Government Spokesmen: Managing Issues, Not News

The resignation of State Department spokesman Bernard Kalb, as an act of dissent over a “reported disinformation program” aimed at Libya, raises many questions--about the policy, about the implementation and about the role of a spokesman.

I understand why Kalb quit--I think. It was a matter of deep anguish over what he perceived to be a disinformation campaign directed, as a matter of conscious policy, through the U.S. press. He felt it hurt his country and, no small thing, he felt it threatened his own credibility. Those who might condemn him for leaving just before the Reykjavik meeting ignore the immensity of the issue for his sense of integrity. What I have trouble coming to grips with is that, despite careless drafting and mindless execution, I am convinced there was no policy of using the U.S. press to spread disinformation.

Unless Kalb speaks out more directly, we won’t know the details of his involvement--or lack of it. On the face of it, however, it seems he did not see any planning documents for the Libyan program at the time of the first stories in late August or possibly even after the Oct. 2 Washington Post story that revealed the alleged disinformation campaign in the U.S. media. White House spokesman Larry Speakes said he had not either.

This is not unusual. Spokesmen do not have to know every detail of every policy. But it is foolish, from the government’s viewpoint, and unacceptable, from a spokesman’s, if he is not included early on, either when there is a media issue or when fallout from a policy could become the focus of public attention.

The problem is not access to people. Speakes sits in on key White House meetings and his counterpart does the same at the State Department. That has been a policy of Secretary of State George P. Shultz since he took office in mid-1982. And someone in the spokesman’s office at State spends a great deal of time working with other bureaus within the department, developing questions and answers on coming actions--be it supplies to Chad, sanctions against South Africa, advisers in El Salvador or International Monetary Fund membership for Poland. He spots gaps in the answers and prods policy-makers to respond to questions they might overlook. Elements of a policy have indeed been changed when shown to be logically indefensible

A notable exception to this procedure involves sensitive operations. With the invasion of Grenada in October, 1983, most spokesman were not briefed until 11 p.m. the night before U.S. forces landed, and even then not all were included. As a result, Speakes was burned when he was forced to answer questions from oral guidance. Much the same thing appears to have happened here.

In mid-August the President authorized a plan designed to rattle Libyan strongman Moammar Kadafi’s cage. It involved a variety of deceptive actions but not, it appears, lying to the U.S. press.

Nonetheless, a story appeared in the Wall Street Journal on Aug. 25 that contained what appears to be a mixture of fact and fiction. Again, based on oral guidance from National Security Adviser John M. Poindexter, Speakes called the story “authoritative” but “not authorized.” The spokesman did not, I believe, seek to mislead the press. He did, however, say the Administration was sending “a warning shot across (Kadafi’s) bow.” In any case, his response came across as a solid endorsement of the thrust of the story.

It is worth noting that spokesmen in Washington--Speakes was in California--did not endorse the story. As happens every August, coordination within the government was disrupted, including the invaluable interchange among spokesmen and between spokesmen and their “principals.” Inevitable gaps in knowledge and interpretation are widened by the void between vacation spots.

A basic problem, however, is a system that does not always involve its spokesmen. In part, one must also say it is the fault of spokesmen who settle for “guidance” from policy officials and do not press for access to the relevant documents--which in my experience can be made available if really necessary.

The problem was compounded by the Administration’s stiff reaction to the Post’s Oct. 2 story. The President declared, “no one on our side has been lying to anyone.” At a minimum, this begged the question of background statements to the Journal in August and sidestepped the misleading--if innocent--official response that the story was “authoritative.”

And Shultz, whose integrity I consider beyond question, complicated the matter with his reference to a Winston Churchill quote about attending truth with a “bodyguard of lies.” Shultz prefaced that citation with the remark: “I probably shouldn’t even say this because you’ll give it the wrong interpretation.” He was right. He shouldn’t have; they did.

The media are also to blame for the way the issue emerged. Some journalists, in August and now, concluded that the Journal story was overdrawn. And in the Post’s October story, it was not until the 22nd paragraph that the reader learned, “The mid-August plan approved by Reagan did not specifically call for the planting of false stories in the U.S. media.” Early indignant editorial reactions suggested the U.S. government had implemented a plan for domestic disinformation. Perhaps the Post and others had concluded there was such a plan, but subsequent reporting, and my own inquiries, showed, I believe, that there wasn’t.

Which brings us back to Kalb. His resignation has been taken as a confirmation of a disinformation program targeted on the U.S. media. As former Carter White House Press Secretary Jody Powell wrote: “Why would the State Department spokesman feel compelled to resign over a loose cannon in the White House basement?” Good question. If spokesmen resigned each time there was a misstatement of fact or policy, at low level or high, for malicious motives or innocent, there would be a string of spokesmen-for-the-day. Spiking loose cannons goes with the territory, though it is not always easy in the face of those who assert truth rather than adhere to it.

But at some point, whether intended or not, misstatements and mishandling can leave an impression of dishonesty that goes beyond a spokesman’s tolerance. That threshold was crossed for Kalb. This was necessarily a personal decision. But it left unanswered ambiguities about this case. Was it the “facts” that disturbed him, or the impression created?

What can we learn from this disturbing set of events? First, even where the U.S. government does not seek to misuse the media, careless or inappropriate policies and practices can have the same effect. Precise thinking, drafting and execution of policy are critical.

Second, it is the responsibility of spokesmen and policy-makers alike to involve the former. Granted, planning documents are often sensitive, but if the spokesman cannot be trusted with such information, he doesn’t belong in the job.

Third, spokesmen must coordinate closely among themselves, particularly when they are outside their established patterns of communication. The question is not managing the news, but managing the issues. Moreover, any efforts to preempt other spokesmen with quick but uncoordinated responses is risky at best. It matters far less who speaks first, or even who speaks at all, than what is said.

And, finally, the integrity of the democratic process depends on the credibility of government. No government can be faulted for promoting its policies and protecting its secrets. And it is the press’s responsibility to sort out “objective facts” (whatever they are) from Administration bias. But the press has a right to assume it is not being lied to.

Moreover, there is always a danger that by skewing facts or using information selectively, government will both fool itself about its real interests and, whether by design of policy or flawed individual performance, deprive the public of information on which their judgment must eventually depend. This is both dangerous and unacceptable.