New Arms Offer Made by Soviets : Gorbachev Proposes Eliminating Short-Range Missiles in Europe

In a new offer unveiled to Secretary of State George P. Shultz on Tuesday, Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev proposed dismantling short-range nuclear missiles in Europe as part of a broader agreement to eliminate all nuclear missiles on the Continent, according to the official Soviet news agency Tass.

Gorbachev challenged the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to accept the new idea, saying, “What are you afraid of?”

The proposal is certain to be controversial because the Western alliance relies on nuclear weapons to compensate for the Warsaw Pact nations’ superiority in conventional forces, and Washington’s NATO allies have balked at proposals to eliminate all nuclear weapons from Europe.

Offers to Visit U.S.

Gorbachev then offered to visit Washington “to conclude a treaty” on intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe--an issue that is considered close to settlement within the next few months--and “to reach agreement on key provisions” of most other outstanding arms issues: offensive intercontinental-range nuclear weapons, anti-missile defenses and nuclear weapons tests.

The Tass report, released after midnight here, appeared to violate an understanding that the substance of the talks would remain confidential until the conclusion of the three days of meetings today.

The initial U.S. response was cautious. Dan Howard, a deputy White House press secretary, said:

“Without confirming or denying that it is the Soviet negotiating position, the proposal as it is presented in Tass is interesting, one we take seriously, but we are an alliance and we would have to consult with our allies before responding to a proposal of that kind.”

Precisely what the Soviet proposals will mean to the final day of the Shultz trip is unclear. But earlier, there was a generally upbeat atmosphere here following Shultz’s 4 1/2-hour meeting with Gorbachev as well as an additional six hours with other top Soviet officials.

State Department spokesman Charles Redman said the talks with Gorbachev were “very intensive, serious, businesslike.” Most of the time, he said, was spent on the issue of medium-range missiles.

Tass said that “greater understanding of each other’s positions showed up” in the course of what it called “a frank, principled conversation” between Gorbachev and Shultz.

‘Could Lay Groundwork’

Gorbachev indicated that the next summit, even if it does not conclude treaties, “could lay the groundwork for them” to be finished by the next U.S. Administration.

“Much work has been put in for preparing them (new treaties),” he said, “hence, the political work which has already been done should not be wasted.”

Arms control experts are divided on whether the Reagan Administration, with less than two years left, can complete negotiations on all the arms issues, sign treaties and have them ratified. In the opinion of most experts, President Reagan will effectively no longer be able to negotiate arms treaties beginning with the presidential nomination period in the middle of next year.

While the Tass report of Gorbachev’s offers came as a complete surprise, one U.S. source had indicated earlier that progress had been made during Shultz’s 18 hours of talks in the first two days of his visit. But he cautioned that the final day would be crucial.

U.S. officials have not forgotten how, after major progress, the Reagan-Gorbachev summit last fall in Reykjavik, Iceland, fell apart at the final session. The conference collapsed over the issue of restraints on the Strategic Defense Initiative, Reagan’s proposed space-based missile defense program popularly known as “Star Wars.” SDI remains the thorniest of all arms control issues today.

ABM Concession

In a proposal related to “Star Wars,” Gorbachev on Tuesday appeared to offer a concession on how much work would be permitted under the existing Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Until now, the Soviets have sought to restrict work to research conducted inside a four-walled laboratory on Earth, while the United States wanted development and testing of exotic beam technologies, as well as research, in space as well as on the ground.

Gorbachev said the Soviet position still stands but that research could be performed in laboratories, at testing grounds and in factories.

“Let experts of the two countries take their time, ponder on the subject and agree on a list of devices which would not be allowed to be put into space in the course of this research,” he said, adding that his new position represents a compromise between the two sides.

A concession of more immediate impact, however, was the new Soviet offer on the issue of short-range missiles, which fall under the somewhat misleading category of “intermediate nuclear forces.” So far, both sides have agreed to eliminate from Europe the longer-range INF missiles, which can hit targets from 1,000 to 3,000 miles away. They also agreed to limit each side to 100 warheads of this category, with the Soviet force in Asia and the U.S. force in the continental United States.

But the two sides differ on shorter-range INF missiles. The Soviets now deploy about 130 of these shorter-range systems, which can reach targets 350 miles to 750 miles away. The United States has none in this category. Moscow sought to preserve this monopoly by offering to freeze the missiles at current levels on both sides. Washington wanted equal levels, with the right to build up to match the Soviets in this category if the Soviets do not reduce their force.

Divisive Issue

The two sides were also divided on how to handle these shorter-range systems. Moscow wanted to negotiate about them later, while Washington wanted a commitment in the treaty on longer-range INF weaponry to equal ceilings in the shorter-range category.

What Gorbachev has now proposed, according to Tass, is to eliminate his country’s shorter-range missiles within a relatively brief time frame, perhaps one year, and moreover “to eliminate also battlefield tactical missiles” of even shorter ranges.

One other concession, on nuclear weapons tests, appears to have come from Gorbachev during the talks with Shultz.

Until now, the Soviets have wanted to negotiate a new agreement that would ban all nuclear tests. The United States wants first to adopt new verification procedures for two treaties that have been signed but never ratified: the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974 and the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Explosions Treaty of 1976, which limit tests to 150 kilotons (150,000 tons of TNT) in yield.

‘Formula’ Proposed

At the Reykjavik summit, a compromise was worked out in which verification procedures would be worked out and the two treaties ratified, while at the same time new negotiations would begin to reduce the number of permitted tests annually and to lower the threshold of the power of the tests. Gorbachev said Tuesday that “a formula” could be worked out to do both, according to the Tass report. He also dropped his country’s previous insistence that the goal be the eventual end of all nuclear tests, although he restated it as a Soviet aim.

Gorbachev also complained about new U.S. positions that backtrack to some degree on positions taken at Reykjavik. Washington recently has extended from five to seven years the period for achieving a 50% reduction of offensive intercontinental weapons and has reduced from 10 to eight years the period in which it would promise not to violate the ABM treaty with a “Star Wars” missile defense system.

Tass said Gorbachev concluded his arms control proposals by proposing “to work out key provisions” about strategic offensive arms, ABM systems and nuclear tests. Along with the signing of an agreement on INF missiles, those provisions could be worked on at the summit level and could be the basis for legally binding treaties, he said.

“I am ready to meet the President of the United States in order to reach agreement on these ‘key provisions’ and conclude a treaty on medium-range (INF) missiles,” Gorbachev said.

Gorbachev also rejected Shultz’s complaints about spying at the U.S. Embassy, declaring, without actually denying Soviet activities, that U.S. intelligence agencies spy on the Soviet Embassy in Washington. He contended that “spy scares” are invented in the United States when progress in U.S.-Soviet relations appears imminent.