DECISIONS, DECISIONS : While Their Teams Struggle, These Two Managers Endure : TOM LASORDA : More Often Than Not, He Makes the Correct Move

When the cameras focus on him in the Dodger dugout, Tom Lasorda usually is shown in profile. His hands are buried in his back pockets, his stomach is spilling over his belt and his jaw is often working on gum or a home-plate umpire.

It could be a clever robot constructed in the Dodger manager’s image, for all we know. Some perceive Lasorda as little more than a public relations creation, a cartoon character who recites Dodger Blue gospel, consumes mounds of pasta, hugs players after home runs and engages in animated arguments with umpires.

What is not always apparent, or maybe just overlooked, is that Lasorda actually manages the Dodgers. The moves he makes, the lineups he manipulates, often determine or alter the course of a game.

But when people study him as a strategist, they often find much to question and criticize, justified or not.

While Angel Manager Gene Mauch is looked upon as somewhat of a baseball intellectual, Lasorda is remembered as the guy who pitched to Jack Clark in the 1985 National League playoffs when almost an entire city urged him not to.

The situation, for those with short memories: With two runners on and first base open in the ninth inning of a tie game, Lasorda let Tom Niedenfuer pitch to Clark instead of walking him to load the bases. The result was a three-run homer and a trip to the World Series for the St. Louis Cardinals.

The fallout from that decision has haunted Lasorda and caused considerable damage to his professional reputation. No matter how many good decisions he might make, there always will be someone protesting, “Yeah, but this is the genius who pitched to Jack Clark!”

In charting Lasorda’s decisions over a one-month span, however, it appears that he makes far more correct moves than incorrect ones. That, perhaps, is one reason why he has remained the Dodger manager for 10 seasons.

More than anything, Lasorda seems a creature of habit. He is a manager who plays percentages more than hunches, who sees black or white and ignores the gray.

Lasorda, however, is more than just a button-pusher in a tight uniform. Occasionally, as he did in the period between July 16 and Aug. 15, he will defy the odds and go with a, uh, gut feeling. Later, he may regret it. See Jack Clark, 1985.

Even now, Lasorda still is sensitive about that infamous decision. In fact, if you question any of Lasorda’s questionable moves, he will fervently defend most of them. Just last month, Lasorda exploded at a reporter--this one--for asking why he had sent a runner home from third on a ground ball to first. He concluded a 10-minute screaming session by derisively saying: “Why don’t you watch the game and learn something.”

For the last month, Lasorda has been watched, his decisions analyzed.

PLAYING PERCENTAGES

Like most managers with longevity, Lasorda does not often waver in his managerial style. There has to be a good reason for Lasorda to go against his philosophy, but it sometimes happens.

In the 24 games charted, Lasorda always called for such basics as a sacrifice bunt or a hit-and-run play when they were needed. The problem was that his players often failed to execute.

The basis for nearly all of Lasorda’s more difficult decisions is past performance and the percentages.

Before the start of each series, Lasorda gets an updated, detailed scouting report on the opponent. He also has a list of how each opposing pitcher and hitter performed against individual Dodgers in previous series and seasons.

Lasorda usually plays the percentages. He will send up a left-handed pinch-hitter if there is a right-hander pitching, or he will bring in a left-handed reliever to face a left-handed batter.

Nowhere is Lasorda’s dependency on percentages more evident than in his pinch-hitting. In the 24 games charted, Lasorda sent up pinch-hitters--or had probable cause to do so and didn’t--37 times. He made a percentage move 29 times, resulting in seven hits. In the five times that Lasorda defied the odds, he got two hits.

Considering that the Dodgers’ pinch-hitting average through Aug. 15 was .167 and their team batting average was only .256, the pinch-hitting averages during the games charted does not seem poor.

Usually, Lasorda will go to any length necessary to ensure that the left-right principle is followed.

On Aug. 11, for instance, against the Cincinnati Reds, injured pitcher Bob Welch was pulled for a pinch- hitter. Because of injuries and the fact that Tom Montgomery, a right-hander, was pitching for the Reds, Lasorda had put all available left-handed hitters in the starting lineup.

Determined to make a percentage move, Lasorda sent Fernando Valenzuela, a good hitter for a pitcher, to the plate for Welch. Lasorda had used Valenzuela earlier this season in similarly desperate situations, and Valenzuela had gone 0 for 3. This time, though, he singled to left, starting a rally that gave the Dodgers’ the win.

Not all of Lasorda’s percentage moves, however, are successful.

One that backfired occurred July 22 against the Cardinals. The Dodgers were leading, 1-0, in the bottom of the eighth inning. They had runners on first and second with one out and Mickey Hatcher, the club’s second-leading hitter at the time, coming up against left-hander Greg Mathews.

Cardinal Manager Whitey Herzog brought in right-hander Lee Tunnell to pitch to the right-handed Hatcher, who had gone 0 for 3 against Mathews. Lasorda countered by replacing Hatcher, who hits 71 points better against left-handers, with left-handed pinch- hitter Danny Heep, who had been 2 for 24 as a Dodger.

Herzog, playing the percentages himself, then summoned left-handed reliever Ken Dayley. Lasorda then brought in right-hand hitting Alex Trevino, who was 0 for 3 lifetime against Dayley.

Trevino grounded sharply into a double play, ending the threat, and the Dodgers eventually suffered a two-run loss.

Lasorda was forced to overlook the percentages again on July 27 against the Giants, when he sent Trevino to pinch-hit against right-handed reliever Scott Garrelts in the 11th inning of a tie game with a runner on first.

Lasorda had already used all of his left-handed hitters, and Valenzuela was the only other left-handed alternative.

Bringing up Trevino didn’t appear to be a bad move, though. On April 22 in San Francisco, Trevino had produced a game-winning pinch-double off Garrelts in the ninth inning.

As is the case with most sequels, this one disappointed. Garrelts struck out Trevino, then struck out Pedro Guerrero, ending the threat.

Usually, when Lasorda shrugs off the percentage move in pinch-hitting, catcher Mike Scioscia is involved.

Lasorda usually does not want to remove the left-handed hitting Scioscia because he needs Scioscia’s defense. Through Aug. 15, Scioscia was hitting .278 against right-handers, .236 against left-handers.

On Aug. 5 against the Reds, the Dodgers trailed by four runs in the eighth inning but had a runner on first with one out. Red Manager Pete Rose pulled right-handed starter Ron Robinson and brought in left-hander Rob Murphy to face Scioscia, 0 for 2 lifetime against Murphy.

Trevino was available to pinch-hit, but Lasorda stayed with Scioscia, who struck out.

Four days later, against the Braves, the situation arose again. Atlanta Manager Chuck Tanner summoned left-hander Ed Olwine to pitch to Scioscia with two runners in scoring position. Scioscia delivered an RBI single.

In that case, however, Lasorda might have wanted Scioscia to stay in the game to handle rookie pitcher Shawn Hillegas, who was making his major league debut. Besides, the Dodgers had a four-run lead.

A week earlier against the Braves, Lasorda had used all of his right-handed pinch-hitters against left-hander Zane Smith. So, he turned to Scioscia to hit in the pitcher’s spot, and Scioscia drove in a run with a single.

Sometimes, Lasorda’s percentage-playing flies in the face of statistics. He continued to call on the left-handed Heep to pinch-hit, even though Heep had been 0 for 15 in that role. Heep’s pinch-hitting slump continued during the 24 games charted.

On July 19, Lasorda brought in Heep to hit for the pitcher over fellow left-hander Landreaux with a runner on third and two outs against Pittsburgh Pirates right-hander Mike Dunne. Heep grounded to second.

The next night, Lasorda called on Heep again and he flied out. The night after that, July 22 against St. Louis, Heep was involved in the aforementioned Hatcher decision but did not hit.

On July 27, Heep was the only left-hander available to pinch-hit for the pitcher against Giant right-hander Jeff Robinson. He struck out. A similar situation arose on July 31 in Atlanta, when Heep grounded to first with runners on first and third.

Finally, on Aug. 8 against Atlanta, Heep produced. Summoned to pinch-hit for pitcher Orel Hershiser with two out and nobody on in the fifth, Heep singled to right. He later advanced to third but was stranded there.

That same game, hitting in the same pitcher’s spot as Heep, Landreaux hit a home run off right-handed reliever Gene Garber. Six days earlier, Landreaux was sent up against Garber with a runner on third and two out in the seventh. He weakly grounded to first.

The Landreaux and Heep sagas indicate that Lasorda ultimately will have success playing the percentages on pinch-hitters, provided he is patient enough to wait.

PITCHING PUZZLEMENTS

Maybe it is merely fallout from the Jack Clark decision, but Lasorda seems criticized more for his pitching decisions than anything else.

Among the complaints:

--He keeps his starting pitchers in too long, exhibiting a lack of faith in his bullpen.

--He will go with a “hot” reliever until the pitcher either has cooled or burned out.

--He hesitates to walk a good hitter with first base open to get a force play. Again, see Jack Clark.

The monitoring showed that Lasorda occasionally does leave in starters too long, but mostly because he hasn’t had a consistently “hot” reliever to use.

As for the open-base criticism, Lasorda walked the hitter almost every time he faced that situation.

Several times this season, Lasorda has been questioned about leaving in a shaky Valenzuela. The pre-1987 Valenzuela had the ability to work out of jams and could pitch effectively even on off days.

That is not the case this season.

In seven starts during the 24 games charted, Valenzuela had two complete games, one of which he lost. But there were several instances when Valenzuela just didn’t have it, but Lasorda delayed turning to his bullpen.

On Aug. 10, against Cincinnati, Valenzuela took a 2-0 lead into the sixth. He gave up a leadoff walk, then a double and a sacrifice fly that scored a run.

After yielding another walk one out later, he had runners on second and third with switch-hitter Kurt Stillwell pinch-hitting. Stillwell delivered a double, scoring both runners.

There had been only token movement in the Dodger bullpen during that Red rally, and Lasorda stayed with Valenzuela in the seventh. In that inning, he gave up a one-out walk to Eric Davis, who stole second and third and scored on Dave Parker’s single. Parker, a left-hander, had previously had two hits off the left-handed Valenzuela.

“I never even thought about taking (Valenzuela) out,” Lasorda said afterward.

On July 26, against Chicago, Lasorda decided to pull Valenzuela in mid-inning, but it still proved too late. Valenzuela had struggled but took a 5-4 lead into the sixth. After he had given up the tying run and then hit Bob Dernier with a pitch to load the bases, Lasorda brought in right-hander Brian Holton to face right-handers Ryne Sandberg and Andre Dawson. Holton got out of the jam with only an infield single by Dawson, but it scored the go-ahead run.

There are games, however, in which Lasorda is rewarded for his faith in Valenzuela--or maybe fear of the bullpen.

On July 16, Pittsburgh had runners in scoring position in five innings, but Valenzuela worked out of each jam. He also got surprising support from his infielders, who turned four double plays.

Valenzuela, though, isn’t the only Dodger starter who has been left in to carry on when a reliever was ready to help out.

On Aug. 13, against Cincinnati, Hershiser took a 2-0 lead into the eighth inning. He gave up a leadoff home run to Kal Daniels and, one out later, had runners and second and third. Lasorda had left-hander Matt Young and right-hander Holton warming up but stayed with Hershiser.

Hershiser struck out Barry Larkin for the second out. But Tracy Jones, a left-handed pinch-hitter, singled home two runs for a 3-2 Cincinnati lead. Then Hershiser gave up a run-scoring triple to Stillwell.

Finally, Lasorda yanked Hershiser in favor of Young. Rose brought in right-handed pinch-hitter Dave Concepcion, whose subsequent run-scoring single made it 5-2, Reds.

Perhaps one reason Lasorda has disregarded warning signs of fatigue in his starters is because he has yet to find a bullpen stopper. He usually brings in relievers according to the percentages, although he is partial to leaving Young in even if he is facing right-handed hitters.

The open first base problem? During the month charted, Lasorda walked batters with first-base open six times. The move worked three times, and resulted in runs three times. Twice, when a hitter could have been walked with an open base and wasn’t, run-scoring hits followed.

In one game, July 19 against Pittsburgh, that strategy worked and failed in the same inning.

Holton relieved left-handed starter Rick Honeycutt with runners on second and third with one out. Left-handed pinch-hitter Andy Van Slyke was walked intentionally, loading the bases. Holton then gave up consecutive run-scoring singles to right-handers Jim Morrison and Mike Diaz.

Later in the inning, Holton intentionally walked left-hander Sid Bream with two outs, putting runners on first and third and giving the Dodgers a chance at a force play. It worked--sort of. Holton accidentally walked Junior Ortiz, a right-hander, again loading the bases, but Dunne, the pitcher, grounded out.

Another open-base situation in which the “right” move produced the wrong result occurred Aug. 2 in Atlanta.

The Braves had runners at second and third against left-hander Brad Havens with Dale Murphy at the plate. Havens intentionally walked Murphy, loading the bases. Up came switch-hitter Ted Simmons, who had gone only 5 for 22 against Havens in the American League.

Simmons doubled in three runs.

Valenzuela faced a similar situation Aug. 5 in Cincinnati. With runners on second and third and one out, Lasorda had Valenzuela intentionally walk left-hander Nick Esasky to load the bases, even though a right-hander, Concepcion, was the next hitter.

Perhaps Lasorda had consulted the performance charts on this one. Esasky had a .423 average against Valenzuela, whereas Concepcion was batting just .232 against him.

Concepcion delivered a run-scoring single.

Then, there was the continuing problem of Jack Clark. On July 22, Welch had a 1-0 lead in the ninth, the Cardinals had runners at first and second with none out and Clark was at the plate.

Obviously, a manager doesn’t put the winning run on first in that situation. But Clark stung the Dodgers’ again anyway, hitting a three-run homer for a 3-1 Cardinal win. Perhaps Lasorda should have a blanket rule to avoid Clark whenever possible.

“Lasorda is my favorite manager,” Herzog said. “He pitched to Jack Clark.”

RETAIN YOUR STUBBS

When Lasorda is in his right mind--that is, when a left-handed pitcher opposes the Dodgers--first baseman Franklin Stubbs usually finds himself on the bench.

As he did with Greg Brock and other unproven young hitters, Lasorda began the season playing Stubbs against right-handed pitching and sitting him down against lefties.

But last month, Lasorda reversed his thinking and let Stubbs hit against left-handers, apparently trying to determine whether he is capable of producing.

The experiment, cut short in early August when Stubbs suffered a dislocated shoulder, was inconclusive. But it did begin to indicate what Lasorda suspected all along--that Stubbs hits much better against right-handers.

Against right-handers during the period studied, Stubbs went 6 for 28 with three home runs. Against lefties, Stubbs went 1 for 15. Stubbs faced seven different left-handers in a five-game span and managed only a single off the Giants’ Atlee Hammaker.

Early in the study, Lasorda benched Stubbs against left-handers Bob Kipper of Pittsburgh and Mathews of St. Louis. Hatcher, Stubbs’ replacement, went 1 for 6 with a home run.

Stubbs had his most frustrating night July 27 against the Giants. He went 0 for 1 against left-handed starter Kelly Downs, 0 for 2 against left-handed reliever Joe Price, and 0 for 1 against left-hander Craig Lefferts.

Compounding his frustration, Stubbs struck out with a runner in scoring position in the ninth against right-hander Jeff Robinson.

But Stubbs erased the memory of those earlier failures in the 12th inning, when he homered off Garrelts, a right-hander, and gave the Dodgers a 6-5 win.

Afterward, Stubbs worked his way through reporters to shake hands with Lasorda.

“Thanks for not giving up on me,” Stubbs said.

Lasorda smiled and said: “Forget it.”

WHO’S ON THIRD?

Before he became the Dodgers’ manager, Lasorda was the team’s flamboyant third base coach.

He would wave his arms at oncoming runners like a New Yorker hailing a cab, signaled baserunners to slide by flopping on his belly, and averaged maybe a hug an inning. During a particularly arid offensive drought in late July, Lasorda decided that a change was needed. He had tried most everything else, so he went back to coaching third base until the team lost a game.

He lasted four games.

On July 26, after Lasorda’s second straight win as a third base coach, he was not in a good mood. He apparently had heard that some reporters were questioning a move he had made at third.

In the bottom of the sixth, with the Cubs leading, 6-5, the Dodgers had Scioscia on third and Tito Landrum on first with one out and pinch-hitter Landreaux at the plate. Landreaux hit a grounder to first that Manny Trillo had to backhand. Lasorda sent the slow-footed Scioscia home from third, thinking that Trillo would throw to second for a double play.

Instead, Trillo threw Scioscia out at the plate. Landrum, however, made it to third on the play and Landreaux to second. Steve Sax, the next batter, doubled in both runners for a 7-6 Dodger win.

Lasorda’s contention was that the first baseman would almost always try for the double play, so sending the runner from third is automatic.

Some believe that might be true on a ball hit to either second base or shortstop, but not to either third or first base. Anyway, the play was nearly forgotten after Sax’s game-winning double.

Afterward, this reporter jokingly asked: “Are you going to fire the third base coach for sending home Scioscia?”

Bad decision.

Lasorda, genuinely angry, picked up the conversational ball and threw a high, hard one. He stalked around his desk, expletives flying like beach balls in the stands.

“I had to send him,” Lasorda, screamed. “I’d look pretty stupid if didn’t. I was waiting for some (expletive) to ask me about that.”

The reporter screamed back: “Yeah, well I’m the (expletive) who asked. So what?”

Luckily, Jack Clark’s name wasn’t mentioned.