Facing the Ugly Facts on Nicaragua : Its Regime Is Objectionable; We Can Only Make It Less So

The Nicaragua battle is about to begin again in Washington. Although the issue has been trumpeted as a matter of U.S. security against an extra-hemispheric threat, for five years the fighting has been largely intramural: the Administration vs. Congress, Democrats vs. Republicans. Now, with the Administration in disarray and Democrats in control of both houses, it is time to begin shaping a new and sustainable policy toward Nicaragua. But first, partisans on both sides have to shed their time-worn rhetoric and face some unpleasant facts.

It is undeniable that an unfriendly and undemocratic regime is entrenched in Nicaragua, that it is tightly allied with Cuba and the Soviet Union, and that it is antagonistic to the established order in the rest of Central America. It is also a fact, however, that the present U.S. policy goal of a counterrevolution in Nicaragua has virtually no chance of success.

Aid to the contras was never a sustainable national policy. A policy that could be imposed on Congress only after five grueling debates over a two-year period, and then only by intense White House pressure in an election year, was fragile from the start. It was based on wishful thinking about the political complexion and the military capability of the so-called freedom fighters, and on equally shaky assessments about the Sandinistas. It evolved in bits and pieces, and ultimately it was shaped by the compromises that were necessary to win votes in Washington rather than by hard-headed analysis of how best to protect U.S. interests in Central America.

In theory, support for the contras might have been useful as a means of putting pressure on the Sandinistas to induce flexibility and foster compromise in negotiation. In practice, however, aid for the contras has become a policy of all stick and no carrot; it is not intended to make the Sandinistas more democratic, conciliatory, respectful of their neighbors or independent of the Soviet Bloc, but rather to make them disappear.

But the contra policy is a very weak stick. The United States has been pursuing a military approach without applying enough force to win a military victory. Poking at the Sandinistas with sporadic hit-and-run attacks near remote borders has only made them more repressive and more dependent on their Soviet and Cuban friends.

In any event the contra approach is now a shambles. President Reagan, who could barely obtain congressional permission for the contra policy by dint of great effort when his own standing was very high, is less likely to prevail now that he has been wounded. The Central American countries, whose quiet acceptance of the contras was ambivalent at most, are backpedaling away from them. The contras themselves, whose strategy had been to hang on until stronger U.S. involvement could be obtained, face severe problems of morale. And Nicaragua has hardened; the Sandinistas no longer hide their Marxist-Leninist ideology, and their historic distrust of the United States has understandably deepened.

We can continue to play out a kind of slow-motion Bay of Pigs, but the result of the contra policy is predictable: If we do not intervene directly and militarily, we will be humiliated. Sensible Americans of both parties agree on the need to avoid this no-win dilemma. They seek an alternative approach.

A new policy toward Nicaragua must address three central issues:

The first is to prevent the introduction into Nicaragua of Soviet strategic facilities, major offensive weapon systems or Soviet or Cuban combat forces--that is, to block the posing of a direct military threat to the security of the United States or of other nations in the hemisphere.

A second key goal is to stop the Sandinistas from providing material support to insurgent movements in neighboring countries--that is, to contain the Sandinista movement within Nicaragua.

Finally, we must make clear that the people of the United States will promote democracy and protect human rights in the Americas, including Nicaragua.

Each of those objectives can be pursued more effectively if the contra policy is shelved.

The Reagan Administration would have solid bipartisan backing for a clear statement, expressed publicly as well as through diplomatic channels, that the United States will not permit the establishment of a Soviet or Cuban military base in Nicaragua--that this country will use force if necessary to prevent the introduction of strategic weapons, major offensive weapon systems or Soviet or Cuban forces.

The second objective, to contain the Sandinistas, should be pursued along regional lines. Washington should make it clear that U.S. troops would help repel a Nicaraguan invasion of one of its neighbors. It is equally important to strengthen the Contadora efforts to reduce the Sandinista arms buildup and to prevent cross-border support for insurgent movements or other attempts to subvert established governments.

The Contadora process--the diplomatic initiative spearheaded by Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia and Panama--has come a long way toward specifying which activities must be ended, devising surveillance and monitoring procedures to detect them and reversing the regional arms race. Now it is vital that Latin American nations agree to commit their own troops to enforce the proposed regional peace treaties. But Contadora cannot move any further until the United States stops supporting the contras, by far the largest cross-border insurgency operating in Latin America.

The United States, working with others, can also do a great deal to thwart the Sandinistas by working to open up Central America’s political systems, curb repression and support social and economic development--and thus deprive Marxist insurgents of potential followers.

The final objective, promoting democracy in Nicaragua, cannot be accomplished at once. The peace and stability of all Central America will be better assured when the whole region is democratic, but democracy cannot be imposed by force.

The best means for promoting democracy in Nicaragua are not the contra forces, themselves of questionable democratic credentials, but long-term peaceful pressures and inducements--like those employed successfully in the Philippines and now being attempted in Chile. Working with the other democratic countries in the hemisphere, the United States should consistently push for human rights and democratic openings. Washington should work with the Catholic Church and other non-government organizations, emphasize media and diplomatic pressures, and isolate the repressive regimes of the hemisphere, both internally and internationally.

In time, persistent multilateral pressures should lead to Nicaragua’s becoming not the first domino, but rather one of the last in a hemisphere-wide turn toward democracy. Nicaragua is not in Eastern Europe; as Nicaragua’s democratic forces grow, the Soviet Union will be unable to repress them from afar.

There is no quick-fix solution for Nicaragua--no easy means to bring about a peaceful, democratic and congenial regime there. With a sense of perspective and some patience, however, the United States could still adopt a sound policy toward that end. It is surely high time to try.