Conflicts in Reagan Iran Remarks Cited : Told Tower Panel He Authorized Shipment of Arms but Later Denied It, Sources Say

President Reagan, in two meetings with the special commission investigating the Iran- contra affair, gave conflicting statements on whether he authorized Israel’s first shipment of arms to Iran in August of 1985, White House and other sources said Wednesday.

The President at first told the commission, headed by former Sen. John Tower (R-Tex.), that he had approved the shipment, the sources said. That contradicted congressional testimony by White House Chief of Staff Donald T. Regan and substantiated testimony by former National Security Adviser Robert C. McFarlane.

But almost three weeks later, in a second closed-door session that was initiated by Reagan, the President told the commission that after a lengthy discussion with Chief of Staff Regan, he had concluded that he was mistaken--that actually he had not authorized the shipment.

Comment Declined

At the White House, both chief spokesman Marlin Fitzwater and David M. Abshire, Reagan’s special counsel coordinating the President’s response to investigations into the scandal, declined to comment on what Reagan told the commission.

Reagan’s contradictory statements, along with the conflicting accounts Regan and McFarlane gave to the Senate Intelligence Committee, are expected to be cited in a hard-hitting commission report that will criticize the President and some of his top advisers for what one source called “an operation so sloppy that every time they turned around, there was another screw-up.”

The Tower commission has concluded that the major goal of the President’s policy was to secure Iran’s assistance in seeking the release of American hostages held in Lebanon, even though Reagan has said that the main goal was to establish relations with “moderate elements” in Iran, one knowledgeable source said.

The presidentially appointed commission is the only official body to question Reagan about the Iran-contras affair, and its report will be the most comprehensive account thus far of a scandal that has developed into the most severe crisis of the Reagan presidency.

‘Scrambling Around’

The report, scheduled to be sent to the President next Thursday, will describe how White House aides were “scrambling around” in an effort to create a “cover story” explaining the Iranian arms sale after it was first disclosed in a Beirut magazine on Nov. 4, according to an informed source.

The report will make few recommendations for structural changes at the National Security Council, according to a source familiar with it, because the commission “found a people problem, not a structural problem.” Among other things, the source said, the report will show that:

--There were two aspects of a cover-up attempt. Aides at first tried to come up with a plausible cover story but were so baffled by some aspects of the “incredibly complicated” covert operation that they were unable to do so. Then White House aides tried to quell the furor by putting Reagan on television at a news conference.

“They thought they could get out of the problem by sticking the old man in front of the television tube with three-by-five cards to explain it, but that didn’t work either,” the source said.

--Secretary of State George P. Shultz, who privately opposed the policy of selling arms to Iran and publicly stated his opposition to the policy after it was exposed, knew much more about the operation than he has stated publicly and “absented himself” from his duties in connection with the operation.

“Shultz doesn’t come out looking good and neither does anybody else,” the source said.

Funds Unaccounted For

--More than $20 million in funds ostensibly intended for the Nicaraguan contras--$10 million contributed by the Sultan of Brunei at the State Department’s request and more than $10 million in profits from the sale of arms to Iran--has not been accounted for and the commission has no evidence that any of the funds went to the contras.

--Former CIA Director William J. Casey was more deeply involved in the Iran-contras affair than he has admitted and he personally solicited funds from some foreign countries to aid the contras.

--Besides the funds contributed by Brunei, funds for the contras were solicited by Casey or other government officials from about five other countries, including South Korea and Taiwan.

The selling of arms to Iran and evidence turned up by Atty. Gen. Edwin Meese III that profits from the arms sale had been diverted to aid the contras are also being investigated by an independent counsel and special Senate and House committees.

‘Scratched the Surface’

According to one source, the commission has “only scratched the surface of the biggest issue that involves possible illegalities--and that’s White House involvement in funding for the contras.”

The investigation by independent counsel Lawrence E. Walsh, who is being aided by FBI agents, reportedly is concentrating not only on covert operations to finance the contras but also on attempts to cover up the arms sales and their link to the contras.

A source familiar with that investigation said: “The cover-up is becoming more important than what they tried to cover up and it’s looking more and more like there could be an obstruction of justice.”

In this regard, the Walsh investigation is now understood to be focusing on the activities of White House and other Administration aides, rather than on the President.

The contradictory statements by Reagan concerning the first Israeli shipment of arms to Iran occurred at two meetings of the Tower commission at the White House.

The President, when he first appeared before the commission on Jan. 26, reportedly was asked twice whether he had authorized the Israeli shipment. Both times he said he had done so.

These statements buttressed the account given by McFarlane when he testified earlier before the Senate Intelligence Committee that Reagan gave oral authorization for the shipment.

But the President’s Jan. 26 statements also contradicted Chief of Staff Regan’s sworn testimony before the Senate committee that the President had declined to authorize the sale because of misgivings about the credentials of Manucher Ghorbanifar--the Iranian arms merchant and middleman in the deal--and questions about whether Ghorbanifar had any significant influence in Iran.

After the Jan. 26 meeting, Reagan offered to meet again with the commission and on Feb. 11 spent 70 minutes with its three members: Tower, former Secretary of State Edmund S. Muskie and Brent Scowcroft, national security adviser in the Gerald R. Ford Administration.

That time, according to a knowledgeable source, “the President said that he had talked it over at great length with Don Regan and wanted to correct himself, he had not authorized the first shipment.”

Interview of McFarlane

The commission is scheduled to interview McFarlane today at Bethesda Naval Medical Center, where he is recovering from an overdose of drugs that police said were taken in an apparent suicide attempt. The commission originally had been scheduled to interview McFarlane on Feb. 9, the day he was rushed to the hospital.

The report of the commission, which is still being drafted, reportedly will include a narrative of about 250 pages detailing the origin and development of the President’s policy of selling arms to a country that was on the State Department’s list of terrorist regimes and that had conducted a virulent anti-American campaign ever since American hostages were seized in the American embassy in Tehran during the Jimmy Carter Administration.

In addition to the narrative, the report will consist of about 50 pages that will summarize the narrative’s significant issues.