soviet action against the U.S. News & World Report correspondent, “a pall has been cast over our relations with the Soviet Union.” The prosecution of Nicholas S. Daniloff has undoubtedly created a lot a wreckage that blocks the road to the summit. Gorbachev should be under no illusion as to what the consequences of further persecution of the American reporter will have on his credibility in the United States and, indeed, on our willingness to conduct business with his government.

Yet the Daniloff affair is not just a reflection of the fragility of the U.S.-Soviet relationship. The case is also a barometer of the current status of the relationship. There are many important and pressing issues on the superpower diplomatic agenda. At a minimum, Moscow and Washington both have a vested interest in not losing political points in Western Europe by accepting responsibility for the collapse of the summit. The dispute over the status of Daniloff and accused Soviet spy Gennady F. Zakharov notwithstanding, both sides are bound to make an effort to demonstrate their arms-control (read peace-making) credentials.

If the effort is fruitful and the summit appears to be in sight, it is not likely that the Daniloff affair will be allowed to become an insurmountable obstacle. With some diplomatic ingenuity a formula can be found allowing everybody to claim victory. While the Soviets continue to insist on a straight swap of Daniloff for Zakharov, they privately acknowledge that some other gulag inmates--whether dissidents or Western intelligence agents--may have to be released to sweeten the deal for the United States.

Fundamental differences continue to exist between the two nations on key arms-control issues. A “grand compromise”--trading the U.S. commitment to the Strategic Defense Initiative for drastic cuts in Soviet heavy missiles--seems to be as elusive as ever. And Gorbachev rarely loses an opportunity to remind the West that he is not going to come to Washington for another photo opportunity, as was the case in Geneva. But while the general secretary insists on “substantive results” as a precondition to the summit, he seems to be fairly flexible on what those specific results may be.

The agreement on confidence-building measures in Europe has just been signed in Stockholm. Another agreement on crisis-reduction centers in both Washington and Moscow will be ready for signature in no time at all. With some improvement in verification procedures, the Administration is ready to submit for Senate ratification two earlier treaties limiting the yield of nuclear explosions. And Reagan made it clear in his U.N. speech that the United States is “prepared to discuss ways to implement a step-by-step parallel program of limiting and ultimately ending nuclear testing.” That falls short of the Soviet appeal for a comprehensive test ban, but certainly represents a meaningful gesture to Gorbachev.

Finally, there was some narrowing of the gap on intermediate-range missiles in Europe.

Both sides make concessions. Too much disagreement remains to assume that even an interim deal is close to completion. But we may never find out unless the date for the summit is set.

The Daniloff affair is a powerful reminder that nothing can be taken for granted in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. But tea leaves point toward the summit taking place. Daniloff may become its first beneficiary.