A TELLING TIME FOR AMERICA : When a Campaign Stumbles: A Few Golden Rules for Damage Control

The collapse of Gray Hart’s campaign should be a lesson to all presidential candidates. Every presidential campaign faces crises. How the next candidate handles the next crisis may determine whether he makes it to the White House at all.

Richard M. Nixon’s Checkers speech, following revelations of a slush fund, and Jimmy Carter’s “lust in my heart” quote were crises handled successfully. Other crises, such as George Romney’s brainwashing comment on Vietnam and Sen. Edmund S. Muskie crying in New Hampshire, were not. These events marked the beginning of the end for those candidates.

All these situations were similar in severely threatening the campaigns. All the responses were attempts to deal with the threat. Not all were equally effective. Some extended and deepened the crisis; others shortened its duration and minimized its impact. Some crises, however, are beyond the control of even the most able campaigns. Hart’s crisis was obviously beyond any good campaign manager’s control.

After participating in a number of presidential campaigns and running one for the last Democratic nominee, I’ve found at least six golden rules for crisis management. On some of them the Hart campaign did well, on some poorly. 1) Plan for a crisis.

In a presidential campaign it is suicidal not to assume the worst--there will be a crisis. Before it happens the key players need to understand their roles. They have to expect rapid decisions, a solid phalanx behind the story put out by the campaign and a minimum of internal discussion. Which leads to the second rule:

2) Minimize the number of voices .

Quick decisions mean fewer participants are making those decisions. The fewer people involved usually (not always) means fewer screw-ups. The campaign is trying to get a coherent message out quickly. That means a small decision-making group, speaking with one voice, with the timing and substance of the response closely controlled. Which means one needs to:

3) Gather all the facts quickly.

The purpose of collecting all the facts is to know the complete story and present that to the public in the best possible light. To prevent new revelations appearing daily on the front page or the evening news, the campaign will, in most cases, opt to take its lumps and tell the whole thing at once. This serves to:

4) Reduce the number of news cycles.

The only thing worse than a scandal on the front page is a scandal on the front page day after day. Trying to shut off a sensational story while packs of reporters are in a feeding frenzy makes this rule the hardest to control. Part of it is dependent on what other news stories are demanding attention. At very least, a campaign should never contribute, through its mistakes, additional news cycles. The goal for whatever stance is taken must be to:

5) Minimize damage to the support base.

A major purpose behind any story released to the press is to give supporters a line to use, to give them a reason to maintain support for the candidate. The support base needs to be contacted quickly and reinforced. Of course the person best positioned to do that is the candidate. Whenever possible he should be the:

6) One spokesman for the campaign.

Not only is this important for presenting a unified coherent response, it is also vital for what it reflects about the candidate. The crisis is likely to have raised questions about the candidate’s leadership qualities, judgment under fire and desire for high office. What better way to address these charges than having him appear in command in public?

Now that the Hart campaign is over, a few preliminary judgments can be made on how well it handled the situations.

Compared to the 1984 campaign organization, the Hart campaign of ’88 was improved. In this crisis, unlike the “Where’s the beef?” issue of ‘84, it seemed prepared for tough problems. But what Hart gave them was more than any campaign structure could handle.

In following Rule No. 2, the campaign had less success, in part because of the origins of the crisis. Involvement of people outside the campaign made it difficult to limit the number of voices speaking for the campaign. Initially, Hart’s campaign manager, William Dixon, and William C. Broadhurst, the lawyer who said he housed both women, spoke out, as did the candidate himself. By the second day, Miami model Donna Rice and her lawyer joined in, a number of other campaign staff members made comments and Dixon took on most of the spokesman duties. Only by the third day did the candidate re-emerge to become the primary spokesman through his speech to the publishers. But at this time, so crucial to limiting the damage, Hart tried to refer to the incident only in passing. In any case, too many people had already been speaking.

Under Rule No. 3 of gathering and presenting the facts, the Hart campaign chose to attack some facts and ignore others. Whether Rice had spent the night at the senator’s town house and whether reporters had kept the rear door under surveillance were points of contention in the initial Hart response. The major line of attack was on the tactics of the press.

But not all the facts were brought out. Notably missing from the initial Hart response was the overnight yacht trip to Bimini. While Hart acknowledged calling Rice several times from around the country, the boat trip did not come out immediately. This led to another day’s worth of headlines.

The Hart campaign staff tried desperately to limit the number of news cycles, Rule No. 4, but they met with little success. The campaign was helped in the second 24 hours by the Iran- contra hearings, which competed for the front page. But the story was not to die.

For journalists, there were numerous angles remaining. The delay in hearing from Hart’s wife, Lee, added another news cycle. The boat crew on the yacht Monkey Business had to be interviewed; Rice’s elusive roommate/friend had to be found; the person who gave the initial tip to the Miami Herald has yet to be identified, and so on.

Holding on to the campaign’s support base, Rule No. 5, was not easy. Hart moved to minimize damage by giving the staff a story line to use, as well as contacting important backers directly. The anti-press message got a good initial response and its repetition by New York Gov. Mario M. Cuomo and Geraldine A. Ferraro helped give it legitimacy and headlines. Unfortunately for the campaign, sex was inherently more interesting than the press and pictures of Rice more enticing than those of reporters.

In addition, as the polls showed Hart losing support, that in itself became a story. The “stony silence of supporters” also developed into an important lead.

Though he initially relied on other spokesmen, Hart quickly realized he could not duck behind others. After spending the first day getting his story together, he gave an effective performance before the publishers in New York. However, he misjudged the situation badly when he said this was his last word on the incident. Every question at his press conference the next day in New Hampshire focused on Rice, his relationship with her and ultimately, his relationships with other women. And Hart had to answer: Once he assumed the spokesman’s role on this issue, he could not surrender it.

No matter how well Hart and his campaign staff attempted to handle this crisis, it proved overwhelming. Hart realized this rendezvous would haunt him because of the resonance the issue gained from the character questions raised during the 1984 campaign. As a problem of judgment it was not an isolated incident. With news organizations prepared to throw huge resources into every conceivable angle of the story, this flaw in judgment was amplified in other incidents made public in the days following.

Ironically, given the severity of this crisis, the Hart campaign handled it reasonably well. Dixon and other staffers followed the rules of crisis management and acted under pressure like the professionals they are. But problems they faced were beyond what even the most competent campaign could manage.