THE IRAN-CONTRA HEARINGS : Excerpts: Covert Activity Is by Nature a Lie

Following are excerpts from testimony Tuesday by Lt. Col. Oliver L. North before the Senate and House committees investigating the Iran-contra affair. He was questioned by chief House counsel John W. Nields Jr. about his role in the U.S. arms sales to Iran and in the support of t he Nicaraguan contra rebels during the time government aid was banned by Congress :

Covert Operations

Question: . . . These operations, they were covert operations?

Answer: Yes, they were.

Q: And covert operations are designed to be secrets from our enemies?

A: That is correct.

Q: But these operations were designed to be secrets from the American people?

A: Mr. Nields, I’m at a loss as to how we could announce it to the American people and not have the Soviets know about it. And I’m not trying to be flippant, but I just don’t see how you could possibly do it.

Q: Well, in fact, Col. North, you believed that the Soviets were aware of our sale of arms to Iran, weren’t you?

A: We came to a point in time when we were concerned about that.

Q: But it was designed to be kept a secret from the American people?

A: . . . If we could . . . talk about covert operations to the American people without it getting into the hands of our adversaries, I’m sure we would do that. But we haven’t found the way to do it.

Q: But you put it somewhat differently to the Iranians with whom you were negotiating on the 8th and 9th of October in Frankfurt, Germany, didn’t you? You said to them that Secretary of Defense (Caspar W.) Weinberger in our last session with the President said, “I don’t think we should send one more screw”--talking about Hawk (missile) parts--”until we have our Americans back from Beirut, because when the American people find out that this has happened, they’ll impeach you”--referring to the President.

A: . . . That was a bald-faced lie told to the Iranians, and I will tell you right now I’d have offered the Iranians a free trip to Disneyland if we could have gotten Americans home for it.

Q: . . . And when the (Eugene) Hasenfus plane went down in Nicaragua (while attempting to resupply the contras last year), the United States government told the American people that the United States government had no connection whatsoever with that airplane. Is that also true? . . .

A: No, it was not true. I had an indirect connection with that flight . . . and many others, I would point out.

Q: Now, in certain communist countries, the government’s activities are kept secret from the people. But that’s not the way we do things in America, is it?

A: . . . I think it is very important for the American people to understand that this is a dangerous world . . . and they ought not to be led to believe, as a consequence of these hearings, that this nation cannot or should not conduct covert operations. By their very nature, covert operations or special activities are a lie. There is great deceit, deception practiced in the conduct of covert operations. They are at essence a lie. We make every effort to deceive the enemy as to our intent, our conduct and to deny the association of the United States with those activities. . . .

Q: The American people were told by this government that our government had nothing to do with the Hasenfus airplane, and that was false. And it is a principal purpose of these hearings to replace secrecy and deception with disclosure and truth. And that’s one of the reasons we have called you here, sir. And one question the American people would like to know the answer to is what did the President know about the diversion of the proceeds of Iranian arms sales to the contras. Can you tell us what you know about that, sir?

A: You just took a long leap from Mr. Hasenfus’ airplane . . . I never personally discussed the use of the residuals or profits from the sale of U.S. weapons to Iran for the purpose of supporting the Nicaraguan resistance with the President. I never raised it with him and he never raised it with me during my entire tenure at the National Security Council staff. Throughout the conduct of my entire tenure at the National Security Council, I assumed that the President was aware of what I was doing and had, through my superiors, approved it.

I sought approval of my superiors for every one of my actions and it is well-documented. I assumed when I had approval to proceed from either Judge (William) Clark, Bud McFarlane or Adm. (John M.) Poindexter (all former national security advisers), that they had indeed solicited and obtained the approval of the President.

To my recollection, Adm. Poindexter never told me that he met with the President on the issue of using residuals from the Iranian sales to support the Nicaraguan resistance or that he discussed the residuals or profits for use by the contras with the President or that he got the President’s specific approval. But again, I wish to reiterate that, throughout, I believed that the President had indeed authorized such activity.

. . . On or about Friday, Nov. 21, I asked Adm. Poindexter directly: “Does the President know?” He told me he did not. And on Nov. 25, the day I was reassigned back to the United States Marine Corps for service, the President of the United States called me. In the course of that call, the President said to me words to the effect that “I just didn’t know.”

Q: . . . You testified that you assumed that the President had not authorized the diversion. Lieutenant colonels in the Marine Corps do not divert millions of dollars from arms sales to Iran for the benefit of the contras based on assumptions, do they? You had a basis for your assumption.

A: I had the approval of my superiors. As I did for all the other things that I did, Mr. Nields.

Q: You had something else, didn’t you, sir? You had a specific reason for believing that the President had approved. You wrote memoranda, did you not, seeking the President’s approval for the diversion?

A: I did.

Q: And, indeed, you wrote more than one of them.

A: I did.

Q: How many did you write?

A: Again, I will estimate that there may have been as many as five.

Q: . . . And these five were written, I take it, on each occasion where there was a proposed sale of arms to the Iranians that you felt had reached sufficiently final form to seek the President’s approval?

A: Yes.

Q: And the first one was in February or January of 1986, is that correct?

A: As I recall, it was. . . . It’s my recollection that there were probably five times, total, that we actually got to a point where we thought, one, that the sale would take place and, No. 2, that we would have the hostages released and dialogue with the Iranians, as a consequence.

Q: And you sent those memoranda up the line?

A: It is my recollection that I sent each one of those up the line, and that on the three where I had approval to proceed, I thought that I had received authority from the President. I want to make it very clear that no memorandum ever came back to me with the President’s initials on it, or the President’s name on it, or a note from the President on it . . .

Q: Now, at any time did Adm. Poindexter tell you, “Don’t send any more memos like this?”

A: I don’t recall such an instruction . . .

Memoranda for Reagan

(North was asked about a note he sent McFarlane, relating that Poindexter had requested North to prepare “a paper for our boss, which lays out arrangements” for selling arms to the Iranians and diverting profits to the contras.)

Q: So, far from telling you to stop sending memoranda up for the President’s approval, Adm. Poindexter was specifically asking you to send memoranda up for the President’s approval?

A: Well, again, in this particular case, that’s true, Mr. Nields, and I don’t believe that I have said that Adm. Poindexter told me to stop. Did I?

Q: Did--where are these memoranda?

A: Which memoranda?

Q: The memoranda that you sent up to Adm. Poindexter seeking the President’s approval.

A: Well, they’re probably these books to my left that I haven’t looked through yet and I’m going--if I try to guess, I’m going to be wrong. But I think I shredded most of that. Did I get ‘em all? I’m not trying to be flippant but I’m just--

Q: Well, that was going to be my very next question, Col. North. Isn’t it true that you shredded them?

A: I believe I did.

Q: . . . I take it that includes the memoranda with the check mark opposite the line “approved.”

A: Again, I do not testify here, nor do I believe I did so earlier, that I recall any specific check marks or initials. . . . The reason for shredding documents and the reason the government of the United States gave me a shredder--I mean, I didn’t buy it myself--was to destroy documents that were no longer relevant, that did not apply or that should not be divulged. . . . I came here to tell you the truth, to tell you and this committee and the American people the truth. And I’m trying to do that, Mr. Nields, and I don’t like the insinuation that I’m up here having a convenient memory lapse, like perhaps some others have had.

Q: . . . And I take it that you would agree that you at least shredded some documents on the 21st of November (1986)?

A: Oh, absolutely.

Q: And at that time, can you think of any document which would have been more damaging to the President than one of these documents seeking his approval for the diversion (of arms sale proceeds to the contras) with a check mark next to the box “approved”?

Brendan V. Sullivan Jr. (North’s attorney): Objection. Mr. Chairman, the question assumes that such a document existed . . .

Q: . . . Did you or did you not shred documents that reflected presidential approval of the diversion?

North: I have absolutely no recollection of destroying any document which gave me an indication that the President had seen the document or that the President had specifically approved. . . .

False Chronology

(North was asked about a false chronology of events that he helped prepare in November, 1986, summarizing the government’s involvement in arms sales to Iran.)

Q: . . . You have indicated that there were reasons given to you and that you had in your own mind why it was a good idea to put forward this false version. . . . There were reasons on the other side, were there not?

A: . . . Reasons on the other side?

Q: There were reasons--well, I’ll give them to you, and see if you agree. First of all, you put some value, don’t you, in the truth?

A: I’ve put great value in the truth. I came here to tell it.

Q: So, that was--that would be a reason not to put forward this version of the facts?

A: The truth would be a reason not to put forward that version of the facts, but as I indicated to you a moment ago, I put great value on the lives of the American hostages . . . and I put great value on that second channel (an intermediary used by the United States to deal with the Iranians), who was at risk.

Q: By putting out this false version of the facts, you were committing, were you not, the entire Administration to telling a false story?

A: Well, let, let--I’m not trying to pass the buck here. OK? I did a lot of things, and I want to stand up and say that I’m proud of them. I don’t want you to think, counsel, that I went about this all on my own. I realize there’s a lot of folks around that think there’s a loose cannon on the gun deck of state at the NSC. That wasn’t what I heard while I worked there. I’ve only heard it since I left. People used to walk up to me and tell me what a great job I was doing, and the fact is there were many, many people, to include the former assistant to the President for national security affairs, the current national security adviser, the attorney general of the United States of America, the director of central intelligence, all of whom knew that to be wrong. . . .

Q: Isn’t it true . . . that others above you, by putting out this version of the facts, were committing the President of the United States to a false story?

A: Yes, that’s true.

Q: Did you ever say to any of those people, “You can’t do that without asking the President?”

A: No, I did not . . . and in fairness to them, I think that they had a darn good reason for not putting the straight story out . . .

Contributions to Contras

(North was questioned about money contributed by private citizens and foreign governments to assist the contras at a time when the Boland amendment barred U.S. aid.)

A: I get the sense that somehow or another we’ve tried to create the impression that Oliver North picked up his hat and wandered around Washington and foreign capitals begging for money. I didn’t do that. I didn’t have to do it, because others were more willing to put up the money than the Congress because they saw well what was happening to us in Central America . . . I didn’t beg them. They offered and that’s important, sir.

Munitions List

(North, while insisting he never solicited contra aid from U.S. citizens, acknowledged that he showed munitions lists to some potential donors.

Q: And did you let them know how much the contras needed money for munitions?

A: I’d let them know how much the contras needed everything. . . . I do not recall ever being in the presence of (conservative fund-raiser Carl R. (Spitz)) Channell when he asked someone for money. . . . Nor do I recall Mr. Channell offering someone a visit to the Oval Office or the President of the United States of America for a price. I received several suggestions to that effect by several other people, and they were turned away. . . .