Treaty Games

As Secretary of State George P. Shultz prepares for a visit to Moscow next week, both U.S. and Soviet officials are being cautiously optimistic about the prospects for wrapping up a medium-range-missile treaty. As Shultz acknowledged the other day, however, there are still some problems that could derail not only the treaty, under which the United States and the Soviet Union would eliminate all their medium-range and shorter-range missiles, but also an early Washington summit meeting between President Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev.

Verification provisions are still in dispute. Potentially, however, the biggest problem is the renewed insistence by the Soviets that the pending treaty allow them to keep some of their shorter-range missiles until West Germany’s 72 Pershing 11-A missiles and their American-controlled warheads are dismantled, too.

The West German government pledged a few weeks ago that the Pershings, while not covered by the prospective U.S.-Soviet treaty, would be dismantled by the time American and Soviet missiles are removed. Washington gave similar assurances about the warheads aboard the German Pershings. The Soviets seemed satisfied at the time, but are now insisting that these assurances be written into the treaty.

On the surface the demand sounds reasonable enough. Since the West German Pershings are essentially under U.S. control, the Soviets are entitled to assurances that the missiles will be eliminated. As the Soviets must well know, however, there will be no treaty if they insist on formally including the West German missiles in the agreement. It is fundamental and appropriate American policy that the United States cannot be put into a position of dealing away the military forces of its allies in bilateral negotiations with Moscow. To do so would destroy the Atlantic Alliance.

It is true that the West Germans conceivably could renege on their pledge, in which case few people would blame Moscow for holding back on the destruction of an equivalent force of Soviet missiles--treaty or no treaty. Given the strong public sentiment in West Germany in favor of getting rid of the missiles, however, that eventuality would be very unlikely to arise.

Anatoly F. Dobrynin, a top adviser to Gorbachev, voiced optimism during a visit to Bonn on Tuesday that the problem will be ironed out when Shultz goes to Moscow. Soviet Ambassador Yuri V. Dubinin says the same thing, as does top U.S. arms adviser Paul H. Nitze. Let’s hope that they are right, because unwise and unnecessary Soviet obstructionism plays into the hands of conservative Republican senators who are cranking up to block the treaty.

Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) and 19 other senators sent a letter to President Reagan last month charging the Soviets with violating the 1972 anti-ballistic-missile treaty. The senators asked that the Administration report to Congress on the matter by December--and meanwhile refrain from signing any new agreements.

The charges involve two old radars that have been seen at an electronic installation near Kiev. Administration officials are split over the radars’ purpose, but the appropriate place to pursue the matter is within the Standing Consultative Commission--established by Washington and Moscow as the appropriate forum for such questions.

Quite plainly the group led by Helms is less interested in the radars than in blocking the Euro-missile agreement and a prospective summit visit by Gorbachev. The Administration should not let itself be manipulated by anti-treaty forces. If the Soviets genuinely want an agreement--and the evidence indicates that they do--they should forgo last-minute stalling for marginal advantage.