THE IRAN--CONTRA HEARINGS : Excerpts: One Can’t Go and Ask Mother Teresa to Go to Tehran

Following are excerpts from testimony Thursday by Lt. Col. Oliver L. North before Senate and House committees investigating the Iran-contra affair :

War Against Sandinistas

(George Van Cleve, the Republicans’ deputy counsel on the House committee, asked North what would have happened to the Nicaraguan contras’ war against the Sandinista government if there had been no private funds to replace U.S. funds cut off by the Boland amendment in 1984. North, who organized the private resupply operation, answered:)

Our assessment was that if there was not something done . . . within six to 10 months the Nicaraguan resistance would cease to be; that they would be annihilated in the field, and that the refugee flow, which is already considerable, would probably treble. And that that would have a considerable effect on the neighboring democracies. . . .

Question: What, in your view, was the purpose of the massive Soviet investment in Nicaragua?

Answer: Well, I think the Soviets have a neat way of doing it. . . . They don’t come out and advocate until they’re absolutely certain that the revolution is going to succeed, as it did in Cuba. . . . What they have done is they have provided a steady and consistent and increasing level of military and economic support to (the Sandinistas in) Nicaragua, in hopes that their revolution will succeed. . . . The Soviets desperately want to achieve the consolidation of a Soviet client state on the mainland of this hemisphere. . . . The Soviets are outspending us in our own hemisphere about five to one, in dollars alone. They have more military advisers in this hemisphere than we do south of the Rio Grande. . . .

Boland Amendment

(Van Cleve asked North if he thought that the Boland amendment, which barred U.S. intelligence agencies from aiding the contras, applied to members of the National Security Council. North, a staff member at the time, answered:)

My understanding was that, first of all, we were to work to comply with Boland, and that we were to work to keep alive the Nicaraguan resistance. Second, I did not view, nor did my superiors view, that the National Security Council staff was covered by Boland. There were people who were concerned about that, and we sought and obtained legal advice to the effect that it was not. . . .

Q: . . . Your actions with respect to the contras represented the direct implementation of the policy of the President on these sensitive foreign policy issues. Correct?

A: Yes.

Q: Now, if you were directly carrying out the foreign policy of the President in working with the contras, it would be necessary to show that Congress intended to interfere with the President’s carrying out of his foreign policy, before it could be shown that you were violating the Boland amendment, wouldn’t it?

A: Yes.

Q: . . . And it’s also clear, isn’t it, that if Congress told the President he could not ask foreign countries or private individuals for financial or other official assistance for the contras, there would be serious doubt about whether Congress had exceeded its constitutional power. Correct?

A: Well, if you’re asking for my opinion, I think there is no doubt that if the Congress had passed such a measure, it would clearly, in my opinion, be unconstitutional.

Q: And you’re basing that at least in part with your conversation with John Norton Moore of the University of Virginia Law School. Is that correct?

A: And others. Marines can read. . . .

‘A Liar . . . a Cheat’

(North explained why the Administration used Iranian arms broker Manucher Ghorbanifar as a go-between in arms-for-hostages dealings with Iran despite his unsavory reputation.)

I knew, and so did the rest of us who were dealing with him, exactly what Mr. Ghorbanifar was . . . a liar . . . a cheat . . . a man making enormous sums of money. He was widely suspected to be, within the people I dealt with at the Central Intelligence Agency, an agent of the Israeli government. . . . That is important in understanding why we continued to deal with him. We knew what the man was, but it was difficult to get other people involved in these kinds of activities. I mean, one can’t go to Mother Teresa and ask her to go to Tehran. And I am not being light about this, but you have to deal with who you’ve got at the time. And the good fairy wasn’t there. And I know there’s a lot of folks that think we shouldn’t have dealt with this guy, but at the bottom we got two Americans out that way, and we started down a track that I think we could have succeeded on. . . .

North’s Credibility

(Later, Van Cleve asked North about his own credibility.)

Q: You’ve admitted before this committee that you lied to representatives of the Iranians in order to try and release the hostages. Is that correct?

A: I lied every time I met the Iranians.

Q: And you’ve admitted that you lied to Gen. (Richard V.) Secord with respect to conversations that you supposedly had with the President. Is that correct?

A: In order to encourage him to stay with the (contra resupply) project, yes.

Q: And you’ve admitted that you lied in creating false chronologies of these events. Is that correct?

A: That is true.

Q: . . . Can you assure this committee that you are not here now lying to protect your commander in chief?

A: I am not lying to protect anybody, counsel. I came here to tell the truth. I told you I was going to tell it to you, the good, the bad and the ugly. . . . I have told you the truth, counsel, as best I am able.

‘The Fall Guy’

(North then was questioned by the Senate committee’s counsel, Arthur L. Liman.)

Q: . . . On the 25th, you learned from the press conference (by Atty. Gen. Edwin Meese III) that you had been fired (from the staff of the National Security Council). . . . And you learned at that press conference that you were the subject of a criminal investigation. . . . Is it . . . so that for some months you had been telling friends like Mr. (Robert) Owen that you were going to be the fall guy? . . . You were prepared to take the rap for political purposes, but not for criminal purposes?

A: Precisely.

Q: . . . And is it a fact that on Nov. 21, after meeting with (Vice) Adm. (John M.) Poindexter, you told your colleague, Col. (Robert) Earle, that you were going to be the scapegoat?

A: . . . I may have. I don’t deny that I said that to him.

Q: . . . And did you tell Adm. Poindexter that you were prepared to play that role?

A: I had told Adm. Poindexter that and I had told Mr. (Robert C.) McFarlane (Poindexter’s predecessor as NSC director) that as early as 1984.

Q: Had you told Mr. (William J.) Casey (the CIA director) that?

A: I think it may well have been his idea to begin with that there had to be somebody who was going to stand up and take the rap for this.

Q: . . . Now, Adm. Poindexter, who was your superior and who had approved this, was not dismissed. . . . Do you remember that he was allowed to resign and be transferred with honor?

A: I don’t recall those words specifically. . . .

Q: . . . Do you remember, sir, that as you listened to the press conference that the attorney general said nothing about the fact that Adm. Poindexter had approved the diversion?

A: Quite frankly, counsel, I don’t remember a great deal about that press conference.

Q: . . . Now, after you were dismissed, did Adm. Poindexter call you and say . . . “Col. North, don’t worry. Even if you destroy all the documents, I’ll stand up and say I approved it.”

A: No, I recall no such conversation.

Q: So that you were--once the documents were destroyed--you were out there without any kind of assurance that anyone would stand behind you, is that fair to say?

A: That was the plan. I mean, it was planned that I would be out there. I mean, everything had gone right according to plan, right up until . . . I heard the words criminal investigation or criminal behavior or whatever the words were that were used in the press conference. . . . My mind-set changed considerably. . . . There was probably not another person on the planet Earth as shocked as I was to hear that someone thought it was criminal. And I can tell you that that shock was compounded . . . when I was the only name in the appointment order for that independent counsel (Lawrence E. Walsh, who is heading the Iran-contra criminal investigation).

Q: . . . When you met with the attorney general on the afternoon of the 23rd of November, he asked you about the diversion (of funds to the contras). . . . Do you recall that you told him that Adm. Poindexter knew, that (retired Gen.) Richard Secord knew and that Mr. McFarlane knew?

A: That sounds right.

Q: . . . Was it part of the plan at that stage that you would not name Director Casey?

A: It had always been part of the plan that Director Casey would know nothing of the support to the Nicaraguan resistance.

Q: . . . And so the fall-guy plan was that even though Casey knew, you would not finger him. . . .

A: That’s correct.

Q: . . . Were there other people who knew things that you were also not supposed to name?

A: Not that I know of. . . . I could well have said to the attorney general on the 23rd . . . “Oh, by the way, the President knows.” But I had asked the admiral on Friday if the President knew, and the admiral had told me no. And so when the attorney general asked me about the President, I told him “no.”

Q: . . . Did you ask him: “Adm. Poindexter, why did you not discuss this with the President?”

A: No.

Q: Why not?

A: First of all, I’m not in the habit of questioning my superiors. . . . I don’t believe that what we did . . . is wrong or illegal. . . . I still think it was a good idea, counsel.

Q: And have you wondered why, if it was a good idea, that the President of the United States dismissed you because of it?

A: Let me--let me just make one thing very clear, counsel. This lieutenant colonel is not going to challenge a decision of the commander in chief, for whom I still work.

Q: . . . Was it just instinctive that you don’t mention the name of (Casey) when you’re talking to the attorney general about knowledge of support for the contras?

A: It was instinctive, counsel, from my earliest days of contact with the director that his relationship and mine not be something that was publicly bandied about. . . .

Q: Well, how often did you commune?

A: I would say several times a week.

Q: Where?

A: Most often on the telephone, but we would meet in his office, occasionally in mine, occasionally out at the office in Langley. . . . I can recall meetings in his home. I recall riding in the car with him, I can recall airplane trips with him. . . .

Q: He was a person who you could confide in?

A: I did.

Q: He was a person whose advice you valued?

A: Inestimably.

Q: . . . Did you look upon him, in a way, as a boss?

A: . . . He wasn’t a “boss” so much as he was a personal friend, and an adviser and a person with whom I could consult and get solid advice and a person to whom I could turn for support.

Shredding Documents

(North was asked about shredding documents at about the time Meese began inquiring about the diversion of funds to the contras.)

Q: Do you remember shredding documents during the lunch hour on (Nov.) 22 (1986), when the representatives of the attorney general’s office had left for their lunch?

A: I remember shredding documents while they were in there reading documents.

Q: Shredding them in their presence?

A: Well, I mean, they were sitting in my office, and the shredder was right outside, and I walked out and shredded documents.

Q: More than a few pieces of paper, right?

A: Pardon?

Q: It would be more than a few pieces of paper.

A: Well, that’s a pretty high-speed shredder. It eats ‘em pretty quick. I’m not trying to be light about it, but I mean, they were sitting in my office reading and I’d finish a document and say: “We don’t need that anymore.” I’d walk up and I’d go out and shred it. They could hear it, the shredder was right outside the door.

Q: . . . And did anyone say to you, “Colonel, what are you doing?”

A: No, and I didn’t think anything of it either. I mean, what you’ve got to understand, counsel, is that I didn’t think I’d done anything wrong.

Q: . . . Were you taking single documents over to the shredder or were you taking files. . . ?

A: I was not taking files. I would go through a file. I was sitting at my desk. They were working 10 feet from me, and we would go--they were working on their projects; I was working on mine. (Laughter in the audience) . . . I don’t think you ought to accuse them of incompetence because they stopped a guy from doing his job. That’s why the government of the United States gave me a shredder.

Q: . . . Weren’t you going through your files to get rid of embarrassing documents?

A: Embarrassing? No. Documents that would compromise the national security of the United States, documents that would put lives at risk. . . .

Q: Are you saying, colonel, that . . . allowing the attorney general . . . or his representatives to see documents would jeopardize lives?

A: No. What I--what I’m saying to you, counsel, is that revelations regarding those documents would destroy lives.