Reagan Republicans Now Divided Into Three Parts

OK, most of us are bored with the Iranian arms mess. But it’s more than a bunch of Central Intelligence Agency gunrunners, wild-eyed Tehran mullahs and Errol Flynn characters operating out of the White House. It’s also an episode that could marginally redefine American politics--not just by increasing Democratic chances to win the White House in 1988 (although it does), but also by shuffling presidential prospects and strategies within the Republican Party.

Three developments underscore the increasing impact of the Iran- contra imbroglio within the GOP: December’s nose-diving poll support for Vice President George Bush, the related rise of Senate Republican Leader Bob Dole of Kansas and mid-January’s attempted New Right draft of feisty White House Communications Director Patrick J. Buchanan as a 1988 contender. Iran-linked dynamics were operating in each case.

Dole, boosted by his clever minuet of disagreement with fumbling Reaganite tactics on the Iranian- contra scandal, has to some extent become a rallying point for critics and skeptics of the Administration. Arch-loyalist Buchanan, by contrast, ignited a brush fire among Reaganite stalwarts convinced that only political recrimination and hand-to-hand ideological combat could save the Reagan Revolution. And Bush, for his part, was caught in the middle on two troubling dimensions: the faint possibility of greater-than-revealed vice presidential knowledge of the arms scandal plus a loyalty to Ronald Reagan too uncritical for skeptics and too genteel for true believers.

The flurry over Buchanan was particularly revealing. In contrast to other conservative contenders looking toward 1988, fire-eater Buchanan has the temperament and capacity to resurrect a campaign of frustration that’s been apparent twice before in post-World War II GOP politics. During the Eisenhower era in 1959-60, and then again during the post-Watergate Ford regime in 1975-76, conservatives turned bitter as they saw a GOP administration dominated by moderates lose headway after serious election defeats (1958, 1974).

It was amid those disillusioned last years of a stymied GOP White House that the 1964 Barry M. Goldwater and 1976 Reagan movements began gathering force. Today’s sourness following the GOP’s Senate loss and increasing frustration over the Iranian- contra scandal is not dissimilar--including the psychological pressure on rightists to find a new face and sound a new trumpet.

Nevertheless, conservatives now seem to have shrunk back from the idea of mounting a banzai charge replete with attacks on the liberal media, charges of betrayal in Central America and the like. Captained by someone like Buchanan, it might have won about 15%-20% of the 1988 Republican primary vote, but probably no more. That isn’t necessarily a failure, mind. In point of fact, a Buchanan-style, hard-line, right-wing protest candidate may have more 1988 primary vote-getting potential than the other conservative contenders seeking the nomination--Rep. Jack F. Kemp of New York and TV evangelist Marion G. (Pat) Robertson. That’s because events of the last few months are changing the tenor of U.S. conservatism. For one thing, America’s tenuous mid-1980s optimism has ebbed. A Roper poll in early December for U.S. News & World Report and Cable News Network found that a majority of Americans once again believe the United States is on the wrong track. A Gallup sampling found a similar result. Hostility to the media is widespread.

Concerns like these are tailor-made for a polarization-type campaign resurrecting themes from George C. Wallace, Spiro T. Agnew and even circa-1976 Ronald Reagan. Perhaps the past tense isn’t altogether appropriate; Buchanan’s Jan. 20 non-candidacy announcement was vaguely hedged by statements that a declaration “in the near future” would be divisive among conservatives, and that Kemp and Robertson need “more time to prove their electability or lack thereof.” Buchanan’s sister and closest adviser, former U.S. Treasurer Angela M. (Bay) Buchanan Jackson, candidly told the press that Kemp’s people requested more time to show their man’s viability. If Kemp fails to voice the right issues and continues to lag, she said, “I will be knocking down my brother’s door” to get him to change his mind and run.

On the surface, one would also expect Kemp to profit from the decline of Bush. Loss of votes by Reagan’s loyal vice president ought to free up some for conservatism that, like Caesar’s Gaul, divides into three parts: economic, religious and the New Right mix of cultural, patriotic and social-issue anger-politics. Kemp, bubbly, babbly and so caught up in his economic panaceas that some call him the Hubert H. Humphrey of the right, hasn’t been able to tap the latter two. In fact, if ever Kemp had an hour in U.S. politics, it was back in 1981, when tax cuts were pushing their way through Congress and 1984 trial heats assuming Reagan’s retirement gave the New Yorker 15%-25% of the 1984 GOP primary vote against Bush. In 1986, after further tax reform was enacted and Americans yawned, Kemp’s support in national preference polls generally languished in the 5%-9% range. All of which helps explain the candidacy of Robertson. Kemp advisers, aware of their man’s limitations, want to try to Buchananize him a bit in coming months. But it’s unlikely to work: You can’t graft persimmons on a passion-fruit tree.

So the principal benefit of intraparty Republican frustration with Iran and other Reagan failures may now pass to another wing of the party--the moderate candidacy of Bob Dole. The irony here is considerable. As Senate Republican leader since 1985, Dole has one of the most Reagan-supportive records on Capitol Hill. Yet the senator’s personal image--his profile on issues and tactics from civil rights and the budget to the Iranian- contra scandal--is one of moderation, independence and dissent from unpopular Administration actions. As a result, in the wake of the arms-deal mess, it’s been the Machiavellian and acerbic senator from Kansas--not Kemp--who has profited from Bush’s erosion. National polls in recent weeks have shown Dole rising to roughly 20% among GOP rank-and-filers as Bush falls from the 40%-45% range into the 25%-35% range. Although Bush aides now contend that the vice president is stabilizing or even gaining ground again, December polls in several states actually put Dole ahead.

Take Iowa, for example. The Des Moines Register’s Iowa poll for December put Dole ahead of Bush by 28% to 25%, with other parts of the survey suggesting an important inverse relationship. As of early 1987, Dole seems to do best where Reagan is weakest . Certainly Iowa is Reagan’s worst state--his approval hit 34% just before Christmas, with 73% disbelieving what he says about Iran and 24% saying he ought to resign. Meanwhile, the Hawkeye state also appears to be Dole’s best, outside his native Kansas.

This pattern shouldn’t be too surprising. On top of the GOP Senate leader’s own Machiavellian maneuvers, the Dole campaign has been a staging area for a number of party operatives who’ve been out of favor with the 1980s Reagan White House, and the senator has staked out positions on agriculture and trade at odds with Administration views. In early January he told Newsweek magazine that in 1988 he’ll run as the GOP’s “hope from the heartland,” where farms and rust-belt factories are in need of help. “That’s where the problems are,” said Dole. No buoyant, Kemp-style rhetoric on the splendors of Reaganomics for the senator from Kansas.

Under the circumstances, then, the Iranian mess has tentatively rearranged the 1988 presidential race. First and foremost, the Democrats now stand a much-improved chance of winning, with Democratic front-runner Gary Hart far ahead of all his potential Republican rivals in most polls. And the apparent onset of GOP fragmentation and disillusionment may add to the Democrats’ opportunity. Unless, of course, the ultimate irony occurs: circumstances making it possible for the GOP to nominate a 1988 candidate distant enough from the Reagan White House to be a fresh face in matters beyond Iran and Nicaragua.