Check the Teeth in Gorbachev’s Gift Horse

Battered by the Tower Commission’s report on the Iran- contras scandal, President Reagan has suddenly been offered a boost from an unlikely quarter: Mikhail S. Gorbachev. The Soviet leader has proposed that the two superpowers agree to eliminate medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe without linking the issue to Reagan’s “Star Wars.” For the President, this is a political godsend. It gives him a chance to shine as a leader on arms control and to host a U.S.-Soviet summit meeting later this year.

At Reykjavik last October the two leaders tentatively agreed on the removal of U.S. cruise and Pershing 2 ballistic missiles from the Continent while the Soviets would scrap their SS-20 missiles targeted on Western Europe. The summit meeting collapsed because of disagreement over the development of space-based strategic defenses. And until last weekend Moscow was saying that “no deal” on Star Wars also meant “no deal” on the so-called Euromissiles.

Why the turnabout? Gorbachev could hardly want to rescue the President out of personal affection. Nor is he likely to be deluded that Reagan will give the Soviets a better deal as the price of being helped to look good at home. And the argument is unconvincing that the Soviet leader desperately needs an arms-control agreement with the United States in order to gain a breathing space for dealing with the Soviet economy.

There are tangible benefits for Gorbachev, however. By seizing the arms-control initiative he burnishes his image as a vigorous, forward-looking leader, brimming with personal and national confidence, just when his American counterpart is conveying the opposite impression. Also, the Soviets have less need for their SS-20s, because they have been deploying a large number of shorter-range nuclear missiles.

Most important, Gorbachev is trying to convert a diplomatic failure into a success. The failure was the Soviet effort after the Reykjavik meeting to cast the Star Wars program as the villain preventing arms control. America’s West European allies didn’t buy the argument; they were too shocked by Reagan’s apparent willingness to trade away so much of the U.S. nuclear arsenal and undercut the deterrence doctrine that has been the core of European security for three decades. In allied chancelleries the new signal on arms control was “go slow.”

Gorbachev hopes to gain an offsetting success by presenting the United States with a difficult choice. If the Administration fails to respond effectively and bungles the diplomacy, it will look to the European public--if not to their governments--as once again obdurate on arms control. If, by contrast, the United States agrees to scrap Euromissiles on both sides, then the Soviet Union will have taken a step toward a key long-term goal: the elimination of U.S. nuclear weapons from the Continent.

By tabling a draft Euromissile treaty of its own this week, the Reagan Administration has recognized the importance of, and the political value in, Gorbachev’s proposal. But will it continue to make the right moves?

No doubt, U.S. opponents of arms control will do what they can to prevent success. Indeed, in 1981 civilian leaders in the Pentagon devised the idea of scrapping all Euromissiles--the “zero option”--precisely because they expected the Soviets to reject it. The European allies went along with this ploy, although they wanted some U.S. medium-range missiles in order to demonstrate that U.S. security is firmly coupled to that of its allies.

The allies may now swallow the idea of “zero option” because of its public appeal while looking to the United States to demonstrate its commitment to European security through some other means. The first such means is for the United States to avoid Gorbachev’s trap.

This requires great care in negotiating the Soviet proposal. Two conditions are critical from the West European point of view: The Soviets must accept stringent limits on their shorter-range nuclear missiles, which are as intimidating as the SS-20s; Gorbachev has offered to remove some of them and to negotiate on the rest. Also, the 100 SS-20 missile warheads that the Soviets would be permitted to keep in Asia must be sited well out of range of Western Europe.

The United States is stressing a third condition: The West must be able to verify compliance with the agreement. The Soviets have suggested some on-site inspections, but these may not prove to be sufficient. For their part, U.S. opponents of an agreement will try to raise the standard for verification well beyond what the West needs for security. Verification is always their last refuge.

To avoid Gorbachev’s trap, the Administration must focus on the first two Western conditions. In so doing, it would be visibly championing West European concerns. If negotiations still fail, it will be Moscow’s fault. But if negotiations fail because of U.S. conditions, such as unrealistic demands for verification, then the Administration will again be pilloried in Western Europe--ironically, for failing to secure a treaty that allied governments don’t very much like.

The diplomacy needed for an American success on Euromissiles is not very difficult. But it does pose a key test for Ronald Reagan, particularly because his leadership is in doubt. If he asserts mastery over his Administration, he will succeed, gaining either a treaty and summit or plaudits for making the effort. But if he is outfoxed by the enemies of arms control, he will have to find other ways to put the Iran-contras scandal behind him.