It’s Time for U.S. to Go Back to Vietnam--Diplomatically

Secretary of State George P. Shultz’s negative reaction to recent changes in the Vietnamese government, and his declaration that the United States will continue its attempt to isolate Hanoi, seems to fly in the face of the reality that the Vietnamese leaders are eager for the improvement and normalizing of relations with the United States.

A more realistic approach is that of Sen. Mark Hatfield (R-Ore.) and Rep. G. V. (Sonny) Montgomery (D-Miss.), who have introduced resolutions in Congress calling for the opening of technical offices in Hanoi by the United States and in Washington by Vietnam to speed an acceptable accounting of U.S. service personnel missing in action in Vietnam--long an issue. The Vietnamese government has agreed to this as the first step toward a rapprochement.

We, the authors of this article, support the Hatfield proposal. One of us is a member of Congress who has joined the growing list of resolution sponsors, and the other is an academic and former Foreign Service officer who recently returned from a private visit to Hanoi, where he had extensive discussions with senior ministry and party officials--including Foreign Minister Nguien Co Thach. All expressed an urgent desire for full relations with the United States, and we believe that the selection of a hard-liner, Pham Hung, as the premier will not affect their objective.

The opening of technical offices would provide a specific and reliable channel of communication between the two nations to replace the sporadic contacts that have marked the past 12 years. President Reagan, in anticipation, has appointed retired Gen. John W. Vessey Jr., former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as a presidential envoy to negotiate with the Vietnamese. Preparatory discussions have already taken place between Vietnam’s deputy foreign minister and senior American staff members of the National Security Council.

A serious impediment may have arisen, however. Vessey’s proposed mandate reportedly is to be confined to discussion of humanitarian matters, while the Vietnamese want open-ended discussions. If the MIA issue can be satisfactorily resolved, widows and mothers of the lost servicemen will be thankful. Why, then, not broaden the negotiations to produce further good results?

Vietnam is bound tightly to the Soviet Union. Its treaty obligations with the Soviets include a defense clause, and are reflected in the fact that the Soviets have transformed the former U.S. military installations at Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang into fully operating Soviet bases. The Vietnamese are heavily in debt to Moscow. The Vietnamese resent Soviet exploitation of their economy. An estimated 10,000 Soviet “advisers” are physically present in Vietnam to perpetuate the new status quo.

Recognition of Vietnam by the United States and an American diplomatic presence in Hanoi could be the opening to such positive developments as achieving an end to Vietnam’s military occupation of Cambodia and inaugurating U.S. trade with Vietnam. The Vietnamese have promised to get out of Cambodia when a stable, non-threatening government emerges in Phnom Penh. Any multifaction Cambodian government, the Vietnamese say, would be acceptable as long as the hated Khmer Rouge of former years is not included as an organized entity. They have set a 1990 target date for complete evacuation.

A U.S. diplomatic presence in Hanoi would be a constant reminder to the Vietnamese of their promise. The United States could perhaps help expedite a Cambodian settlement by serving as a mediator between Vietnam and its critics within the Assn. of Southeast Asian Nations. Development of economic ties with the United States could lessen Vietnam’s dependence on the Soviets, and lead to a reduction or an elimination of the Soviet presence. The Vietnamese have been known to say that they got rid of the French and the Americans in the past and will get rid of the Russians in the future.