McFarlane: Reagan Gave Decision Basis

Here are excerpts of testimony by former National Security Adviser Robert C. McFarlane before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on Monday and his responses to questions by committee members:

It wasn’t until the summer of last year that (moderate political) elements surfaced (in Iran) and we became aware that elements that were both in the government and close to it as advisers wanted to know whether the United States had any interest in . . . a discourse (with moderates in Iran).

The elements making the proposal from within Iran--high officials--made clear that for them to be able to sustain that dialogue and over time exert any influence to change policy within Iran, they would need to strengthen themselves. And in their terms this would require them to reach out to elements within the military, the Revolutionary Guards or both and that the currency of that undertaking was arms. . . .

The President acknowledged, faced with this opportunity, that any elements within Iran who truly were committed to change and reform were certainly going to be very vulnerable.

And he acknowledged that the transfer, indirectly, of weapons to support these individuals and allow them to build a constituency would indeed not be a violation of policy but to the extent that it dealt with people who opposed Iranian policy, opposed terrorism, that . . . (it) would be sensible. . . .

From the outset, the possibility of making contact with leaders of competence in Iran . . . might have, within the space of probably two years, enabled them to establish such strength as to be able to alter policy without fear of violence . . . and that over time . . . the beginnings of renewed relations with us might occur. . . .

ON THE PRIORITY OF FREEING HOSTAGES:

It seemed to me that after two or three months, roughly in November . . . that there was a skewing of the emphasis toward the hostages, and as important as they are, the more fundamental issue was the political stability of the U.S.-Iranian relationship. . . . I would agree that his (Reagan’s) concern for the hostages was a very leading underpinning of this whole initiative.

ON ADVERSE REACTION:

. . . The foundation presumption of the use of force and of never even talking to those who exist in the same state as terrorists has been the foundation of our policy. And so for us to proceed as others have . . . is a mistake. . . .

The . . . fact that we didn’t deal with terrorists per se, that we took steps to foreclose the use of these arms in an anti-U.S. or terrorist fashion, is true. And, indeed, that we achieved some results is also true. But it is also finally clear that our body politic cannot yet differentiate between different threats from terrorist states around the world.

ON AUTHORIZATION OF THIRD COUNTRIES TO SHIP ARMS TO IRAN:

I’d be glad to deal with the countries involved in a closed session. I don’t mean to dissemble but the thrust (is) . . . that the President in August (1985) provided the decision basis for events that followed.

Q: . . . It was an oral finding by the President, as opposed to written?

A: That’s correct.

Q: . . . In whose presence was that finding made?

A: The decision followed consultation and advice by the President with his Cabinet officers--the secretary of state, defense, the chief of staff, the director of central intelligence, myself.

Q: To whom did the President orally convey this finding?

A: To me and as well to his Cabinet officers in separate but related talks directly with them, either one-on-one or in groups.

Q: Can we assume that . . . every statutory member . . . of the National Security Council was made aware at that time of that finding?

A: I believe you can. . . .

Q: Was there a legal opinion rendered at the time with respect to that authorization?

A: The legal considerations were discussed, but in terms of something formally in writing, no, sir. . . . The legal points were made by the secretary of state and defense. . . .

Q: . . . On the presidential covert action finding, isn’t it true they can’t be merely oral, they must be in writing, signed by the President, under Section 654 of the Foreign Assistance Act?

A: . . . I’m advised that a determination that preceded well in advance of this matter acknowledges the authority of the President to make an oral finding. But I defer to counsel on it.

ON DIVERSION OF ARMS SALE PROCEEDS TO CONTRAS:

I first learned of this alleged diversion of monies from the Iranian relationship to Central American accounts in May of this year in connection with a mission I was asked to undertake to Iran.

Either en route or returning, I was advised in a very summary fashion that the government, the U.S. government, had applied certain Iranian funds to Central American programs. . . . I took it to have been a matter of established, approved policy sanctioned by higher authority than the officer who conveyed it, who was Lt. Col. (Oliver L.) North (fired National Security Council staff member).

Q: In any of your conversations with the President or any other White House representatives, did you ever discuss the issue of diversion of payments from Iran to the Nicaraguan contras?

A: No.

Q: (How is it possible) for a lieutenant colonel on the NSC staff to have the authority by himself to divert millions of dollars in arms sales to aid the contras?

A: The events . . . occurred after I left the government, and I can’t really account for how a diversion such as has been alleged could have occurred.

Q: Is it possible?

A: Of course it’s theoretically possible. As to whether it is plausible . . . I can only comment on the basis of my knowledge of the individuals concerned. . . . Lt. Col. North is a person of integrity . . . and thus would not have acted contrary to U.S. law, nor would he have taken initiatives without higher authority.

Similarly, Adm. (John M.) Poindexter (who resigned as national security adviser) is a man of integrity . . . and it seems to me very, very unlikely he would have acted in any way contrary to law. . . . One can imagine that once a policy of supporting freedom fighters in whatever country is established and those involved . . . are clearly seized with the high priority attached . . . (they) can, if the system is not terribly disciplined, assume as authority the prior approvals they may have gotten. . . .

“As I’ve said before, I firmly believe that the President of the United States did not know of and did not approve of such actions. I also said that I find it hard to imagine that Adm. Poindexter did as well. Those are not inconsistent. . . .

Q: If Lt. Col. North is not the type of person who would consciously violate the law, is there any reason that he would not have reported this to the President?

A: I wasn’t there and I don’t know. When I was there, Lt. Col. North did not report to the President, he reported to the national security adviser.

ABOUT POSSIBLE LINKS BETWEEN IRAN AND BEIRUT BARRACKS BOMBING:

At the time of the attack on the barracks in October of ‘83, the reports that elements within Lebanon that had links to Iran might well have been responsible, probably were, yes, was known. Distinguish between that and an Iranian unit from Iran having done it, which you didn’t imply. But the suspicion that Iran had links to Hezbollah was known.