Peacemaking Is Not ‘Meddling’ : Reagan Should Listen to Congress, Not His Sword-Rattlers

In the sudden enthusiasm for a summit meeting and arms-reduction agreements, the Reagan Administration might be tempted to dismiss--again--Congress’ wishes as “meddling.” Some of us in Congress, however, want to be sure that what was achieved before President Reagan came to office will endure after he leaves.

The shift in Congress’ role from “interested observer” to more of an “active participant” has taken place largely because of the ideological disagreements among factions within the Reagan Administration itself. At the outset of Reagan’s term in office, the hard-line conservative elements who brought him to power offered little hope that there would be serious bargaining with the “evil empire” of the Soviet Union. A more pragmatic approach prevailed. Through the influence of Robert McFarlane, national-security adviser from 1983 to 1985, arms-control adviser Paul Nitze and others, Reagan was kept aware of the real possibilities of achieving deep reductions in the strategic arsenals of the superpowers.

But the basic conflict within the Administration was never resolved. Some very disturbing recent actions indicate that the faction opposed to any form of arms control may have gained a controlling influence. These actions include an effort to redefine the anti-ballistic-missile treaty to make its limitations on development of space-based weapon systems meaningless while seeking to throw ever-increasing billions into the Strategic Defense Initiative. There is a steadfast refusal to negotiate on anti-satellite weapons. There has been resistance to completing action on a threshold-test-ban treaty and a peaceful-nuclear-explosions treaty, which were negotiated by previous administrations, and a steadfast refusal to negotiate a comprehensive test ban. Finally, the President announced the United States’ intention to exceed the provisions of the SALT II treaty later this year--despite strong opposition from a majority in both the House and the Senate and the clear trend of public opinion here and among the allies.

As a result, a majority of the House of Representatives reluctantly concluded that it was necessary to take decisive action to prevent what we consider to be an undermining of both our national security and the prospects for future arms-control agreements.

Therefore, we have included several important provisions in the defense bill that is now being considered on Capitol Hill. The House version includes:

--A partial nuclear test ban.

--A provision mandating U.S. compliance with the missile limits of SALT II.

--A ban on anti-satellite weapons testing against an object in space.

--Significant reduction in the President’s request for SDI funding in the next fiscal year.

--A ban on the use of funds for binary-chemical-weapons production through the next fiscal year.

All of these provisions are intended to maintain the positive negotiating climate that exists between the United States and the Soviet Union, in addition to keeping Washington and its Western allies in general agreement on negotiating strategy. But each of these provisions has provoked the ire of some in the Reagan Administration, who have begun a stream of constant criticism about “congressional meddling” in the arms-control dialogue.

If the Administration wants to call it meddling, so be it. The meddling of moderates in Congress has helped steer the United States from the precarious position on the far right into the safer position in the middle. We have preserved the opportunity for the serious, productive negotiations that may take place between now and the middle of next year.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union are now prepared to make major concessions on intermediate-range nuclear forces. I am optimistic than an INF agreement, together with the multination agreement on conventional arms, can be reached at the coming summit. These in turn could pave the way for the “grand deal” that Reagan confidants have hinted at for several months.

Timing is still the key, however. While there is sufficient evidence of President Reagan’s sincere desire to leave a legacy of peace, his lame-duck status places a priority on action. As we move closer toward a summit, we can expect further charges of meddling from a President who ostensibly wants a freer hand in setting the stage for a meeting of the superpowers.

The response from Congress must be clear: The U.S. government is committed to upholding the SALT II agreement and the ABM treaty as long as the Soviets do. It is in our own strategic interest, and it sends a clear message that in the future we will honor commitments made at the bargaining table.

The next six months may prove to be the last best hope for an arms agreement in this decade; any actions subsequent to that time will be entangled in the 1988 campaign preparations. Congress, especially if it acts affirmatively on these arms-control provisions, can and should be a partner in progress at Geneva.