Reagan Won’t Play Dead for the Senate

Although Democrats have taken control of the U.S. Senate by a wide margin, it would be foolish to bet that President Reagan will roll over and play dead in the face of new opposition. We can expect him to dust off his veto power for frequent use. The President’s use of that power, along with the makeup of the Senate and its rules, will prevent the sort of dramatic changes that some now predict.

The Senate obviously will be a more “liberal” institution under Democratic control, but much of the change will be subtle. A number of new committee chairmen likely will be at least as conservative as their GOP predecessors. For example, on the tax-writing Senate Finance Committee, liberal Republican Bob Packwood of Oregon will be replaced by moderately conservative Lloyd Bentsen of Texas.

But some key elements of U.S. foreign policy, such as aid to the Nicaraguan contras and the Strategic Defense Initiative --which enjoyed narrow support in the GOP-controlled Senate--will be at risk. Retiring Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.) will be replaced as chairman of the Armed Services Committee by Sen. Sam Nunn of Georgia. Nunn, generally a strong supporter of U.S. defense policy, may be forced to moderate his views as a Democratic leader.

The effort of Reagan and Atty. Gen. Edwin Meese III to move the federal judiciary to the right will meet stiff opposition in the Senate Judiciary Committee, where the chairmanship will go to either Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts or Joseph R. Biden Jr. of Delaware--two of the Senate’s most liberal members. Many more judicial nominations lie ahead for Reagan, including another possible Supreme Court appointment. Nominees who would have passed on narrow party-line votes in the Republican-controlled Senate will probably be rejected in the years ahead.

Aside from committee chairmanships, the two areas where Democratic control will make a real difference involve determining the Senate’s agenda and staff budgets. Since the majority leader--most likely Robert C. Byrd of West Virginia--determines the timing and selection of what is brought before the Senate, he can exert a powerful influence. This power is diminished somewhat by Senate rules, which in effect allow any senator to offer any bill as an amendment to any other bill.

An early ideological test of this power will likely be how protectionist trade legislation fares. The Democrats pushed, and the White House resisted, such legislation in the 99th Congress--but it took a narrowly upheld presidential veto for the White House victory. Despite the declining trade deficit, the White House probably will not be so fortunate next time. If, indeed, Democrats push protectionist trade legislation through early in the new session, it could unleash a wave of such proposals--which would be disastrous for U.S. consumers and would likely spark an international trade war that America could not win.

Committee staff assignments also will be influential. Committee staff budgets are controlled by the chairmen. Although in principle these staffs should reflect approximate balance between Republicans and Democrats, in practice the chairmen can give as many or as few slots to the minority party as they choose. An increase in Democratic staff members on major committees would significantly increase the Democrats’ ability to respond to and challenge the President.

These factors in the Democrats’ favor, however, are offset somewhat by others. Senators’ interpersonal relationships often matter far more than party affiliation. In the past, when Democrats had large majorities, they did not mistreat or abuse Republican senators’ rights the way House Democrats routinely abuse House Republicans. Because the minority can easily tie up the Senate indefinitely with filibusters and parliamentary maneuvers, it is unlikely that the Democratic majority will try to run roughshod over the minority.

We also should remember that Reagan still has far more power than any group of senators to influence policy, and he has had six years of practice in negotiating with a Democratic majority in the House. While the President will lose the luxury of nearly rubber-stamped Senate amendments to House bills, he probably will still be able to get what he wants through negotiation and, if that fails, the veto.

The President will be more likely to use his veto power than in the past. Loss of the Senate, in a sense, sets him free. But he will have to do more than threaten to veto--he’ll have to use it.

Democrats may find that it was easier to push a liberal agenda behind the cover of a Republican Senate. Now they’re on their own, and will have to directly battle an immensely popular, powerful President.