Gorbachev’s Revolution

The Soviet Union is a long way from anything resembling political pluralism, much less democracy in the Western sense, but events at this week’s meeting of the Communist Party’s Central Committee can only be called remarkable.

Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev has been in office 22 months. During that time he has repeatedly made it clear that his first priority is the rejuvenation of the Soviet economy, which can produce first-rate nuclear missiles but can’t manage to keep up with the galloping computer technology that is revolutionizing the civilian economies of Western countries.

Gorbachev has recognized that important elements of the Communist Party apparatus are part of the problem, not the solution. He wants to transform the party into an engine of change, rather than of resistance to change. And he clearly appreciates that his chances for success are far greater if he can enlist the energies of the Soviet Union’s scientific and cultural elite.

The Soviet leader has gone a long way toward replacing the conservative, inflexible members of the power structure with younger men of his own choosing. Cultural controls have been relaxed. The state-run media have been encouraged to become bolder in exposing cases of corruption, inefficiency and stubborn adherence to old, neo-Stalinist ways of doing things.

So far, however, actual economic reform has been extremely modest. In recent months Gorbachev has vented his frustrations with public complaints about the roadblocks being thrown up by change-resistant party bureaucrats and industrial managers.

At this week’s Central Committee plenum Gorbachev continued the process of removing holdovers from the Brezhnev era and stacking the party secretariat with his own men. Most dramatic of all, he proposed to institute secret balloting and a choice of candidates in elections to party leadership positions at local, regional and republic levels. As of now, only one hand-picked candidate for each such post stands for election; such candidates are elected unanimously by a show of hands. He also suggested worker participation in the choice of factory managers.

The extent of the change should not be exaggerated. The new, more democratic voting system will not apply to the policy-makers in the Politburo or the Central Committee. Where it does apply, the nomination process will still be closely controlled, and lower party bodies can still be overruled by officials at the next-highest level. Open debate is supposedly being encouraged, but there is as yet no evidence that criticism of the Politburo or Gorbachev himself will be tolerated. In short, the reforms are intended to enforce Kremlin authority, not dilute it.

Still, the move--if it sticks--will represent a dramatic opening up of the political process by Soviet standards. Clearly Gorbachev wants to supplement reformist pressure from the top with pressure from the bottom; the idea is that obstructionist officials will risk being voted out of their jobs.

Many Western analysts are convinced that Gorbachev is running a considerable risk himself.

In the first place, there is always the danger that the Soviet people will take Gorbachev’s democratic rhetoric at face value, thus producing a revolution of rising political expectations. Of more immediate relevance, the proposed reforms strike at the heart of a system in which official position conveys privilege in the form of special stores, admission to the best universities, foreign travel and party-provided vacation resorts.

The beneficiaries of this system will not appreciate having their job security undermined. Former leader Nikita S. Khrushchev’s attempts to interfere with the system are believed to have played a major role in his removal.

Gorbachev said he had Politburo approval for the reforms. But it is noteworthy that this week’s Central Committee meeting was supposed to have been held late last year; the delay is believed to have been caused by resistance to Gorbachev’s reform efforts within the power structure. Gorbachev seemed to be saying Tuesday that resistance has not been overcome--hence the need for “democratic” pressures on entrenched interests.

Roy Medvedev, a dissident historian who manages to keep open his pipelines to the Kremlin, commented a few days ago that “in two years Gorbachev has gone further than people thought he would. But the further he goes, the more opposition he’s up against.” That being the case, it remains to be seen whether the reforms approved in principle by the Central Committee this week will actually prevail.