Reagan Urged to Ease Stand on SDI and Strategic Arms Amid Compromise Signs

Amid signs that the Soviet Union is willing to compromise on arms control, key advisers Tuesday urged President Reagan to ease his proposals on anti-missile defenses and on strategic offensive weapons systems as Secretary of State George P. Shultz was preparing to visit Moscow next week for critical talks on arms control issues.

The State and Defense departments proposed that Reagan extend the period for restricting the Strategic Defense Initiative, known popularly as the “Star Wars” anti-missile defense program. The State Department advocates a three-year extension, while the Pentagon is seeking a one-year expansion, U.S. officials said.

Similarly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff urged that he extend by two years the period for reducing U.S. and Soviet offensive nuclear weapons by 50%. With some support from the State Department, the chiefs would prefer to reduce superpower arsenals over seven years, instead of five, American officials said.

Reagan was presented with these options Tuesday at a meeting of the Cabinet-level National Security Planning Group at the White House. His decisions on these issues are expected in a day or two.

The President appears to have already approved new negotiating positions for Shultz to take on two other arms issues: intermediate-range nuclear force missiles and nuclear testing. The two sides are closer together on these matters than in the negotiations on long-range strategic offensive weapons and defensive systems.

The Soviets appear to have returned to the position they took at the Reykjavik summit meeting last October, even hinting at going somewhat further, on the intermediate-missile and nuclear underground testing issues, U.S. officials said.

Both sides had agreed at the Iceland summit to eliminate longer-range missiles of the intermediate class in Europe and to limit such weapons to 100 warheads each worldwide. These missiles have a range of about 1,000 to 3,000 miles. The Soviet warheads were to be based in the Asian part of their country, while the American weapons would be based in the continental United States.

There now are indications, two officials said Tuesday, that the Soviets may be prepared to eliminate weapons in this category altogether. This outcome would be attractive to the Soviets on several grounds.

Politically, it would please China and Japan because the 100 weapons would otherwise be targeted on them, as well as U.S. Pacific bases. Militarily, 100 warheads are too small a force to be cost-effective in training, maintenance and deployment.

Most important, eliminating all longer-range intermediate weapons would considerably reduce the demands for on-site inspection and other intrusive verification demands of the United States. U.S. officials believe that eliminating all these weapons is in the interest of both sides.

Verification is considered one of the two main obstacles to an intermediate missile agreement this year. The other major stumbling block is shorter-range weapons classified as intermediate missiles in Europe, capable of traveling 350 to 1,000 miles. The Soviets have roughly 130 of these weapons; the United States has none.

However, if the longer-range missiles are eliminated, some fear that the Soviets might increase their shorter-range weapons to achieve an overwhelming advantage. As a result, the United States has called for an equal ceiling on these missiles for both sides, whether at the current Soviet level or any level down to zero.

The Soviets have taken three positions: no limits on shorter-range systems; a freeze at current levels, leaving the Soviets with the present monopoly, and, most recently, hints that this class of weapons also could be eliminated.

In compensation, the United States is prepared to forgo its present proposals that would allow the longer-range missiles to be converted to shorter-range systems. This could be accomplished by removing a missile stage from the 108 U.S. Pershing 2 missiles now deployed in West Germany to create so-called Pershing 1-B missiles.

On nuclear testing, the Soviets also have returned to their position at Reykjavik, which is close to the U.S. proposal that puts verification for old agreements ahead of negotiations on new agreements.

Under the three-step U.S. proposal, the two sides would first work out additional verification measures to ensure compliance with the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, which limit underground tests to military and civilian explosions of 150 kilotons, or the equivalent of 150,000 tons of TNT.

If improved verification provisions are negotiated, the Administration would support ratification of the treaties and, as the second step, join new negotiations to reduce the size of permitted tests and put some limit on their number per year. Finally, the two nations would then begin talks to end all underground tests in a so-called comprehensive test ban treaty, according to the U.S. timetable.

On strategic missiles and bombers, the two sides have agreed in principle to reduce their arsenals to 1,600 delivery vehicles carrying a total of 6,000 warheads--roughly half their present forces--over five years. The joint chiefs have asked the President to extend this to seven years.

More contentious were the options put to Reagan on space defense, officials said, which center on two issues:

--Whether to offer the Soviets a pact that would promise “no deployment” of anti-missile defenses or to offer a promise of “no withdrawal” from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which forbids deployment.

--Whether such a pact would last eight years, as the Pentagon wants, or 10, as the State Department proposed.