Congress Must Not Bottle Up Testing : Defects in Weapons, Arms Control Demand Continuation

Among the myths that have clouded the national debate on nuclear arms control, the most persistent and pernicious are those surrounding U.S. nuclear testing.

The lore of comprehensive test ban advocates holds that such a ban would not weaken U.S. defenses but would “slow the arms race.” Indeed, these myths have been so enticing that Congress may soon be considering final action on a proposal to ban all U.S. nuclear testing above one kiloton--a step that would be virtually indistinguishable from a comprehensive test ban.

Myths, however, cannot be the basis for decisions affecting our vital national security interests. So lest Congress be swayed by the anti-testing sirens, it is time to end their myths, once and for all.

The fact is that as long as we must rely on nuclear weapons to deter Soviet aggression, nuclear testing will be essential if we are to maintain the safety, reliability, effectiveness and survivability of our warheads and weapons systems. Congress now is considering additional restrictions on U.S. nuclear testing--permitted underground at levels up to 150 kilotons by the 1974 threshold test ban treaty--that would compromise the credibility of our nuclear deterrent, a deterrent that has ensured the Free World’s security for the last 42 years.

Congress correctly demands--as we do--the most rigorous testing of non-nuclear defense systems to ensure their effectiveness and minimize the risks to our servicemen. It seems incredible, therefore, that it would consider banning effective testing of the nuclear systems on which we depend most critically for deterrence.

Any claim that nuclear testing is unnecessary is simply and demonstrably false. Over one-third of all nuclear-weapon designs introduced into our stockpile since 1958 have encountered reliability problems, and 75% of these were discovered and subsequently corrected thanks to actual explosive testing. In the case of the warhead for the Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missile, testing allowed us to fix defects that could have rendered the vast majority of our sea-based deterrent completely inoperable. In addition, every U.S. strategic ballistic missile system has experienced surprises in nuclear effects testing; most of these would have resulted in system failure and required redesigning and retesting.

Such problems can and do occur in spite of extensive analytical and non-nuclear simulations. That is why the directors of our national weapons laboratories have stated that actual testing up to the 150-kiloton threshold permitted by the 1974 treaty is required to meet existing and currently foreseen requirements.

It is particularly ironic that some in Congress who have supported our strategic modernization program now oppose the very nuclear testing required to meet that program’s requirements. The proposed one-kiloton cut-off, for example, would halt the introduction of state-of-the-art safety and security devices as we replace the two-thirds of our stockpile that do not yet have them. We could not stockpile the new Trident II warhead at the normal level of confidence. The small inter-continental ballistic missile program favored by many in Congress could become highly problematical, since we might not be able to develop the optimized safety and security features required for such a system. The list goes on.

The “arms control” aspect of the test-ban argument is even weaker. In the real world, draconian restrictions on testing would not eliminiate a single existing weapon. In fact, thanks to nuclear testing we have been able to introduce newer, safer and more effective systems while actually reducing the number of weapons in our nuclear arsenal by one-third from what we had 20 years ago. We have, moreover, been able to reduce the explosive power of our arsenal to one-quarter of the level fielded by the United States two decades ago.

And while some congressional opponents of U.S. nuclear testing claim that their one-kiloton restriction would be condi-tioned on reciprocal Soviet action and subject to verification measures, their provisions in fact do not provide for effective verification. Absent effective verification, the United States would have no way of knowing whether the Soviets are complying with the same restrictions imposed on our programs--despite Soviet incentives and opportunities to cheat and a record to show that they would have cheated.

This Administration long has had a constructive and practical agenda in the area of limitations on nuclear testing. More recently, President Reagan has requested Senate advice and consent to the two existing treaties limiting the yield of individual nuclear explosions to 150 kilotons--the threshold test ban and peaceful nuclear explosions treaties--subject to the condition that the Soviets first agree to necessary verification improvements. To achieve such verification, the United States has proposed the practical and proven CORRTEX system for on-site measurements of nuclear detonations.

And taking Soviet views into account, the President further stated that once our verification concerns have been satisfied and the treaties have been ratified, and in association with a program to reduce and ultimately to eliminate all nuclear weapons, he will propose that the United States and the Soviet Union immediately engage in negotiations on ways to implement a step-by-step parallel program of limiting and ultimately ending nuclear testing.

The President’s initiatives deserve the support of those who are really interested in practical steps in this area. On the other hand, I can think of no better way of encouraging the Soviets to refuse to address seriously those steps or take seriously our proposals for deep, equitable and effectively verifiable reductions in nuclear arsenals than for Congress to push forward an unsafe, inequitable, destabilizing and--yes--unverifiable ban on U.S. nuclear testing.