A Presidential Salvage Job Awaits : Reagan’s Next Two Years Could Undo Progress of the First Six

Conservatives, dismayed by the beating that President Reagan’s popularity has taken as a result of the arms-to-Iran scandal, urge us to remember the improvements that have taken place in the world during Reagan’s six years in the White House.

They have a point. All things considered, the world is indeed in better shape at the beginning of 1987 than it was when Ronald Reagan took office. And just as U.S. Presidents tend to get a disproportionate share of the blame for everything that goes wrong on their watch, whether or not they are at fault, they are equally entitled to credit when things go right.

However, the Reagan presidency still has two years to go, and you don’t have to be a compulsive skeptic to worry that those two years may turn out badly from the standpoint of American foreign policy and the fundamentals of U.S. national security.

The 1970s, it should be remembered, began with promise: the strategic-arms-limitation agreements of 1972, the seeming flowering of detente in U.S.-Soviet relations and the American disengagement from Vietnam. But hope turned to disillusionment in the last half of the decade.

Soviet- and Cuban-supported Marxists took over in Angola, Ethiopia, Yemen, Nicaragua, Grenada and Mozambique in the years from 1975 through 1979. The Vietnamese communists occupied Cambodia and tightened their hold on Laos. Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan.

The degree to which President Jimmy Carter’s policies contributed to the success of pro-Soviet, anti-Western forces is arguable. There is no question, however, that these years were marked by growing Soviet military power relative to that of the United States, and by a global perception of weak, confused leadership in Washington.

Reagan was elected in 1980 with promises of a military buildup and a tougher posture toward the Soviet Union--and in the face of dire warnings from Democrats that the hard-lining former movie actor would get America into war.

We got the military buildup along with anti-Soviet rhetoric that frightened our allies and enraged the Russians. We also got a greater willingness to make limited use of American military resources--to support the struggle of anti-communist guerrillas in Nicaragua and Afghanistan, to punish Libya for its sponsorship of terrorism and to remove the Marxist government on the tiny Caribbean island of Grenada.

As things turned out, though, we also got a world that on balance is more peaceful and democratic, and possibly closer to significant reductions in nuclear arms, than the one bequeathed by Carter six years ago.

South Africa is a horror, and oppressive regimes remain in power in South Korea and Chile. But democratic civilian governments have replaced military regimes in Argentina and Brazil. With some belated but crucial nudges from Washington, dictators Ferdinand E. Marcos and “Baby Doc” Duvalier were forced to flee the Philippines and Haiti, respectively.

Except for Grenada, no Soviet or Cuban client state has been removed from the Marxist fold. But neither have Soviet-supported forces made significant new gains.

The turmoil in El Salvador continues, but the prospects of victory by the left-wing guerrillas have faded. Right-wing death squads are still in business, but the carnage has decelerated from 9,000 dead in 1980 to a fraction of that number.

Meanwhile, the Soviets show signs of rethinking the extent of their involvement in Third World revolutions. And, while the disagreement over missile defenses remains a formidable stumbling block to a nuclear-arms-reduction agreement, Moscow clearly wants such a deal and is willing to make concessions in order to get it.

Administration critics say that, to the degree that positive things have happened in the world of the 1980s, it is despite Reagan’s policies, not because of them. The President, they suggest, has been the beneficiary of a democratic tide in South America and the Philippines that he did little or nothing to bring about. They argue further that the evolution in Soviet policy springs from Mikhail S. Gorbachev’s obsession with Soviet economic problems, not from any desire to placate a stronger and more confident America.

Still, whether you credit him with good instincts or merely good luck, the reality of a positive turn in the global balance sheet under Ronald Reagan is indisputable--or was, until recent months. The great danger is that it won’t last.

In the first place, the economic underpinnings of a strong and positive American role are imperiled by the huge federal budget deficit and trade imbalance. The President’s blissful refusal to recognize the seriousness of the situation is disturbing, to say the least.

Meanwhile, Reagan’s foreign policy has undergone two avoidable disasters. First came the Reykjavik summit meeting, at which the U.S. President seemed willing to abandon the nuclear deterrence on which European security depends without bothering to consult the Europeans. Then came “Gipper-gate,” the disclosure that the Administration had supplied arms to Iran at the same time that Reagan was vowing not to do business with terrorists.

As a result, America’s standing with its allies has been severely, perhaps permanently, damaged--with incalculable consequences for the alliance. More important, the confidence of the American people in the competence and veracity of the President has been shaken, which could seriously damage his ability to make difficult foreign-policy decisions stick. And that in turn could ultimately influence the Soviets to put serious arms-control efforts on hold while they try to take advantage of perceived weakness in Washington.

The roof has not quite fallen in on Reagan and his foreign policy team, the arms for Iran disaster notwithstanding. But the outlook is grim; the President is going to need as much good luck and good advice as he can muster to do as well in his last two years and he did in his first six.