Power to the Contras : They Show New Strength, and Their Story Deserves Telling

In his State of the Union speech President Reagan began a campaign to rebuild bipartisan support for what he called our “historic commitment” to the resistance fighters of Nicaragua. Democratic congressional leaders have so far responded warily, and with good reason. Although domestic political factors may have weakened this policy, developments in Nicaragua and elsewhere in Central America generally have moved to sustain it.

The guerrilla forces of the Nicaraguan resistance are showing what to many people must be an unexpected strength. Substantial numbers have re-infiltrated Nicaragua, and some informed sources estimate that by the end of this month between 10,000 and 15,000 re-supplied and re-trained fighters will be operating across a large area of the country.

Sandinista military leaders had proclaimed their ability to block the infiltration with a “forward defense” along the mountainous border with Honduras. But in some cases the contras slipped past the Sandinistas; in other cases they fought their way through. That they even would attempt these month-long marches into the teeth of a massive Sandinista mobilization is a reproach to those who argued that the contras were a demoralized, camp-bound army that lacked the will to fight. That they did it at a time when their chief ally, the United States, was in such internal disarray is further tribute to their independence and their spirit.

At the same time, Central America’s young democracies have shown themselves to be surprisingly firm in resisting “peace” plans that involve the abandonment of all hope of democracy in Nicaragua. Last month the so-called Contadora group--Mexico, Panama, Venezuela and Colombia--organized a diplomatic caravan to Central America that included the foreign ministers of eight Latin American countries and the secretaries general of the United Nations and the Organization of American States. Neither the pressure of these dignitaries nor the weakened clout of the United States was enough to cause any of the Central American democracies to yield their longstanding demand that any regional peace settlement must require the Sandinistas to abandon their totalitarian course.

The firmness of these Central American leaders is reinforced by a growing mood of defiance toward the Sandinistas within Nicaragua itself. In recent weeks as many as 20,000 trade unionists, members of the Social Christian Party and ordinary citizens have participated in demonstrations and protests against the regime.

These outpourings of opposition (which, in a police state like Nicaragua, require considerable courage) are stirred by the remarkable disintegration of the Nicaraguan economy. The Sandinistas have long sought to blame Nicaragua’s economic woes on the United States. But first-hand evidence of Sandinista mismanagement and corruption is too strong for such propaganda claims to have much effect on the Nicaraguan people.

Disaffection is so intense within Nicaragua that the regime recently spoiled a celebration of its newly drafted constitution, a curious document that assures many democratic rights to the Nicaraguan people--except those to which the government may take exception. A mere 3 1/2 hours after this painstakingly prepared work of statecraft was promulgated on Jan. 9, the arbitrary powers that it discretely provides to the Sandinista Directorate were invoked, again bringing the country under draconian martial law.

Some liberals decry such affronts as evidence of Sandinista clumsiness and insensitivity. A better explanation is that even when the Sandinistas try to manipulate outside opinion through pretensions of democracy, they run afoul of their more compelling need to frighten their own people out of exercising whatever rights the government has promised them. This testifies to the strongly pro-democratic feeling of the Nicaraguan population.

The mounting opposition to the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and elsewhere in Central America is one reason the Reagan Administration seems willing to make an effort to shore up the contra aid policy here at home. Although opponents on the left often portray the Administration as a cult of mindless devotees of the contra cause, the truth is that powerful elements within the Administration have always been queasy about this policy. The Poindexter-North scandal provided an excellent opportunity to abandon it. But evidence of positive developments in Central America has given ammunition to the pro-contra side.

Nevertheless, supporters of contra aid have no reason to be cocky. All that they now have is an opportunity to rebuild the weakened foundation that remains for this policy in public opinion and in Congress.

Success or failure in the President’s new campaign for contra aid hangs on matters that involve what is often imagined to be the Administration’s strongest suit: public relations. In the past the Administration has failed badly in this field--failure that antedates the Iranian arms scandal and may even have helped to create it.

There is a remarkable army of about 15,000 brave young men and women in the mountains of Central America who share the basic political ideals of the American people. No one who sees how they live or the dangers that they face could accept the charge that they are mere mercenaries for the United States.

Those of us who have had some direct acquaintance with the rank-and-file of the resistance believe that if they can mount a respectable challenge in the next few months, and if the reality of their struggle is at all truthfully conveyed to the American people, Congress will find it very hard to turn its back on them when they are under the Sandinistas’ guns.

But Americans who support the resistance will have to stand up and be counted in ways that many have been reluctant to do. No one will believe that the cause of Nicaraguan democracy is as important as the President says it is until a far more effective bipartisan public campaign is mounted to mobilize and sustain support for this policy here at home. Where are the retired governors and senators, the corporate chiefs, the big givers? Who is out getting resolutions from the state legislatures, the union locals, the veterans? Instead, this often seems to be a policy that, like an exotic plant, lives entirely on the rich atmosphere exuded by small circles of the ideologically committed in Washington. It seems to have no real roots. But it must--and it can.

Back in 1984, when Congress voted a cut-off in government aid to the resistance, a Marine officer detailed to the White House staff proposed that the President go before the American people to sponsor a public campaign to raise contributions for the contras’ cause. He argued that such a campaign would both avoid the stigma of secrecy and create a grass-roots constituency here for a pro-contra policy.

The officer’s name was Oliver L. North. His suggestion was rejected on the ironic ground that it was politically too risky.

Today, in the aftermath of scandal, such a proposal would probably be impossible to carry out. But if it is not now feasible or immediately necessary to encourage private support for the contras’ struggle inthe field, it is ever more necessary to help them tell their story here. Unless respected figures in American civic life are willing to declare their solidarity with the resistance and help it to win the public support that it needs, the future of aid is doubtful.

This issue is now out of the White House basement for good. The President will be judged, and the issue will be decided, by how strongly and effectively his Administration and supporters take their case to the country in the months ahead.

DR, DE LA TORRE Q, Diario Ya, Madrid