THE IRAN--CONTRA HEARINGS : Excerpts: ‘I Was Aware of Threat by Abu Nidal Against Col. North’

Following are excerpts from testimony Thursday by Rear Adm. John M. Poindexter, President Reagan’s former national security adviser, before the congressional committees investigating the Iran-contra affair:

Skirting Boland Amendment

(Senate counsel Arthur L. Liman pressed Poindexter to explain how the Administration could have repeatedly assured Congress that it was fully complying with the Boland amendment while National Security Council staff members were actively aiding the Nicaraguan contras. The amendment barred contra aid by U.S. intelligence agencies.)

Question: Well, did you--do you feel that telling Congress that you were complying with the letter and spirit of Boland, given what the NSC was doing, was a misleading statement?

Answer: . . . I felt that the Boland amendment did not apply to the NSC staff, and I felt that indeed we were complying with the letter and spirit of the Boland amendment.

Q: So that what you’re saying--

A: Now, it doesn’t say that we’re not helping the contras. We were.

(Poindexter’s attorney, Richard Beckler, objects to Liman’s form of questioning, but is overruled by the House committee chairman, Rep. Lee H. Hamilton (D-Ind.).

Q: Admiral, in saying that you are complying with the letter and spirit of the law when you mean that the law doesn’t apply and that you are supporting the contras, you do not consider that to be misleading Congress?

A: The only thing I admit to, Mr. Liman, is withholding information from the Congress. We did not--I have not said that we weren’t helping the contras. We clearly were helping the contras, but we were also trying very hard to stay within the letter and spirit of Boland by keeping the other departments that were covered by the Boland amendment out of the issue.

Q: So that, in saying that you are complying with the letter and spirit of Boland, what you mean is that the NSC was doing the support without the CIA?

A: That was my understanding.

Q: And did the President understand that?

A: I think he did understand that in--

Q: What’s that based on?

A: --in a general way. He understood that the contras were being supported and that we were involved in generally coordinating the effort. . . .

(After another objection from Beckler, Liman asks Poindexter what the President knew.)

Q: Did you brief the President on the fact that the NSC staff was helping the contras?

A: Mr. Liman, as I have testified yesterday, I am not going to answer a question in a positive way unless I can remember a specific conversation. . . . I don’t recall a specific conversation that would allow me to answer your question in an affirmative way.

Q: Right. Now--or a negative way.

A: Or a negative way.

North’s Security

(Liman asks Poindexter whether Lt. Col. Oliver L. North asked for special security protection at his house after his life was threatened by terrorist Abu Nidal. North has testified that it was only after his requests went unanswered that he accepted an expensive security system paid for with Iran arms operation funds.)

A: I don’t recall his requesting one, but I am certain that he did. One regret I have after hearing Col. North’s testimony about that is that I didn’t follow up on it personally. I was aware of the Abu Nidal threat against Col. North. I have a vague recollection that he came to me and indicated his concern. And my recollection is that I asked him to speak to one of my assistants . . . and asked Ollie to talk to them about the problem and see what could be worked out. I don’t recall following up on it. I, as I say, regret that I didn’t, and I suspect Col. North thought at the time that I wasn’t concerned enough about the security of him and his family.

Memory Overtaxed

(Liman asks Poindexter about his congressional testimony last November that it was not until January, 1986, that he learned that a 1985 shipment to Iran described as oil equipment parts was really Hawk missile parts. Other evidence has shown Poindexter knew the contents in November, 1985.)

A: That was my recollection at the time. I thought that was an accurate statement. It obviously is inaccurate.

Q: Now, Admiral, you’re a man who prides yourself on memory. Fair to say?

A: I have a reasonably good memory, but I have also--I have, up until my year as national security adviser, I have never been hit with so many issues in such a short period of time. There was a lot of activity that had happened over that previous year and the events of November of 1985 until November of 1986 were very far from my current memory.

Q: Wasn’t the Hawk shipment a memorable event, in that it was a disaster? (Iran had complained that the parts were outdated and demanded replacements.)

A: Not necessarily, I--

Q: “Not necessarily,” you keep using--

(Beckler objects, demanding that Poindexter be allowed to finish his answers.)

A: Mr. Liman, I don’t know how a person’s memory works. I am telling you, at the time, I did not remember it, and that is an honest answer. . . .

North’s Notes

(Liman asks Poindexter about notes taken by North that would have shed light on what Poindexter knew and when about the controversial 1985 shipments.)

Q: On (Nov. 21, 1986), did Oliver North come into your office with his spiral notebook?

A: That’s correct. This was the afternoon of the 21st.

Q: And did he tell you that he had in that spiral notebook some notes that indicated that you knew that it was Hawk shipments, that the President had approved it?

A: That is correct. He came in sometime middle to late afternoon with one of his old spiral notebooks, and said that he had just pulled these out of his files and gone back through to try to reconstruct what had happened in November of ’85. And he reported that conversation with--

Q: Did--

A: --with me at the time. I told him that I didn’t recall it, but I didn’t question that it happened. I’m sure it did happen.

Q: Did you reach a conclusion as to what Oliver North was going to do with his notebooks?

A: Yes. I, from--well, something he said, and I don’t recall exactly what it was, but I recall, as he left the room, that I had the impression that he was going to destroy that notebook. And--

Q: Did you tell him not to?

A: I didn’t tell him not to.

Q: Now if what you were interested in was telling the Congress and the public the truth about what was known about the November shipment and the fact that the President had approved it, why didn’t you say to Oliver North: “Don’t destroy the note?”

A: . . . My recollection was that there was nothing in the note that described whether or not the President had approved, in Geneva, before the operation started, the shipment of the Hawks, and that--the whole plan to get the hostages back that the Israelis had come up with. And that, in my mind was the crucial issue at the time, not related to what Col. North had just read to me.

(Liman asks why Poindexter thought North would destroy the notes.)

A: I don’t think I really particularly focused on that at the time. The working notebooks and the working files, I have never considered as official documents and it was perfectly all right with me if Col. North destroyed his personal notebooks and working files that he had. . . .

The Long Silence

(Liman asks Poindexter why he waited until this week to state publicly that he had not informed the President of the use of Iranian arms sale proceeds to benefit the contras.)

Q: Admiral? You said that one of the reasons you did not tell the President about this was because you realized that it would be controversial and you wanted the President to be able to deny it.

A: That’s correct.

Q: Now, all of a sudden (in November, 1986) the controversy that you had anticipated if this became public when you approved it in February, 1986, had occurred. Right?

A: Would you repeat that again?

Q: Well, hadn’t the controversy now occurred. . . ?”

A: Yes, that is a statement of fact.

Q: Did--can you tell us why you didn’t then stand up and say: “I, Adm. Poindexter, made the decision and did not tell the President of the United States”?

A: Well, Mr. Liman, that’s a hypothetical question and before I made the decision to retain attorneys, I was obviously giving it a lot of thought, but I did not want to make that kind of decision until I had had an opportunity to consult with attorneys, and after I did, I followed the advice of my attorneys.

Q: And now, you talked about how much you wanted . . . to provide the President with deniability.

A: Correct.

Q: Now you--deniability usually, in covert operations has another word, an adjective that proceeds it, called “plausible deniability.” Right?

A: Yes, that’s the usual term of art.

Q: Did you make any contemporaneous record in your notes or any other place at the time that you decided to give the President deniability, that you were not going to tell the President?

A: No, I did not write that down.

Q: So that you created a situation where it would be only your word to corroborate that of our commander-in-chief.

A: That is correct.

Q: I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.