A Nobel for a Work in Progress : Arias Deserves His Prize, but Only U.S. Can Deliver Peace

Since the beginning of the Central American crisis in 1981, there have been many attempts to pacify the region and negotiate an agreement among its warring parties. None has succeeded, but President Oscar Arias Sanchez of Costa Rica has come closest, getting the other four Central American presidents to agree to give his proposal a try. Now Arias at least has a Nobel Peace Prize to show for his efforts. He deserves it, and the Nobel committee in Oslo also merits congratulations for its selection.

Arias’ pacification efforts, in substance, are not terribly different from preceding attempts. Since 1981, the rough contours of a deal in Central America have been relatively well understood: an end to U.S. aid to the Nicaraguan contras and an end to any outside aid to the insurgents in El Salvador; a general reduction in arms levels in the region; the geopolitical neutralization of Nicaragua; a cease fire and negotiations in El Salvador, and some form of national reconciliation in Nicaragua that did not try to reverse at the bargaining table the Sandinistas’ revolutionary victory of July, 1979.

The Arias plan has gone further than other attempts, and has greater chances of success, partly for reasons not of its own making--the Iran-contra scandal and Ronald Reagan’s weakened presidency--but also as a result of its author’s talents and action.

Oscar Arias has not hesitated to speak out clearly, and to do so where it counts: in Washington and in Managua, where the ultimate decisions concerning the key issues of the Central American crisis are made.

In marked contrast to other pacification efforts, Arias has not hesitated to explicitly state that continued American aid to the contras is a major obstacle to peace in Central America. In the face of President Reagan’s vow that he will support the contras to his last breath, Arias reminds Washington that the Central American peace plan is doomed if Congress approves $270 million in additional funding for the contras. Moreover, Arias has made these points in the United States, where opponents of the Reagan Administration’s policies toward Nicaragua can make the best use of them.

Indeed, Arias has for all practical purposes established a formal alliance with the House and Senate Democratic leadership to block more funding for the contras. While this strategy entails great risks--Arias and the Democrats may lose, and even if they win, the Administration can make tiny and indebted Costa Rica pay a high price for its boldness--it is the only approach that has any possibility of success.

It has been clear for some time now that no Central American agreement can work without the United States’ consent, and that neither the nations of the area nor even all of Latin America can force the United States into accepting an arrangement that it does not want. And the Reagan Administration is adamantly opposed to any agreement that leaves the Sandinistas in power. The logical conclusion is to work with those who can impose an agreement on the Administration: Congress, if only by cutting off funds to the contras.

Arias has understood this and acted in consequence. He has already harvested the first fruits of this tactic, in addition to the peace prize: meaningful concessions from the Sandinistas, and the establishment of a serious negotiating dialogue with them.

Arias and the comandantes in Managua agree on few things, and are worlds apart in terms of their political preferences. But both accept that they have something to gain from helping each other. In Arias, the Sandinistas have finally found a valid interlocutor; they can make concessions that will obtain tangible, important results. This is the meaning of their reopening of La Prensa and Radio Catolica, freeing a number of political detainees and allowing the return of some opponents, such as Bismarck Carballo, the director of the church radio station. And there will have to be even more concessions made along these lines.

For his part, Arias has understood that no negotiating process in Central America will work if it requires symmetrical concessions and procedures. This is why he has not called for direct talks between the rebels and the Nicaraguan government--as he did in the case of El Salvador--but only for a cease-fire between both camps to be mediated by Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo. This is also why he has insisted on a suspension of U.S. aid to the contras without symmetrically demanding an end to Soviet and Cuban aid to the government in Managua. Arias has tacitly accepted the undisputable fact of regional life: that Ronald Reagan’s contras cannot be placed on the same level with the Sandinistas, or even with the El Salvador’s guerrillas.

Oscar Arias has a prize he deserves, and Central America has a chance to achieve the peace that it desires. In the United States, those who support Arias must oppose Reagan, and in Latin America those who support peace must help Arias--and with more than lip service and joint communiques. A recurring rumor has the Reagan Administration primed to punish Arias by cutting or delaying aid to Costa Rica. If that happens, Arias will need much more than words of praise and honors.

DR