Presidential Trap

People have a natural desire for simple answers to complex problems, even when logic says that this is impossible. It was thus that President Reagan may have long ago set for himself, and the nation, the trap that ultimately led to the Iran arms mess. The danger now is for Americans to think that there is a simple way out of that trap.

The easy rationalization for the Iran affair is that the President’s detached style of management allowed a reasonable plan to run amok. The solution, then, should be simple: Have a hands-on manager as President.

Ah, that the world were so neat and tidy.

The President has always been a detached manager. That has been described as a key to his success. But clearly there are other reasons that made an event like the Iran affair possible. Some may be inherent in the Presidency itself. Others have their roots in the expectations that Reagan generated in his own Presidency.

From the outset he led the nation to believe that there were simple solutions to problems. The limited scope of Reagan’s agenda helped validate the idea of simplicity. Cut taxes, cut the budget, build a strong defense, and other problems would take care of themselves. This all worked well enough early in the Administration, if one ignored side effects like the budget deficits. A people weary of “failed” presidencies was eager for him to succeed.

Such clear sailing could not last forever. In his second term the President found that most of the easy problems had been “solved.” The difficult ones remained--often involving tiresome efforts to keep situations from getting out of hand, with no particular political reward.

A passive President who dislikes conflict allowed himself to be sold on White House staff changes that effectively isolated him from real debate. As long as no dissent reached his ears, the President had no reason to believe that events were going awry. When doubters did manage to get through, the President stubbornly clung to the conviction that he was doing the right thing. There are indications that he still holds that belief.

An obsession with news leaks made matters worse. Leaks force debate on controversial policies. In isolation, the seeming infallibility of decisions goes unchallenged. The chances and consequences of failure are muted. An overzealous staff can elevate the primacy of the President’s will beyond the limits of the law.

And there is the Presidency itself, and the possibility that Reagan’s own expectations for what he could achieve surpassed reality. Cornell University Prof. Theodore J. Lowi says that often the best that a President can hope for is to cope with problems. He adds: “Successful coping comes mainly from understanding, and the chief barrier to understanding is ideology.”

Many Americans admired Reagan for his ideology, in that he had a clear idea of where he wanted the country to go. But he was never clear about what it would take to get there in terms of trade-offs involved, the risk of failure or the obligation to be accountable. Reagan and his closest advisers always labored under the fallacy that the country could be managed like a corporation. They sought to short-circuit traditional political processes. Dealing with the media and Congress--that is, with the public--was a nuisance to be circumvented, not a check and balance with a legitimate role in molding sound public policy. The role of the public was to applaud, not to judge.

No President can, or should, know the details of all his programs. But a leader must have a firm understanding of, and belief in, the process of government, and a realization of its limits. Policies cannot be willed into place as can business decisions, whether for the Gipper or for any other President. Assumptions must be challenged at every step of the way. The policy must have a reasonable chance of success and be compatible with accepted national goals. If good judgment is superseded by good intentions, a policy is doomed from the start.

The Iran adventure failed on almost every count.

Americans now are asking: What did the President know, and when did he know it? The real question should be, simply: Why did it happen?